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Abstract 
 
This thesis provides the first evidence on how ownership structure and corporate 
governance relate to market liquidity in the Caribbean.  The research is based on the premise that 
both corporate governance and ownership concentration can impact on corporate disclosure 
which in turn have implications for market liquidity. Based on panel data of 71 firms from three 
selected Caribbean markets − Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad & Tobago − results show that 
firms with concentrated ownership are associated with lower liquidity. Moreover, the direction of 
the association depends on the identity of the largest shareholder. Specifically, family firms and 
firms with foreign holding companies are more liquid than government firms. Although the 
second largest shareholding does not appear to matter to liquidity, there is some evidence 
showing that firms with foreign holding companies as the second largest shareholder are less 
liquid. Caribbean firms suffer from poor corporate governance but this study is unable to 
establish a significant relationship between corporate governance and liquidity. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Liquidity is a core element of stock market development since a liquid market can provide 
allocational efficiency and aid economic growth (Bencivenga et al., 1996; Levine, 1991).  
Liquidity is an immediacy of exchange (Demsetz, 1968) characterised by resiliency, depth, 
tightness, immediacy, and breadth (Sarr and Lybek, 2002). Efficient markets require liquidity so 
that investors can trade any amount of a security without adversely affecting its price. Yet market 
imperfections exist which may have implications for liquidity. Kyle (1985) posits that liquidity is 
a “slippery and elusive concept”, because of market risks and associated costs. Stoll (2000) 
suggests that “frictions” exist that impact price formation. Market risks, associated costs and 
frictions impair liquidity through adverse selection in trading with an informed party, reduction 
in the availability of floating shares, and lack of disclosure and transparency. 
For emerging economies like those in the Caribbean,1 having a liquid market is essential. 
Marlon Yarde (2006), general manager of the Barbados Stock Exchange, stresses the key 
importance of liquidity and argues that the best way to achieve improved liquidity is through a 
common trading platform approach. This move would create a fair and well-informed market 
for financial securities, and ultimately one that is internationally competitive. A key objective of 
the CARICOM 2  Single Market and Economy is the free movement of capital through an 
integrated capital market, such as a regional stock exchange. In order for this to happen, a 
structure of effective corporate governance is crucial to attract local and foreign investors, and to 
broaden and deepen the capital market. Despite the adverse effects that poor corporate 
governance has on market liquidity (Brockman and Chung, 2003), to date, there is no Caribbean 
                                                          
1
 Caribbean in this paper refers to Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago, where the larger stock exchanges are 
located. 
2 CARICOM stands for Caribbean Community. 
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code of corporate governance, only poorly administered Companies Acts. This inadequacy can 
impede investor interest in the region and capital market development.  
Poor regulatory systems, inexpertness of directors plus negligence in exercising due care 
and diligence on the part of directors have led to serious consequences in the Caribbean. In 
Jamaica in the 1990s, for example, six of the nine commercial banks, five insurance companies, 
and a third of all merchant banks along with several building societies were deemed insolvent 
and subsequently closed. In Barbados, Trade Confirmers Limited, a finance based company 
collapsed, left depositors out of pocket to the sum of US$1.2 million in 1987.  The failure of the 
Trinidad & Tobago based Colonial Life Financial Group in December 2007 was the most 
serious in the region. 3 It was the largest conglomerate in the Caribbean, encompassing over 65 
companies in 32 countries with consolidated assets amounting to US $16 billion.  
As in most emerging economies, concentrated stock ownership is a salient feature of 
Caribbean firms, with an average blockholding (according to our data) of 63%, where 
blockholding is defined as shareholding in excess of 5%. In the presence of highly entrenched 
controlling shareholders, corporate resources can be diverted for personal gains at the cost of 
outside minority shareholders (Johnson et al., 2000; Stultz, 1990). Effective corporate 
governance serves to protect shareholders’ rights by mitigating such perverse insider behaviour. 
Unequivocally, corporate transparency about ownership and control is a good thing. Of the 
various governance mechanisms, board monitoring is seen as a necessary mechanism to keep the 
alignment of interest between managers and shareholders, and between controlling shareholders 
and outside minority shareholders. For this reason, the board of directors forms the central 
internal control mechanism (Fama, 1980).  
The effectiveness of board monitoring depends on its size, composition, and leadership 
structure (Jensen, 1983) and so agency theory posits that the board should comprise a majority 
                                                          
3
 Colonial Life Financial consolidated assets equalled to around 30% of the Caribbean region’s GDP (Monroe and  
Wu, 2011). 
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of independent directors to reduce “agency costs” of modern capitalism (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). As well, board monitoring should reduce information asymmetry amongst the various 
stakeholders in the firm (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). In sum, effective board monitoring can 
enhance market liquidity. 
 
1.2 Research Aims, Questions and Contributions 
This thesis aims to investigate the effect of ownership concentration and corporate 
governance on liquidity in three Caribbean exchanges − Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad & 
Tobago − during the period January 1, 2005 through December 31, 2011. The stock markets of 
the Caribbean provide a unique opportunity to investigate the impact of ownership structure and 
corporate governance on liquidity for several reasons. First, little research has been done on 
frontier markets like the Caribbean and as yet there has been no study of the determinants of 
liquidity in these markets. The existing literature primarily focuses on the U.S. and Canada, where 
stock markets are well developed with different institutional features. It is unclear whether the 
effect of ownership structure and corporate governance on liquidity in these well-developed 
markets is equally applicable to Caribbean markets. The evidence from the Barbados, Jamaica, 
and Trinidad & Tobago stock exchanges may shed new light on the association between 
ownership structure, corporate governance, and liquidity. This information may assist regulators 
and policy makers to better understand liquidity issues that will prove beneficial to Caribbean 
and other frontier markets. Finally, given that internal corporate governance is weak in firms in 
the region, investigating board monitoring will reveal the extent of investor protection.  
The first research question asks how ownership concentration and structure relate to 
liquidity. To answer this question, the thesis draws on the adverse selection and trading 
hypotheses. The second question asks what the association between corporate governance and 
liquidity is. To answer these questions, three liquidity proxies are used: quoted Spread, Zero Return, 
and turnover. Since trading will be concentrated in the stocks for investors who have 
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information, volume will be greater (Stoll, 1978). Two measures of turnover are used, Turnover1 
captures trading frequency and Turnover2 captures costs per trade. Further the Amihud (2002) 
measure serves as the measure of price impact. 
Two empirical tests are conducted in this thesis. First, fixed effects panel regressions are 
carried out on the developed model. Compared to purely cross-sectional data, panels often 
contain far more information than single cross-sections and thus allow for an increased precision 
in estimation (Hoechle, 2007, pg1). Second, to further verify the results, the model uses 
exchange, year, and industry dummies to reduce concerns about omitted variables bias regarding 
variation in parameters over time, such as economic development, market size, and differences 
in accounting and regulatory standards. This research contributes to the existing literature by 
examining the role of large shareholdings and board monitoring in the provision of liquidity in 
frontier markets. Distinct from past research, this study examines both the percentage ownership 
and identity of the largest and second largest shareholders. Four mutually exclusive groups are 
identified: institutions – domestic and foreign; holding companies – domestic and foreign; 
family; and government. In contrast to other studies that focus on common measures 4  to 
evaluate board monitoring and effectiveness with regards to liquidity, this study constructs a 
weighted corporate governance index based on standards adopted from Institutional Shareholder 
Services. While the corporate governance index is similar to that of Brown and Caylor (2006) 
and Chung et al. (2010), it is more focussed on board attributes contributing to monitoring and 
independence.  
 
1.3 Summary of Findings 
The empirical analyses show that high ownership concentration, as measured by the largest 
shareholding and total blockholding, is negatively related to liquidity. This relationship is further 
                                                          
4
 The most common measures are the percentage of independent directors; CEO and Chairman separation; 
independence of audit, nominating, compensation committees and board meetings held. 
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examined to see which the dominant shareholder(s) drives liquidity. Family firms and firms with 
holding companies as the largest shareholder are more liquid than government firms. Although 
the second largest shareholding does not matter to liquidity, there is some evidence showing that 
the identity of the second largest shareholder does; specifically, firms with foreign holding 
companies as the second largest shareholder are less liquid.  
Contrary to expectations, results show an insignificant relationship between corporate 
governance and liquidity. Pertaining to board independence, the study is unable to establish a 
significant relationship between board independence and liquidity, due in part to differences in 
defining independence across the exchanges. 
 
1.4 Thesis Layout 
The thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 describes the institutional framework of the 
three selected Caribbean countries: Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad & Tobago. Chapter 3 
reviews the literature on liquidity, ownership, and corporate governance, particularly the board of 
directors. Chapter 4 develops the research hypotheses for the study, followed by Chapter 5 
which describes the research method. Chapter 6 presents the empirical results and Chapter 7 
presents the conclusions of the study, the limitations, and the contributions to the literature as 
well as to practice. 
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Chapter 2 
The Institutional Setting 
2.1 Introduction 
In the face of globalization, emerging economies are challenged to improve their 
investment climate5 if they genuinely seek economic growth and prosperity. One such channel to 
achieving this goal is to implement and enforce an efficient corporate governance system that 
reduces information asymmetry. Ultimately, a more liquid stock market ensues, which plays a key 
role in economic growth (Bencivenga et al.1996; Levine, 1991).  
In the Caribbean, there have been inadequate levels of transparency and monitoring, 
creating opacity which obscures the existence of corporate governance problems from 
stakeholders. An additional problem is that publicly listed firms in the region are characterised by 
the prevalence of concentrated ownership, which creates a governance risk for minority 
shareholders. Concentrated ownership allows large shareholders to have voting rights in excess 
of their cash flow rights; construct ownership pyramids; and control the board of directors (La 
Porta el al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000). When this happen, firm opacity increases and 
controlling shareholders form coalitions (Zwibel, 1995, Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000) to 
obscure their siphoning off private benefits6 from minority shareholders. 
Even though several Caribbean countries have responded to these challenges by 
commencing evolutionary reforms, there is currently no Caribbean code of corporate 
governance. This unfinished business impedes investor interest in the region and slows down 
capital market development. Better corporate governance can make investments less risky and 
more attractive by enhancing stock market liquidity, which in turn leads to more investment 
(Holstrom and Tirole, 1993). 
                                                          
5
 An investment climate is ‘a menu of policy, regulatory and institutional factors that provide incentives sufficiently 
robust to induce the private sector to invest in socially desirable projects’ (Weingast, 1995). 
6 For instance favours conferred by a firm, access to inside information, or perquisites of control. 
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This chapter outlines the institutional setting of three Caribbean countries that have a 
more established stock exchange and which form the basis of this thesis: Barbados, Jamaica, and 
Trinidad & Tobago. An examination of several institutional weaknesses, along with key issues 
and challenges at the firm level will form a part of the discussion.  
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 examines economic growth and stock 
market development. Section 2.3 outlines of the importance of corporate governance in the 
Caribbean, with a focus on the evolution of corporate governance in response to the issues that 
require a better regulatory regime. Section 2.4 presents a summary of the chapter. 
 
2.2 Economic Growth and Stock Market Development 
2.2.1 Economic Growth 
A system of effective corporate governance is necessary to engender investor confidence 
and attract liquidity to capital markets. Theoretically, stock markets are supposed to spur 
economic growth by providing a boost to savings and increasing the quantity and quality of 
investment.7 A liquid market can create long term investment, hence economic growth through 
lower transaction costs (Levine, 1997). Economic growth is vital for emerging economies as 
macroeconomic stability is very important (Andrianaivo and Yartey, 2009).  
Over the past decade, the market capitalization of equity markets has increased 
significantly in emerging economies,  accounting for about one-third of world GDP  (at market 
exchange rates) compared with around one-fifth in the late 1990s (Bailey, 2010). The Caribbean 
is no exception. Thomas and Watson (2005) find that the development of the stock exchanges 
has contributed to economic growth in the Caribbean, 8  despite the fact that the region is 
                                                          
7 Levine and Zervos (1998) find that stock market development plays an important role in economic development;   
Garcia and Liu (1999) examine macroeconomic variables in  Latin American and Asian countries and find that  
GDP growth and domestic investment are important factors; El Wassal (2005) finds that economic growth was a 
leading factor in the growth of emerging stock markets. 
8
 The study was conducted on Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. 
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considered to be low to middle income developing, with an average per capita income of less 
than $3,600 (U.S.).   
Over the past fifty years, the per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in the Caribbean 
has been prone to significant variation. For example, between 1961-2002, the average per capita 
GDP growth for Caribbean countries was 2.8%, higher than Latin America in each decade but 
lower than that in East Asia, especially Singapore and Hong Kong. From the 1980s to the 1990s, 
there was a spate of declining per capita growth rates in the Caribbean as the average annual per 
capita growth rate declined from 4.3% to 2.2% in the 1980s and then to 1.9 % in the 1990s 
(World Bank, 2005.) This pattern of volatility shows why a liquid stock market is imperative to 
boosting investment and economic growth (Levine and Zervos, 1998) in the Caribbean. 
 
2.2.2 Stock Market Development 
Stock market development strongly relies on investors’ confidence as measured by market 
size, liquidity, volatility, integration with world capital markets, and market regulation (Garcia 
and Liu, 1999).9 Table 2.1 shows that market capitalization as a per cent of GDP, a fundamental 
indicator of stock market development, ranges from 35.86% in the Bahamas to 136.39% in 
Barbados. Although one anomaly must be noted – Barbados’s market capitalization as a 
percentage of GDP in 2010 exceeded that of the U.S. (by 18.86%). This resulted from a block 
trade by Ansa McCal (Barbados) Limited, where 2,853,526 shares were traded at $11.75 in 
October. Besides, Caribbean markets are small with few listed companies compared to Brazil, 
Malaysia, and the U.S., as shown by the value traded as a per cent of GDP and turnover ratios in 
Table 2.1. For example, about 0.4% of all outstanding shares on the Barbados Stock Exchange 
(BSE) were on average traded once during 2010. In addition, the number of listed firms on the 
Jamaica Stock Exchange (JSE), Trinidad & Tobago Stock Exchange (TTSE), and  BSE has not 
changed much since inception (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2).  
                                                          
9
 Espinosa and Kwon, 2009 
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Table 2.1 
Indicators of stock market development, 2010 
 
 
 
Table 2.2 
Overview of major Caribbean stock exchanges at establishment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country
Number of 
Listed 
Companies
Market 
Capitalization 
(percent of 
GDP)
Value 
Traded 
(percent of 
GDP)
Turnover  
(percent)
GDP per 
Capita 
Barbados 26 136.39 0.50 0.40 12855.50
Jamaica 38 47.30 1.50 3.29 4794.72
Trinidad & Tobago 35 59.60 0.70 1.17 15492.17
Emerging Markets
Brazil 373 74.00 43.20 66.43 7553.82
Malaysia 957 172.60 37.90 27.07 6909.10
Developed Markets
France 901 75.30 32.30 42.48 39028.38
United States 4279 117.50 208.80 189.06 45588.58
Source: World Bank, Word Bank Indicators, 2010
Exchange
Year 
Established
Number of 
Companies
Market 
Capitalisation 
($billion)
Jamaica 1968 34 14.23
Trinidad and Tobago 1981 32 8.14
Barbados 1987 12 11.01
Source: Selected Exchanges
10 
 
Table 2.3 
Selected Caribbean exchanges: Legislative framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stock exchange
Year 
Created Securities Traded Relevant Legislation Amendments
Jamaica Stock Exchange 1969 Private debt and equity
BOJ Act, 1960; Banking 
Act,1992; Company Act 1965; 
Financial Services Commission 
Act, 2001
Company Act 
2004
Trinidad and Tobago Stock 
Exchange 1991
Debt, equity, mutual 
funds
Securities Industry Act 
1981,amended 1995; Financial 
Institutions Act, 1993, Company 
Act 1995
Company Act 
2007
Barbados Stock Exchange 1981 Stock, mutual funds
Securities Exchange Act, Cap 
318A, of 1982; Securities Act 
2001 -13,The Financial 
Institutions Act, 1996-1, 
Company Act 1982
Company Act 
2007
11 
 
The legislative framework is outlined in Table 2.3. In addition to these Acts, there are 
provisions in other laws such as the Insurance Act, Financial Acts, and Freedom of Information 
Act, 1999 (Trinidad and Tobago.) 10  Regardless of the legal framework for capital market 
activities in the Caribbean, the region has had its spate of financial crises, which have been 
attributable to weak legislative and regulatory infrastructure, poor internal governance, and 
insufficient regulatory collaboration (Williams, 2008).   
 
2.2.3 Trading systems 
The BSE, JSE, and TTSE operate an automated order driven system and prices are 
determined through matching of buy and sell orders. Automation of the exchanges was 
introduced to BSE, JSE, and TTSE in 2001, 2000, and 2005 respectively. The number of trading 
days per week varies across the exchanges. For the BSE, prior to March 2007, the number of  
trading days was three per week; for  the TTSE, prior to April 2008, the number of trading days 
was  three  per week; and for the JSE,  five days per week. The three exchanges have brokers 
who act as intermediaries, facilitating the matching of orders and execution of trades as well as 
traders who execute orders on behalf of brokers. There are no market makers, orders are 
executed via market orders or a limit order book, and prices arise from the interaction of traders. 
Orders submitted electronically are queued according to price, the best of which takes priority. 
Although the orders are time stamped, price priority has precedence. 
In the trading process, there are liquidity traders and informed traders. Liquidity traders 
use the efficient price from the limit order book to make trading decisions. These investors are 
not adequately informed to determine which firms are high or low risk. So when they submit 
limit orders, their orders will fill quickly if they overprice their bids and under-price their offers. 
Informed traders on the other hand know the fundamental value of the asset and may submit 
limit orders. They will submit market orders when the current market value of the asset deviates 
                                                          
10 Barbados-  Insurance Act Cap 310; Jamaica- Insurance Industry Act 1971, repealed in 2001; Trinidad & Tobago –  
Insurance Act (Chapter 84:01, No. 6 of 1980); the Bahamas- the Insurance Act 2005. 
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a lot from their private fundamental value (Rosu, 2009). If limit order traders and informed 
traders trade on the same side of the market, informed traders orders often do not fill. 
 
2.3 Development of Corporate Governance in the Caribbean 
Several steps have been taken to improve corporate governance in the region since 1999. 
This section traces the development of corporate governance in the Caribbean. The important 
dates are: 1999, 2003, and 2005. 
 
2.3.1 Corporate Governance Initiative 1 (1999-2003) 
Following a number of Commonwealth meetings and publications during 1989-1994, a 
three year strategic plan (1997-2000) aimed at improving corporate governance was endorsed by 
the Commonwealth Heads of Government Edinburgh Economic Declaration in October 1997. 
The Commonwealth Secretariat documented the following consequential factors as matters of 
concern for emerging Commonwealth markets: lack of accountability; out-dated company laws; 
and the absence of formal regulations with weak professional institutions markets. The 
Caribbean was no exception as it had experienced financial failures11 and had overly complex 
                                                          
11
 Jamaica experienced financial collapse in commercial banking and insurance sector as this was attributed to 
financial liberalization,  a critical tenet of the “Washington Consensus”, a framework of economic policies based on 
the ideology of “free market” fundamentalism and marketed by the Washington Financial Institutions via their 
structural adjustment programs for developing countries in the late 1980s early 1990s.  Resulting from same were 
increases in the number of financial institutions from 67 in 1989 to 105 in 1995, with the major increases being 
among building societies and merchant banks.  During the same period, the deposit liabilities of commercial banks 
increased from J$10.5 billion in 1990 to J$89 billion in 1995, and the contribution of the financing and insurance 
services to GDP rose from 9% in 1987 to 50% in 1994.   The Jamaican authorities were not unmindful of the need 
for financial regulation, but the task proved beyond them.  Between 1995 and 1998, six banks, accounting for about 
60% of total commercial bank deposits, five life insurance companies, accounting for over 90% of premium income 
in the business, one third of all merchant banks, and some building societies had to be rescued by government 
injections of capital or close (Blackman, 2010). 
Trinidad and Tobago had several major incidents of potential regulatory failure going back to the 1980s. 
During the recessionary period 1986 to 1993, the Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC) had to intervene in eight 
cases of failed non-bank financial institutions. The total liability to the DIC was TT$191 million as over 13,000 
depositors had to be compensated; January 2009: collapse of CLICO caused the Trinidad and Tobago economy to 
decline 3.5%. In 1986, Trade Confirmers a finance company in Barbados collapsed. The company was not 
regulated by the Central Bank and offered interest rates on deposits that were in excess of what the other regulated 
entities were offering. Depositors lost all their money. 
13 
 
ownership structure, board interlocks, and continuous government intervention into the 
operation of boards.  
Thus, included in the mandate was the Caribbean. The objective for the region was to 
establish and strengthen a national corporate governance code relevant to Caribbean countries. 
In 1999, a workshop on “Towards a Caribbean Governance Program” was held in Trinidad & 
Tobago with the following objectives: 
i) to establish and/or strengthen a national corporate relevant to Caribbean countries;  
ii) to devise national/regional codes of conduct;  
iii) to promote national strategy to develop best practices and debate in corporate governance; 
and  
iv) to train cadres of directors conversant with best practices in corporate governance.  
These objectives were discussed under four thematic headings, namely i) board accountability 
and power sharing; ii) corporate governance in the global economy; iii) corporate governance – 
issues, roles and responsibilities; and iv) CEOs, company secretaries, and non-executive 
directors. In keeping with the workshop’s objectives, the expected outcomes included: 
international recognition of Caribbean countries as priority locations for investment; and the 
genesis of foreign direct investors in all Caribbean countries. However, the workshop was 
unsuccessful in garnering a unified corporate governance consensus despite the presence of 
salient interlocking directorships and complex ownership structure in the region. 
The salient interlocking directorships of Caribbean firms bring into question the 
effectiveness of monitoring by the board. A survey conducted on 30 listed companies 12  in 
Trinidad & Tobago reports that 25 companies had at least one director presiding on the board of 
another company. It further reports that from a total of 231 directors, 15% presided on a second 
board and 4% sat on three or more boards. Overall, firms that had directors sitting on more than 
two boards controlled 55% of the total value of assets of the surveyed firms. These firms 
                                                          
12 Survey conducted by Trinidad and Tobago Securities and Exchange Commission 1997-2003. 
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represented 67% of the total market capitalization. On one hand, board interlocks may enhance 
information transfer across firms, which can be a good thing. The flip side of this however is 
increased rivalry amongst competing firms through these shared relationships. This may affect 
corporate strategy and practice,13 a claim refuted by Devos et al. (2009) who contend that board 
interlocks do not affect firm value. Following on from this, in a 2002 McKinsey and Company 
Global Investor Opinion Survey, investors identified the following as areas of concern that 
needed reform: more timely board disclosure (52%); more independent board (44%); and more 
effective board practices (38%).14  
Caribbean firms are typically controlled by family,15 institutions, the local government, or 
conglomerates. Ownership concentration is high with 76% of majority shareholders being 
institutional investors (Kerr, 2007).  This concentrated ownership can contribute to conflicts of 
interest between majority and minority shareholders, if the majority shareholders find it 
beneficial to work for management instead of monitoring them (Pound, 1988). Simultaneously, if 
vigilant oversight is absent, large shareholders are more likely to exploit minority shareholders 
(Faccio et al., 2001). According to William Layne (2010),16 retired Permanent Secretary - Ministry 
of Finance (Barbados), inadequate supervision in Caribbean firms resulted in switching of 
resources within groups from regulated to non-regulated entities to get around restrictions 
placed on the regulated entities. For example in Trinidad & Tobago, Colonial Life Financial 
Limited (CLICO), a privately owned conglomerate, had operations in 28 countries through at 
least 52 subsidiaries and associates, both public and private. This company failed to heed 
numerous regulatory requirements regarding solvency issues from 1994 through 1997. As a 
consequence, in 2009 the Governor of the Central Bank of Trinidad & Tobago announced that 
                                                          
13 Haunschild(1993), Haunschild and Beckman (1993) find that corporate acquisition activity is emulated across 
firms that have interlocking board members; Gulati and Westphal (1999) find that firms are more likely to form 
strategic alliances, such as a joint venture. 
14
 Percentage of investors listing change as the top reform priorities for companies. 
15 Examples include Ansa McCal in Trinidad & Tobago; Goddard’s and Prestige Holdings in Barbados; and Jamaica  
 Broilers in Jamaica.   
16 http://da-academy.org/Financial_Crisis_in_the_Caribbean.pdf 
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the Central Bank was taking over the operations of CLICO. It is noteworthy that CLICO had 
majority ownership in the largest commercial bank, the Republic Bank of Trinidad (55%), as well 
as Angostura Holdings (78%), the Caribbean’s leading rum producer, both of which are listed on 
the Trinidad & Tobago Stock Exchange. Layne suggests that a contributory factor to the 
company’s demise was an inadequate or indecisive regulatory environment. The economic 
dominance of conglomerates has been a barrier to the development of corporate governance in 
the Caribbean. 
The 1999 corporate governance workshop failed to stimulate a unified Caribbean 
corporate governance movement as there was no sense of urgency for the implementation of 
corporate governance principles from the government. Notwithstanding the absence of cohesive 
action, limited corporate governance measures were undertaken by some countries in the region 
in the form of training. Unfortunately the effort was hampered by the lack of formal codes, 
unclear guidelines for accountability by corporate board members, and power sharing in areas 
such as risk management and internal controls. For these reasons, a legal framework is required 
to provide clarity and uniformity across companies, industries, and countries, thereby enforcing 
practices of good corporate governance. This framework should enhance investor protection.  
Despite the establishment of a legal framework of investor protection, it is really 
enforcement that is of vital importance. Without a solid framework of corporate governance 
which is enforceable, potential providers of capital will avoid the stock market.  
 
2.3.2 Corporate Governance Initiative 2 (2003- 2005) 
In 2003, the first Caribbean corporate governance forum was held at the headquarters of 
the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, St. Kitts and Nevis. In attendance were 120 participants 
from 16 countries.17 The aims of the forum were to get regional stakeholders to discuss and 
                                                          
17
 Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica,  
Montserrat,   St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Marten, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and    
Tobago. 
16 
 
explore ways of enhancing corporate governance within the public and private sectors; identify 
key corporate governance issues relevant to the investment and development needs of the 
region; and assess the current state, emerging needs, and priorities of corporate governance in 
the region. 
On conclusion, the Caribbean Technical Working Group (CTWG) was formed and in 
2005, a draft recommendation of a Caribbean code of corporate governance in securities market 
was issued.18 The code included key issues related to the board of directors, disclosure and 
transparency.  
 
2.3.3 Principles of Good Corporate Governance 
The institutional factors affecting corporate governance in the Caribbean include the 
corporate legal environment, which is based on common law, and the regulatory bodies, 
including Securities and Exchange Commission; Central Bank; Stock Exchange; the Registrar of 
Companies; and Institutes of Chartered Accountants within their jurisdiction. The Private Sector 
Organization of Jamaica (PSOJ), a self-regulatory body from the private sector, forms part of the 
institutional framework for corporate governance within the Caribbean. In 2006, the PSOJ 
launched the first code of corporate governance which was based on the 2003 combined code of 
Financial Reporting in the U.K. The code provides the ‘guiding principles’ and was prepared to 
conform to the Jamaican business climate, and companies can opt for a ‘comply or explain’ 
approach. In 2009, a second edition of the Jamaica code of corporate governance was issued 
under the auspices of the PSOJ, approved and adopted by the Jamaica Stock Exchange (JSE) 
Rule 414 – corporate governance guidelines and disclosure, 2010.  
Improvements are also seen in the board structure and process, where board members are 
given rules regarding transparency and their duties and obligations to shareholders. However, the 
following areas need improvement: i) more protection for minority shareholders as companies 
                                                          
18 See Appendix 1 
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only have to ‘comply or explain’; and ii) the establishment of a Caribbean-wide code of corporate 
governance.  
Despite these initiatives, the Caribbean lags behind the world in corporate governance, 
according to the World Bank index of governance quality constructed by Kaufman at al. (2010).19 
Table 2.4 shows how the Caribbean countries fare relative to the U.S. on the quality of 
governance. With the exception of Barbados, Caribbean countries suffer from poor governance 
relative to the U.S., which has an average index of 1.19. These findings related to the U.S. are 
similar to Berglof and Claessens (2004). On a ranking ranging from -2.5 (weak) to 5 (strong), the 
average rating across the Caribbean varies from -0.06 (Jamaica) to 0.92 (the Bahamas). Measures 
of political stability, rule of law, and control of corruption are weak factors, as depicted by the 
negative scores of – 0.04, -0.22, and -0.37 respectively. These results indicate risks of investing in 
the region. 
Further, the results imply poor investor protection, an indication of much needed 
improvement in laws and enforcement. The scores are also an indication that capital markets in 
the region are not developed enough to attract investors. So, to foster a productive business 
environment in the Caribbean, policy makers will need to ensure that better monitoring systems 
are in place to garner security for the investor, reduce corruption, and increase transparency 
through measures of good corporate governance. 
 
 
                                                          
19
 See Appendix 2 
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Table 2.4 
World governance indicators 
 
 
 
  
the 
Bahamas Barbados Jamaica
Trinidad 
& Tobago
Antigua 
and 
Barbuda Dominica Grenada
St. Kitts 
and 
Nevis St. Lucia
St. Vincent 
and the 
Grenadines
OECS 
Average
United 
States
Voice and accountability 1.00 1.21 0.44 0.52 0.31 1.01 0.84 1.12 1.24 1.18 0.95 1.16
Political Stability and absence 
of Violence/Terrorism
0.97 1.07 -0.40 -0.04 0.92 1.01 0.58 1.07 0.81 0.92 0.89 0.31
Government Effectiveness 0.98 1.41 0.18 0.25 0.49 0.66 0.17 0.72 0.81 0.72 0.59 1.44
Regulatory quality 0.51 0.46 0.30 0.49 0.63 0.44 0.39 0.45 0.44 0.41 0.46 1.42
Rule of law 0.68 1.04 -0.50 -0.22 0.98 0.69 0.11 0.71 0.82 0.86 0.70 1.58
Control of corruption 1.35 1.43 -0.37 -0.35 1.33 0.74 0.44 1.05 1.23 1.05 0.97 1.23
Average 0.92 1.10 -0.06 0.11 0.78 0.76 0.42 0.85 0.89 0.86 0.76 1.19
Source: World Governance Indicators, 2010
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Directors 
In the draft Caribbean code of corporate governance principles (2005), Principle V refers 
to the timely and accurate disclosure of information on all matters related to the entity inclusive 
of ownership and governance. Principle VI speaks to directors of listed firms being identified as 
independent. The Companies Acts (Table 2.3) require a minimum of three directors, at least two 
of whom are not officers or employees of the company or its affiliates. Guidelines for boards, as 
outlined by the Central Banks, have mild variations pertaining to director independence. Boards 
and independence are defined along the following guidelines: 
 Barbados:  
i. Boards should have a minimum of three (3) directors but boards with this low number 
will only be permitted where the level of assets on and/or off balance sheet is less than 
$50 million and there are no third party funds involved. 
 
ii. At least 51% of board members should not hold executive positions with the licensee; 
iii. At least 20% of the board should be independent of affiliates. 
Jamaica: 
i. The board should comprise at least five (5) members, with a sufficient number of 
independent directors to ensure that the entity carries out its mandate. As international 
best practices require that two-thirds of an entity’s board comprise independent non-
executive directors. 
 
Trinidad & Tobago:  
 
i. The board should comprise both executive and non-executive members at least two 
(2) of who should be independent. 
ii. At least 51% of board members should not hold executive positions with the 
licensee; 
iii. At least 20% of the board should be independent of the licensee or its affiliates. 
 
Principle VI of the draft Caribbean code of corporate governance principles refers to board 
responsibilities to ensure strategic guidance of the entity, effective monitoring of management, 
and accountability to the entity and stakeholders. 
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2.4 Summary 
 This chapter presents the institutional setting for Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad & 
Tobago. Caribbean stock markets are small and undeveloped by international standards, with 
concentrated ownership being a prevalent feature of the firms in the region. To bring investors 
to the region, a system of good corporate governance must be established. Although corporate 
governance is a new phenomenon for the Caribbean and is still in its infancy, since the 2003 
corporate governance workshop, there has been a move across the region towards better 
corporate governance. Jamaica issued a code of corporate governance principles in 2006, which 
was updated 2010. Other nations have not done the same as yet; nevertheless they are guided by 
regulatory bodies such as the Companies Act, Central Banks, Financial Services Commission, 
and stock exchanges. This is seen as an evolutionary measure mandated on improving capital 
markets in the region by attracting capital and providing better investor protection. Nevertheless, 
effectual Securities laws aimed at regulating the behaviour of market participants and acting as a 
deterrent for the abuse of information advantages by large investors must be instituted and 
enforced. 
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a review of relevant literature on corporate ownership, corporate 
governance, and liquidity. It consists of four sections. Section 3.2 examines competing theories 
of information asymmetry between large and small shareholders − the trading and the adverse 
selection hypotheses. Section 3.3 reviews the literature on ownership structure and liquidity, 
followed by the literature on the relationship between corporate governance, particularly board 
practices, and liquidity in section 3.4. Section 3.5 summarizes the chapter. 
 
3.2 Adverse Selection and Trading Hypotheses 
Efficient market hypothesis postulates the price of a security contains all information 
available to the market (Fama, 1970). Therefore new information is instantaneously reflected in 
the price and the bid-ask spread will be zero. Price changes should be random and unpredictable 
(Lo and MacKinlay, 1999). But the reality is that not all information is made available to all 
market participants at the same time. This information gap creates an information asymmetry 
and the informed trader may wish to trade as soon as possible.  
As markets are not informational efficient, investors will gather and trade on information 
when satisfactory profit opportunities arise (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). Resultantly, the 
market maker’s defence against potential losses to the informed trader(s) is to set a higher bid-
ask spread thereby passing part of the cost of informed trading to uninformed traders. This is 
because he is not in a position to determine which trades are information driven. Still, this 
situation persists in dealer markets where market makers are the only providers of liquidity.  
In order driven markets like those in the Caribbean, investors place market or limit orders 
and trade with the intervention of a broker acting as an agency trader only. Market orders 
demand immediacy, so they are executed as soon as possible at the best available price. Limit 
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orders allow a trader to set a limit price at which the order might fill, but at the same time, there 
is a risk the order will not execute. Even though an order driven market relies on limit orders to 
supply liquidity, limit orders influence bid/offer quotes and ultimately spreads (Lo et al., 2002). 
Plus investor heterogeneity in beliefs may give rise to differences in trading among market 
participants. Some literature suggests that informed traders prefer market orders (Easley and 
O’Hara, 1987; Rock 1996), for example, when information is believed to be short lived (Anand 
et al., 2005). Yet others disagree as there is evidence that informed traders also use limit orders, 
sometimes even more than market orders (Berber and Caglio, 2005; Bloomfield et al., 2005).  
Previous studies have strived to explain the behaviour of informed traders in the trading 
process using either the adverse selection or the trading hypothesis, or both. However there is no 
consensus. Copeland and Galai (1983) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) show the presence of 
informed traders can impose adverse selection costs between liquidity traders and dealers. 
Accordingly, the adverse selection hypothesis posits that because some investors are more 
informed than others, an information asymmetry arises and this reduces market liquidity. The 
trading hypothesis on the other hand suggests that it is really the lack of trading by blockholders 
that reduces liquidity. This is because in firms with concentrated ownership, the number of 
shares available in the free float is limited and trading frequency reduces. Conversely, when 
blockholders turn their portfolios over more often, liquidity increases (Demsetz, 1968; Schwartz 
and Shapiro, 1992).  
 
3.3 Ownership Structure and Liquidity 
Essentially, the theoretical basis for the ownership-liquidity relationship is anchored mainly 
on agency theory, which seeks to explain the problem arising when the agent (manager) exploits 
the responsibility of control delegated by the principal (owner) to act on her behalf.  Conflicts of 
interests borne through self-interest and opportunistic nature of individuals (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) give rise to information asymmetries between managers and shareholders, and 
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between small and large shareholders (Gomes, 2000). The presence of large shareholders with 
privileged access to firm value information gives rise to information asymmetry (Heflin and 
Shaw, 2000). The greater the information asymmetry, the higher the adverse selection cost, and 
the larger will be the bid-ask spread.  
Research in corporate finance suggests that ownership has become concentrated in the 
hands of family, institutions, individuals and management in contrast to the Berle and Means’ 
(1932) dispersed ownership structure of the modern corporation. For example, Faccio and Lang 
(2001) assert that in continental Europe, family controlled firms are dominant. Claessens et al. 
(2000) find that more than two thirds of firms in nine East Asian countries are controlled by 
either a single shareholder/managers or by relatives of the controlling firm’s family. In a study of 
27 wealthy countries, La Porta et al. (1999) find controlling shareholders are either the state or 
families. In Italy, Volpin (2002) contends that controlling shareholders are the executives of their 
holding companies. 
Large controlling shareholders impose costs on firms, for instance, private extraction of 
benefits (Volpin, 2002) through access to privileged information (Barclay and Holderness, 1989). 
Accordingly, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, page 761) argue that “as ownership gets beyond a certain 
point, large owners gain nearly full control of the company and are wealthy enough to prefer to 
use firms to generate private benefits that are not shared with minority shareholders.” Such act 
of opportunism serves as a short cut to better decision making for buying and selling shares, as 
the required information to do so is readily available. Consequently, when large shareholders 
trade on asymmetric information, market conditions are compromised and so is liquidity.  
The following studies form the core of this literature review as they strive to establish the 
relationship between ownership structure, liquidity, and information asymmetry in different 
countries around the world. More specifically, the reviewed literature classifies large shareholders 
as either blockholders or institutions. Key U.S. based studies include Heflin and Shaw (2000), 
Sarin et al. (2000), Dennis and Weston (2001), Fehle (2004), Schnatterley et al. (2008), Brockman 
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et al. (2009), and Rubin (2007). Studies outside the U.S. include Naes (2004) on the Norwegian 
market; Attig et al. (2006) in Canada; Ginglinger and Hamon (2012) in France; Yosra and Sioud 
(2011) in Tunisia; and Prasanna and Menon (2012) in India. As outlined, most of the studies 
conducted on the relationship between ownership structure and liquidity have been on 
developed economies. 
Varying results are produced from the studies. Sarin et al. (2000) shows that higher adverse 
selection costs are associated with managerial ownership rather than institutional ownership, 
whilst Dennis and Weston (2001) find that spreads decrease with institutional ownership and the 
adverse selection component of spreads. Fehle (2004) finds that ownership type may have an 
informational advantage which leads to an increase in adverse selection costs whilst Schnatterly 
et al. (2008) contend that it is the size of institutional shareholdings that really plays a role in 
adverse selection and liquidity. Pertaining to the trading hypothesis, Heflin and Shaw (2000) state 
that trading activity rather than information asymmetry reduces market liquidity. Among the few 
studies in developing markets, Yosra and Sioud (2011) and Prasanna and Menon (2012) find that 
ownership structure and information asymmetry weaken market liquidity. This disparity in 
empirical results may stem from the fact that large shareholders are heterogeneous in beliefs, 
skills, and even preferences. As the outlined review recounts, institutions are a varied lot (for 
example mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies), and the trading activity of some 
may cause spreads to widen, whilst others contribute to a liquid market. 
Basically, the logic underlying the ownership and liquidity literature is the agency conflict 
between shareholders as the reviewed studies portray. The trading activity of institutional 
shareholders, blockholders, and even insiders impacts on market liquidity. Regardless of the 
methodology used, the reviewed studies typically concur that large shareholdings are 
consequential for a liquid market.  
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3.3.1 Adverse Selection Theory 
The diversification of a firm’s ownership structure can prove influential on corporate 
liquidity. The trading behaviour of blockholders and institutional investors form the review 
based on the adverse selection and trading hypotheses. 
 
Blockholders 
Adverse selection theory predicts that concentrated ownership reduces liquidity by the 
information asymmetry created. Blockholders as monitors have access to valuable private firm 
information, which places them in a better position to know when and how much to trade. 
However this informed trading is costly as it reduces market liquidity. Heflin and Shaw (2000) 
examine the effect of block ownership on liquidity for a sample of 260 U.S. firms for the period 
1988 through 1989. Their study examines both internal and external blockholders to test whether 
or not they contribute to information asymmetry and reduce market liquidity. The liquidity 
measures are relative spreads, effective spreads, and quoted depths. Heflin and Shaw (2000) find 
a strong positive relationship between the percentage of shares held by blockholders, both 
internal and external, and total quoted relative spreads, total effective spreads, and the informed 
trading component 20  of the effective spread. This suggests that internal and external 
blockholders are informed traders whose trading actions reduce market liquidity.  
In a similar informational advantage argument regarding large investors, Naes (2004) 
studies the relationship between ownership and liquidity by using transaction data from a pure 
limit order driven market, the Norwegian equity market. The sample consists of filtered 
continuous transaction data of 94 securities in 88 companies on the Oslo Stock Exchange and 
monthly ownership data from the Norwegian Central Securities Depository (VPS) from 1999 to 
2001. The results show a positive relationship between bid-ask spread and block ownership, 
                                                          
20Adverse selection spreads are measured using Lin et al. (1995) model by estimating the percentage of the effective 
spread attributable to informed trading and Huang and Stoll (1997) model using an aggregate buy/sell indicator.   
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suggesting that blockholders trade on privileged information which reduces market liquidity. 
Other findings of the study show that institutional ownership has no effect on spread, which 
differs from the findings of Sarin et al. (2000). Naes’ result may be related to the issue that 
institutional investors hold diversified portfolios and are liquidity seekers. An incentive for 
portfolio managers is the active management of their portfolios since they are compensated on 
that basis. So, trades will be incentive based rather than information based (Dan and Gorton, 
1997). 
Control 21  is another variable that has implications for the relationship between stock 
market liquidity and ownership structure within the firm. Control is typically denoted by high 
ownership concentration and is not contestable. Ownership concentration is high in countries 
with weak minority shareholder protection and so blockholders are able to extract private 
benefits associated with control (Holderness, 2012). Research indicates that large blockholders 
monopolize ownership structures of firms in the U.S. and other developed countries,22 where 
control is exercised via pyramidal structures, multiple class shares, family, and cross holdings (La 
Porta et. al, 1999). Pyramidal structures allow the group leader to have a lot more control rights 
than cash flow rights over its subsidiaries (Bebchuk et al., 1999). This magnitude of control 
presents an ideal condition for information asymmetry between management, other companies 
in the pyramid, and minority shareholders. Similarly, multiple class shares highlight the difference 
between the proportion of capital and control rights, and give the controlling shareholder the 
freedom to divert corporate resources for their private benefit (Attig, 2007). So it is probable that 
controlling shareholders will capitalize on informational advantages. 
 Attig et al. (2006) investigate Canadian firms, which typically have a highly concentrated 
ownership structure along with the presence of pyramids and multiple class shares that augment 
                                                          
21 Schleifer and Vishny (1997), page 761) argue that “as ownership gets beyond a certain point, large owners gain 
nearly full control of the company and are wealthy enough to prefer to use firms to generate private benefits that are 
not shared by the minority shareholders.” 
22 Schleifer and Vishny (1997); La Porta et al. (1998), Claessens, et al. (2000); and Dennis and McConnell (2003); 
Holderness (2009). 
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shareholder control. Their sample consists of 1,031 Canadian firms in 1996. Given that the 
Ontario Securities Commission requires investors to disclose holdings exceeding 10% of a firm’s 
shares, they use a 10% cut-off for ultimate control and classify firms with at least a 10% ultimate 
shareholder as closely held. For these firms, the ultimate ownership stake and the ultimate 
control stake are calculated.23 The bid-ask spread is computed using intraday data for the first 
quarter of 1996, stamped at 6 second intervals collected from the Toronto Stock Exchange, and 
is used to measure liquidity. Their findings show that firms with a greater deviation between 
ultimate control and ownership have a more severe information asymmetry and poorer stock 
liquidity. So one can say the information asymmetry increases with concentration of ownership. 
This study agrees with the findings of Naes (2004) that concentrated ownership is associated 
with wider spreads, hence lower liquidity. 
Institutional Ownership 
Institutional investors are expanding in numbers worldwide dominating more advanced 
capital markets and a growing number of emerging capital markets (OECD, 2012). Since 
institutional investors have discretionary assets under management, it is possible that institutions 
prefer liquid stocks and large firms (Falkenstein, 1996; Gompers and Metric, 2001; Dahlquist and 
Robertson, 2001). But size has afforded institutional investors the ability to exert influence on 
companies and with this attribute comes an informational advantage gained through exploiting 
economies of scale in information acquisition and processing. Hence they potentially may have 
superior information, a catalyst for information asymmetry. 
There is no universal agreement on the empirical evidence of institutional ownership and 
liquidity, perhaps due to institutional investors being a heterogeneous group. Among others, 
                                                          
23 The firms are classified into two groups – widely-held versus closely-held – at a 10% cut-off of the ultimate 
control stake (Canadian regulations only require insiders to disclose any holding ‘‘beneficially owned, directly or 
indirectly or exercised control or direction’’ over 10% of the shares of the firm). For each closely-held firm, we 
calculate the ultimate ownership stake (UOWS) and ultimate control stake (UCOS). UOWS is measured as 
∑ ∏      
 
   
 
    where OW is the ownership stake at layer i of the ownership chain j. UCOS is measured as 
∑                Where CO is the control stake at layer i of the ownership chain j. Ultimate control stake is equal 
to the product of direct blocks of ownership on the ownership claim. The ultimate control stake is the minimum 
direct block of control on the ownership claim. 
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Sarin et al. (2000) examine the relation between stock liquidity and the fractional ownership of 
insiders and institutions for a sample of 786 firms listed on the NYSE in 1985 and find 
conflicting results. They employ daily weighted bid-ask spread, relative bid-ask spread, and 
quoted depth as liquidity measures and three proxies for information asymmetry.24 Their findings 
show that higher insider and institutional ownership are both associated with wider spreads and 
smaller quoted depth. Additionally, the information asymmetry faced by traders is positively 
related to insider ownership as higher adverse selection costs are associated with managerial 
ownership. There is no relation between adverse selection costs and institutional ownership. So 
basically, managerial ownership but not institutional ownership can be linked to information 
trading. This finding goes against the adverse selection hypothesis that proposes high 
institutional ownership will generate an information asymmetry for the security and therefore 
increase the bid-ask spread. 
Divergent to Sarin et al. (2000), Dennis and Weston (2001) report that information based 
trading is significantly and positively related to institutional ownership. Their sample size is larger 
and is divided into quarters: 5,500 NYSE, AMEX AND NASDAQ stocks per quarter from the 
4th quarter of 1997 to the 4th quarter of 1998. Five measures of the information content of 
trading25are used. Even though the findings show both institutional and insider ownership are 
significantly and positively related to information based trading, the magnitude of the relative 
spread is negatively related to institutional ownership. A possible explanation is the presence of a 
large number of informed investors with perfectly correlated signals increases the competition 
against risk neutral investors, which increases the informational efficiency of prices (Holden and 
                                                          
24 Proxies for information asymmetry: George et al. (1991) by estimating the relative adverse selection component; 
Glosten and Harris (1988) whereby the change in transaction price is related to the signed order flow, the public 
information and change in the sign at the time of the order; Madhavan and Smidt (1991), whereby the expected 
stock value is represented based on public information whilst taking into consideration the effect of private 
information contained in order flow. 
25 Adverse selection component of spread using Huang and Stoll (1997); the price impact of trade using Hasbrouck 
(1991) and Foster and Viswanathan (1993) (HFV); the probability of informed trading, using Easley et al. (1996) 
(EKOP) models; and the quoted bid- ask spread. 
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Subrahmanyam, 1992). When this happens, liquidity increases because the price impact of the 
order flow decreases and uninformed investors will be more likely to invest in the stock. 
Different from Sarin et al. (2000) and Dennis and Weston (2001), Fehle (2004) finds that 
bid-ask spreads decrease with the overall level of institutional ownership. Even though the study 
uses stocks from NYSE like the other two studies, it uses a larger sample and a longer time 
period. In particular, Fehle (2004) uses and distinguishes the impact of the effective spread and 
posted spread26 in ascertaining the adverse selection component of the spread for a sample of 
10,107 NYSE-listed stocks and percentage bid-ask spreads from Fidelity Investments for the 
period 1980–1996. For the overall sample, Fehle (2004) finds that effective and posted spreads 
are affected by the level of institutional ownership. Although there is a negative relationship 
between effective spreads and institutional ownership, further analysis shows the opposite for 
banks and investment managers. Banks and investment companies trade more often as shown by 
high turnover. An explanation for this may be the persistent skill of interim trading by 
institutions (Puckett and Yan, 2011) rather than short lived private information trading. 
Corporate finance literature suggests that wider bid ask spreads are more likely to originate 
from traders who have more information about a particular stock (Amihud and Mendelson, 
1986). Relatedly, a probable influential factor that allows institutional owners to have access to 
better firm information is their investment size. Using this motive, Schnatterly et al. (2008) 
postulate that the size of an institution’s investments will give them better access to private 
information regarding the true value of the firm. The study includes quarterly ownership data of 
the largest institutional shareholders27 of 6,515 firms from the CDA Spectrum database from the 
                                                          
26
 The effective spread is the difference between the highest price at which a security can be sold and the lowest 
price at which it can be bought among all market participants. Whilst the posted spread is the difference between 
the price at which a dealer is willing to sell and the price at which he is willing to but a security. 
27 Largest institutional owner is measured as the percentage of shares held by the single largest institutional owner. 
Also, the shares held by the second largest institutional owner are measured to include as a control in certain 
specifications. This enables the authors to test that it is, in fact, the single largest institutional owner that has 
information advantages and not just large owners generally. In further tests, the largest and second largest 
institutional owners must hold at least 5 per cent of the firm’s outstanding shares. These latter variables are 
motivated by SEC filing requirements, which require 5 per cent or more owners (blockholders) to file additional 
reports. 
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first quarter of 1983 through the third quarter of 1991.28 The design of their study is based 
around the trading behaviour in the NASDAQ market.  In the NASDAQ market, multiple 
market makers compete for trades, hence trading is highly competitive. Thus, the market maker 
has to set a competitive price to attract traders whilst offsetting losses to informed traders. 
Incorrectly anticipating the level of information a trader has is costly. Hence the bid-ask spread 
proxies for the level of information the market maker believes the trader has and the market 
maker’s bid-ask spread proxies the perceived risk of trading with better informed traders.  
Schnatterly et al. (2008) find that the greater the percentage of shares held by the largest 
institutional investors, the larger the bid-ask spread whilst the percentage of shares held by 
smaller institutional owners is related to lower bid-ask spread. The results of the study indicate 
that institutional investors have an informational advantage even in seemingly efficient markets 
and that the larger their proportionate shareholding, the greater their access to firm-specific 
information. Regarding smaller institutional investors, the costs outweigh the benefits of trading 
on asymmetric information, so information acquisition is not really beneficial for them. 
3.3.2 Trading Hypothesis 
Empirical studies document that the larger the market capitalization of a stock, the greater 
its liquidity.29 If market participants are exposed to information asymmetry, then the number of 
investors willing to invest in information acquisition for a particular stock will increase in 
anticipation of the potential gains from the trade (Bolten & Von Thadden, 1998). However, 
when a firm has controlling blocks, the number of shares available for trading reduces, and may 
cause market liquidity to reduce. 
Brockman et al. (2009) expand the work by Heflin and Shaw (2000) by examining the 
relationship between block ownership and total liquidity costs, which they decompose into real 
                                                          
28  This database contains quarterly information on institutional ownership from 13(F) reports filed with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Institutions with $100 million or more in accounts over which they 
exercise discretion must file 13(F) reports with the SEC within 45 days after the end of the calendar quarter. 
Institutional owners need not report equity holdings less than either 10,000 shares or $200,000 in principal and 
market value. 
29 Demsetz (1968); Pagano (1989). 
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and informational frictions30 as suggested in Stoll (2000).31 Their sample consists of 1,225 U.S. 
firms over the period 1996-2001. Three measures are used to compute the adverse selection 
component of spread:32 bid-ask spreads, relative quoted effective bid- ask spreads, and quoted 
depths. Their analyses indicate that it is the lack of trading activity rather than informed trading 
that reduces market liquidity.  
In the presence of a large blockholder, only shares in the free float will trade. Ownership 
concentration can cause a separation between free float and market capitalization. When this 
happens, fewer shares are traded and ultimately reduce liquidity. Also, given the presupposition 
that blockholders may have private information regarding the firm, a higher probability of 
informed trading will cause the bid-ask spread to widen. In France, ownership tends to be 
concentrated and control is enhanced by pyramidal structures and double voting rights. 
Ginglinger and Hamon (2012) examine the free float or trading hypothesis on a sample of 918 
firms traded on the French stock exchange for the period 1998-2003. They find firms with large 
insider blockholder ownership have significantly lower liquidity as there is a positive relationship 
between free float and liquidity. 
A salient feature of the Indian capital market is concentrated ownership. Prasanna and 
Menon (2012) examine the relationship between ownership structure and liquidity for a sample 
of 90 companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange 100 Index from 2009 to 2010. Using the 
Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio, they find that shares held by promoters 33  and domestic 
                                                          
30 Real friction is defined as ‘the real resources used up’ in the liquidity provision process. Trading activity level such 
as volume, turnover, number of trades and trade sizes are important measures. Informational friction refers to 
investors trading on the information.  
31 Stoll’s (2000), p. 1510) suggests that informational friction can be thought of as “the difference between total 
friction (such as the quoted or effective spread) and real friction.” 
32Glosten and Harris (1988); Huang and Stoll (1997); and Lin et al. (1995).  
33 The concept of promoter is enunciated in the Securities Exchange Board of India. It is stated that a promoter is 
neither an agent nor a trustee of a company under incorporation but certain fiduciary duties have been imposed 
upon him both under the English Companies Act and the Indian Companies Act. They have the power of defining 
how and when in what shape and under whose supervision the company shall come into existence. Thus, a 
promoter is a person who exercises substantial control over the company or a person who undertakes all necessary 
steps in the floatation of the company. The relationship between a promoter and a company which he has floated 
must be deemed to be a fiduciary relationship from the day the work of floating the company started .The status of 
the promoter is generally terminated when the Board of directors has been formed and they start governing the 
company. 
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institutions are illiquid. This is consistent with the trading hypothesis; blockholdings reduce 
liquidity as those shares will not be a part of the free float.  
 
3.3.3 Adverse Selection and Trading Hypotheses 
Adverse selection costs are linked with the notion that trading takes place between the 
market maker and an informed trader, while trading friction is related to trading frequency or 
order size. A few studies such as Rubin (2007) and Yosra and Sioud (2011) examine the relation 
between ownership and liquidity in the presence of information asymmetry using both the 
adverse selection and trading hypotheses.  
Rubin (2007) investigates the impact of information asymmetry on ownership level, 
ownership concentration, and firm’s stock liquidity for a sample of 1,369 NYSE firms during the 
years 1999 through 2003. He notes that previous studies 34  tend to focus on insiders, 
blockholders, or institutions without identifying which type of investor is the informed one. 
Accordingly, the study seeks to identify the informed trader given that the classification of 
traders can overlap, meaning that an institutional investor can be an insider, an insider can be an 
institution, and a blockholder can be either or both, and so on. Hence to make the distinction 
clearer, institutions that appear as insiders are excluded from institutional holdings in Rubin’s 
(2007) study.35 Instead the study uses the level of institutional ownership as the proxy for trading 
activities, and institutional owner concentration as the proxy for adverse selection.36  
                                                          
34Evidence of insiders information superiority includes Jaffe (1974); Lin and Howe (1990); Bettis et al. 2000), and 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001). Evidence of blockholders’ information superiority includes Bethel et al. (1988), 
McConnell and Servaes (1990), and Barclay and Holderness (1991). Evidence of institutions’ information superiority 
includes Szewczyk et al. (1992), Alangar et al. (1999), and Bartov et al. (2000).  
35The measure for insider holdings is based on data contained in SEC Form 3 and Form 4.By law, all insiders, 
including all executives, officers, and beneficial owners who hold directly more than 10% of the firm’s shares 
outstanding, must report any transaction on these forms within two business days. The measure for institutional 
holdings is the combined holdings of all financial institutions that report an SEC Schedule 13F but do not report 
themselves as insiders on Form 3 or Form 4. According to rule 16(a)-1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, an 
institutional investor that holds more than 10% of the shares in a company is not considered an insider, and 
therefore is not required to submit Forms 3 and 4. 
36 This is because institutions as a group trade more which can lead to reduction in spread (Gompers and Metric, 
2001).  Ownership concentration determines the incentives of owners to obtain analyse and trade on information 
(Black, 1992; Hartzell and Starks, 2003). 
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While the findings support both hypotheses, liquidity is mostly driven by institutional 
ownership rather than insider ownership. Other findings of the study suggest that liquidity 
increases with institutional ownership due to higher trading activities and decreases with 
institutional blockholdings due to adverse selection. These findings imply that trades carried out 
by institutional blockholders are dependent upon the nature of private information obtained. Or, 
trades by institutions may be driven by ‘window dressing’ whereby institutions (fund managers) 
buy winners and sell losers before accounting statements are made public. 
Emerging markets are found to have a prevalence of pyramid ownership structure, weak 
legal systems, and poor investor protection (La Porta et al., 1998; Lins, 2003), all of which may  
bring about less information contained in stock prices (Morck et al., 2002). Yosra and Sioud 
(2011) study the effect of controlling shareholders and market liquidity in Tunisia, a developing 
economy, where ownership is controlled by pyramidal structures, cross holdings, and non-voting 
shares. In Tunisia, the five largest shareholders on average own more than 80% of the capital 
(Omri, 2003). Their sample consists of 40 listed firms on the Tunisia Stock Exchange, an order 
driven market, from 2001 through 2005 using order-based and trade-based measures of liquidity. 
The Huang and Stoll’s (1997) model 37  is used to examine the adverse selection spread 
component. The order-based measures are effective relative spread and depth, while trade-based 
measures include turnover and the number of trades. The findings indicate that both 
concentrated ownership and pyramidal structures enhance the information asymmetry 
component of the bid-ask spread and decrease liquidity. However, in family firms stocks non-
voting shares increase liquidity as nonvoting shares prevent insiders from trading on private 
information. 
Table 3.1 presents a summary of representative studies on ownership structure and 
liquidity to highlight the gap in existing literature. Even though ownership structure is found to 
be related to liquidity (Attig et al., 2006; Heflin and Shaw, 2000), the relationship may be 
                                                          
37 pt – pt-1  = S/2 x (Qt –Qt-1) +  (α- β) x S/2 x Qt + et 
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endogenous. Other studies attempt to address this problem using simultaneous equations 
(Dennis and Weston, 2001; Rubin, 2007) but face the problem of finding a good instrument for 
the ownership variable that does not co-vary with liquidity. Furthermore the importance of 
unobserved firm specific variables necessitates the usage of panel data approach. 
3.4 Corporate Governance and Liquidity 
In an environment with asymmetric information, investors will be unable to make 
reasonable investment decisions as they are unable to differentiate a good opportunity from a 
bad one.  In keeping with agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983), 
firms should adopt measures of good corporate governance to reduce information asymmetry 
and improve market liquidity. Since better internal corporate governance leads to improved 
market transparency (Chung et al., 2010; Brockman and Chung, 2003; Bacidore and Sofianos, 
2002), the corporate governance mechanism that forms this review is the board of directors. 
Corporate governance embraces board effectiveness and enhanced disclosure since the board of 
directors and information disclosure complement each other in reducing agency problems (Healy 
and Palepu, 2001).  
The board is an important component of internal governance that alleviates agency 
problems in the firm. It provides a monitoring mechanism to protect shareholders’ interests 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983), and mitigates the divergence of interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
At the same time, the board strives to improve the quality and quantity of information released. 
These actions are considered necessary in reducing information asymmetry between managers 
and shareholders, and between majority shareholders and minority shareholders (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986).  
Six key studies on the board’s monitoring role and independence are examined here. Four 
are concerned with board monitoring and liquidity and two with board independence and 
liquidity. The most common measures of board monitoring are the percentage of independent 
directors; separation of CEO and Chairman roles; independence of audit, nominating, and 
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compensation committees; and frequency of board meetings held. Most of these studies use 
separate measures to evaluate board effectiveness.  
 
3.4.1 Board and Liquidity 
A system of good corporate governance improves stock market liquidity by reducing 
information asymmetry.38  According to O’Hara (2001), stock exchanges provide liquidity and 
price discovery, both of which are functions of the degree of transparency of information 
produced by the trading mechanism. Beekes and Brown (2006) suggest that the amount of 
private information of disclosure is positively related to corporate governance, an indication that 
better corporate governance leads to more disclosure. In accordance with this, information when 
disclosed must be monitored by an effective board to ensure compliance with stipulated rules 
and regulations which in turn reduces information asymmetry and improves future liquidity of a 
firm’s securities.39  
Demonstrating how corporate governance affects liquidity, Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) 
investigate corporate governance and information asymmetry around quarterly earnings 
announcements in equity markets, and use bid-ask spread and depths as proxies for information 
asymmetry. Several board characteristics proxy for corporate governance – board independence, 
board structure, board activity, and director’s and officers’ percentage stock holdings. The study 
period is the June and September quarters of 2000 and uses a sample of 345 firms listed on 
either NYSE or the AMEX. The findings show that firms with stronger corporate governance 
have a smaller change in information asymmetry around quarterly earnings announcements. 
Board structure is considered an important aspect of the firm and has evoked continuous 
debate as to what determines the best structure. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that outside 
directors have a greater incentive to actively monitor management than inside directors, and they 
                                                          
38
Welker (1995); Eleswarapu et al. (2004); Chiyachantana et al. (2004); Jain et al. (2008);Chung et al. (2010);   
Matoussi et al. (2004) 
39The cost of capital is reduced (Diamond and Verracchia, 1991). 
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can also act as mediators in disagreements between internal managers. Weisbach (1988) states 
that a board should have outside directors because inside directors are less likely to be effective 
monitors because they will not challenge the CEOs as their careers are tied to them.  Whilst 
Raheja (2005) argues that although outside board members can provide more independent 
monitoring, they are less informed about the firm’s constraints and opportunities. Inside board 
members, on the other hand, have more specific firm information but at the same time may have 
distorted objectives due to private benefits. To alleviate this, firms should organise their board in 
a manner which is consistent with the costs and benefits of monitoring (Linck et al., 2008).   
Levesque et al. (2010) investigate how director monitoring relates to the level of 
information asymmetry, as reflected in the quoted spread, for a sample of 145 firms on the 
Toronto Stock Exchange 300 Index in 1998. The analysis uses the following related variables: 
the composition of the board, the composition of the audit committee, the role of the chief 
executive officer on the board, and directors’ share ownership. They find that firms with a larger 
proportion of outside directors have a lower level of information asymmetry.  
Board independence has become a focal point of corporate governance improvements in 
both developed and developing economies. Gillan and Starks (2000) report that in 1991 
institutional investors used the stockholder process to pressure firms for more board 
independence. The resource dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003) posits that the 
presence of independent directors on the board enhances information flow, reduces uncertainty, 
and hence protects firm resources. Since an independent board has no direct links to 
management, better oversight of the firm’s operations/ management is anticipated. An 
independent board is likely to improve the informational efficiency of equity markets and market 
liquidity (Klein, 2002; Choi et al., 2007).   
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Foo and Zain (2007) examine the relationship between board characteristics and liquidity 
in Malaysia40 using a sample of 481 public listed firms in 2007. Three measures of liquidity are 
used: trade based measure – trading volume; order based measure – quoted depth; and price 
based measure – zero return occurrences. Independent variables include the percentage of 
independent directors on board; the percentage of independent directors on the audit 
committee; the percentage of non-executive directors on the board; and the number of board 
meetings during the year. The study finds that more independent and diligent boards are 
associated with higher liquidity. 
Corporate governance requires that boards be independent and the sub-committees be 
composed of majority independent directors. However, Adams and Ferreira (2007) suggest that 
independent directors, as advisors and monitors, reduce information flow and worsen the 
asymmetric information problem. Aspris and Frino (2011) find that firms with greater board 
independence have narrower spreads and a greater speed of adjustment to new information. 
Their sample consists of 239 Australian listed firms from 2004 to 2009. Information pertaining 
to current and past directors, including position, appointment, and cessation dates; age; and 
gender were collected. Director independence is determined from information disclosed in the 
annual reports and the liquidity measure used is the quoted spread. For the price impact measure, 
the average of the quote mid-points at five trades after and before a trade reference point, 
whether buyer or seller initiated, is calculated. Adverse selection costs are measured using the 
Huang and Stoll (1997) spread decomposition model. The findings indicate that firms with more 
independent boards facilitate a more transparent environment with improved disclosure and a 
higher level of liquidity. This can allow prices to more effectively incorporate new information. 
Chung et al. (2010) examine differences in liquidity due to internal governance for a 
sample of NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ stocks for the period 2001-2004. They hypothesize 
that poor corporate governance gives rise to greater information asymmetry between inside and 
                                                          
40
 Study was conducted on the companies listed on the Main Board of Bursa, Malaysia. 
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outside investors, enabling liquidity providers to post wider bid-ask spreads. They construct a 
governance index with 24 financial and operational transparency related attributes taken from the 
Institutional Shareholder Services. Liquidity proxies are quoted spreads and effective spreads. 
Two measures of information-based trading are used – the price impact of trades and the 
probability of information based trading. 41  Their findings show find that firms with better 
corporate governance exhibit greater stock market liquidity, a lower probability of information 
based trading, and a smaller price impact of trades.  
Developing markets are characterized as having poor regulation and/or enforcement along 
with high ownership concentration (La Porta et al., 2000). These characteristics can contribute to 
poor liquidity and corporate governance especially in the presence of controlling shareholders. 
Prasanna and Menon (2012) analyse the relationship between firm level governance and liquidity 
for a sample of 90 firms listed on an order driven market, the Bombay Stock Exchange, from 
2009 to 2010. Corporate governance variables used are independent directors, participation in 
board meetings, directors’ attendance at general meetings, duality, and the number of governance 
committee meetings. Stock market liquidity is measured using Amihud’s illiquidity (2002) ratio 
and its modified form used by Bortolotti et al. (2007). The findings show that better governed 
firms have higher stock liquidity as information asymmetry is reduced due to the actions of a 
functional board. 
Table 3.1 summarizes the empirical research on corporate governance and liquidity. These 
studies will help highlight the gap in the existing literature. 
 
3.5 Summary and Conclusion 
On a whole, the empirical evidence shows that ownership concentration and type; board 
monitoring and independence; and information asymmetry can have implications for attaining a 
liquid stock market. Even though the results in the studies are at times conflicting, driven in part 
                                                          
41 Probability of information based trading as derived by Easley et al. (1996). 
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by differences in sample size, study period, and the inclusion and choice of control variables, the 
overall consensus is that ownership structure and the practice of good corporate governance 
through improved transparency will afford investors greater ability to peruse happenings within 
the firm, particularly the practices of management. This can lead to a liquid market which 
ultimately aids capital market development.  
The extant studies on the association between corporate ownership, board effectiveness, 
information asymmetry, and the resulting effect on liquidity do not consider the context of 
Caribbean markets. Most studies are limited to developed markets of the U.S. and only a few 
extend to emerging/frontier markets (India and Tunisia). Most of the previous studies employ 
high frequency proxies of liquidity in testing the ownership/liquidity relationship, without 
exploring a mixture of high frequency/low frequency proxies to see if they would yield similar 
results. In the same vein, the empirical analyses of corporate governance and liquidity use a 
number of similar variables, only a single study explores the usage of an index that combines 
different governance standards. 
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Table 3.1 
Summary literature review on liquidity and ownership 
 
 
 
 
Author Year
Sample Size 
and Period
Ownership 
Variable
Liquidity 
Variable
Adverse 
Selection Methodology Findings Conclusion
Frank Heflin                                            
Kenneth Shaw
2000 260 firms           
259 NYSE;             
1 - AMEX        
1988-1989
Total 
blockholdings
Total 
quoted 
depth; 
relative 
spread; 
effective 
spread
Lin, Sanger 
&Booth 
(1995);Huang 
and Stoll (1997)
Cross sectional 
regression
Positive relations with 
total quoted  relative 
spread; total effective 
spread; negative 
relations with total 
quoted depths
Yes
Randy Naes 2004 94 firms - 
Norway       
1999-2001
Blockholding by 
insiders, state, 
institutional, non-
institutional, 
individual foreign
Quoted 
spread; 
effective 
spread; 
relative 
spread
Glosten and 
Harris (1988); 
George et al 
(1991)
Fixed effect 
panel 
regression and 
Granger 
causality.
Positive relation with 
ownership 
concentration and 
spreads
Yes
Najah  Attig                                             
Wai-Ming Fong                                 
Yoser Gadhoum                             
Larry H.P. Lang
2006 1031 firms- 
Canada       
1996
Ultimate 
ownership
Average 
daily 
closing bid-
ask spread; 
average 
variable 
bid-ask 
spread
Glosten-Harris 
(1988)
Cross sectional 
regression
Ultimate ownership  
leads to wider bid-ask 
spread but no evidence 
of severe information 
asymmetry if ultimate 
control does not 
exceed ultimate 
ownership
Yes
41 
 
Table 3.1 (continued) 
 
 
 
Author Year
Sample Size 
and Period
Ownership 
Variable
Liquidity 
Variable
Adverse 
Selection 
Variable Methodology Findings Conclusion
Atulya Sarin                                             
Karen Shastri                                  
Kuldeep 
Shastri
1999 786 firms
AMEX & 
NYSE             
1985
Insiders and 
Institutions
Relative bid-
ask spread; 
daily weighted 
average bid-
ask spread; 
quoted depth
George at al. 
(1991); 
Glosten & 
Harris 
(1988); 
Madhaven & 
Smidt (1991)
Ordinary least 
squares 
regression and 
simultaneous 
equations
Positive relationship between 
insider ownership and spreads 
and adverse selection costs; 
positive (negative) relationship 
with spread (depth) and 
institutional ownership. Overall 
liquidity decreases with 
concentrated ownership
Yes
Patrick Dennis                                         
James Weston
2001 5500 firms –
NYSE, 
AMEX, 
NASDAQ; 
Q4 1997 – 
Q4 1998
Insiders and 
Institutions
Quoted bid-
ask spread
Huang and 
Stoll (1997); 
Hasbrouck 
(1991); 
Foster and 
Viswanathan      
(1993); 
Easley et al. 
(1996)
Two stage           
least squares 
regression
Information based trading is 
positively and significantly 
related to institutional and inside 
ownership. Spread is negatively 
related with institutional 
ownership
No
Frank Fehle 2004 10107 
stocks - 
NYSE         
1980-1996
Institutions Posted 
spread, 
effective 
spread
Feasible 
generalized        
least squares
Effective and posted spread are 
negatively related to institutional 
ownership yet for banks and 
investment managers the relation 
reverses
No
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Table 3.1 (continued) 
 
 
Author Year
Sample Size 
and Period
Ownership 
Variable
Liquidity 
Variable
Adverse 
Selection 
Variable Methodology Findings Conclusion
Karen Schnatterly                                     
Kenneth Shaw                            
William Jennings
2007 6515 firm 
quarter 
observations; 
1983-1991Q1 
1983-Q3 1991
Large 
institutions
Bid-ask spread Cross 
sectional 
regression
The greater the 
percentage of shares held 
by the largest institution, 
the greater the bid-ask 
spread
Yes
Paul Brockman,      
Xuemin (Sterling) 
Yan      Dennis 
Chung
2009 1225 
firmsNYSE, 
AMEX 1992- 
2001
Block 
ownership
Relative quoted 
spread, relative 
effective spread, 
quoted depths
Amihud (2002); 
Glosten and 
Harris(1988); 
Huang and Stoll 
(1997); Lin et al. 
(1995)
Cross 
sectional 
regression
Lack of trading reduce 
liquidity
No
Edith Ginglinger                                                      
Jaques Hamon
2011 1550 firm
observations 
France1998-
2003
Block 
ownership
Number of 
trades, relative 
turnover, depth, 
average relative 
spread
Huang and Stoll 
(1997)
Ordinary 
least square
Blockholding reduce 
market liquidity – 
pyramid structure reduce 
liquidity and double 
voting rights increase 
liquidity
Yes/no
P. Krishna 
Prasanna                                
Anish Menon
2012 55 firms India 
– BSE 100 
Index 2007 - 
2010
Promoters, 
foreign 
institutional 
investors, 
domestic 
institutions, 
other 
investors
Amihud 
(2002),Bertolloti 
et al.(2007)
Ordinary 
least square 
regression
Large shareholdings 
(promoters) reduce 
liquidity
Yes
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Table 3.1 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
Author Year
Sample Size 
and Period
Ownership 
Variable Liquidity Variable
Adverse 
Selection 
Variable Methodology Findings Conclusion
Amir Rubin 2007 1369 firms 
NYSE   
1993 - 2003
Insider 
holding, 
insider 
blockholdings, 
insider 
management, 
insider non- 
management, 
institutional 
holdings, 
institutional 
blockholdings
Dollar volume, 
share volume, 
turnover, equal 
weighted bid-ask 
spread, time 
weighted bid- ask 
spread, effective 
spread, realized 
spread, Amihud 
(2002), dollar depth
Cross sectional 
regression and 
simultaneous 
equations
Liquidity increases with 
institutional ownership 
levels and decreases with 
institutional blockholdings; 
insider ownership is 
negatively correlated with 
trade driven measures of 
liquidity but is positively 
correlated with some order 
driven measures of liquidity 
Yes/ No
Ghabri Yosra  Olfa                                  
Ben Ouda Sioud
2011 40 firms
Tunisia  
2001-2005
Largest 
shareholder, 
Second largest 
shareholder,  
Ultimate 
shareholder
Turnover, number 
of trades, effective 
relative spread, 
depth
Huang and 
Stoll (1997)
Ordinary least 
squares 
regression
Concentrated ownership 
reduces spread and increase 
adverse selection                 
Yes
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Table 3.1 (continued) 
 
 
 
Author Year
Sample 
Size and 
Period
Corporate Governance 
Variable
Liquidity 
Variable
Adverse 
Selection 
Variable Methodology Findings Conclusion
Kiridaran 
Kanagaretam                           
Gerald J. Lobo                                                                                  
Dennis J. Whalen 
2007 345 firms 
NYSE or 
AMEX
June and 
September 
quarters 
2001
Percentage of independent 
directors, percentage of 
independent directors on
the audit committee, board 
size, the existence of 
independent nominating, 
compensation and 
governance committees, 
directors’ retirement age, 
number of audit 
committee and board 
meetings during the fiscal 
year.
Average 
percentage 
spread, 
average 
percentage 
depth
Changes in 
bid-ask 
spreads 
and depths
Ordinary 
least squares 
and two stage 
least squares 
regressions
Changes in bid-ask spread at the 
time of announcements is 
significantly negatively related to 
board independence, board 
activity and the percentage stock 
holdings of directors and officers; 
depth changes are significantly 
related to board independence, 
boar activity and the percentage 
stock holdings of directors and 
officers. 
Yes
Terrence J. 
Levesque                               
Theresa Libby                                   
Robert Matheiu                                   
Sean W.G.Rob
2010 145 firms          
TSX 300         
Jan. 1998 – 
Dec. 1998
Number of directors, 
outside directors o board 
and audit committee, 
CEO and Chair 
separation, director share 
ownership
Quoted 
spread
Changes in 
Bid-Ask 
spreads
Ordinary 
least squares
Larger proportion of outside 
directors reduce information 
asymmetry
Yes
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Table 3.1 (continued) 
 
 
Author Year
Sample Size 
and Period
Corporate Governance 
Variable
Liquidity 
Variable
Adverse 
Selection 
Variable Methodology Findings Conclusion
Yee Boon 
Foo                                         
Mazlina Mat 
Zain
2010 481 firms                    
Malaysia      
End of 2007
Percentage of independent 
directors on the board and 
on the audit committee, 
percentage of non-executive 
directors on the board, 
number of: board meetings 
and audit committee 
meetings.
Trading 
volume, 
quoted 
depth and 
zero return
Ordinary least 
squares 
regression
More independent and 
diligent boards are 
associated with higher 
liquidity
Yes
Angelo 
Aspris                                         
Alex Frino
2011 239 firms        
2004 – 2009
current and past directors – 
position, appointment, 
cessation dates, age, gender
Quoted 
spread
Price 
Impact              
Huang and 
Stoll (1997)
Ordinary least 
squares
Firms with more 
independent directors 
have higher levels of 
liquidity; independent 
directors facilitate a 
more transparent 
operating environment
Yes
Kee H 
Chung                                          
John Elder                                                    
Jang-Chul 
Kim
2010 4449 – 9078 
observations 
NYSE/AM
EX 
NASDAQ 
2001 – 2004
Governance index using 
standards related to: board 
independence and effective 
functioning, including audit, 
nomination and 
compensation committees, 
director’s compensation and 
ownership
Quoted 
spread, 
effective 
spread, 
market 
quality 
index
Price 
impact of 
trades, 
probability 
of 
information 
based (PIN) 
trading 
using 
Ordinary least 
square 
regression and 
fixed effects 
panel regression
Stocks of companies 
with better governance  
structures have narrower 
quoted and effective 
spreads, higher market 
quality index, smaller 
price impact and lower 
PIN
Yes
46 
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Author Year
Sample Size 
and Period
Corporate Governance 
Variable
Liquidity 
Variable
Adverse 
Selection 
Variable Methodology Findings Conclusion
K. Krishna 
Prasanna                              
Anish M. 
Menon
2012 90 firms             
2009 – 2010 
Bombay Stock 
Exchange 
Index 300
Percentage of 
independent directors, 
participation in board 
meetings, governance 
committee meetings, 
directors’ presence in 
meetings, duality of 
chairman and CEO
Amihud 
(2002) 
illiquidity 
ratio, 
modified 
amihud ratio
Ordinary least 
square 
regression
Better 
governed 
firms have 
higher 
liquidity
Yes
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Chapter 4 
Hypotheses 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework and hypotheses on how liquidity is 
influenced by two key variables − corporate ownership and corporate governance − in the 
Caribbean. Section 4.2 develops hypotheses on the relationship between ownership structure and 
liquidity. The hypothesized relationship between corporate governance and liquidity is discussed 
in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 summarizes the chapter. 
 
4.2 Ownership Structure and Liquidity 
In the typical Berle and Mean’s (1932) corporation, the ownership of capital is dispersed 
among shareholders and control tends to be concentrated in the hands of professional managers 
who own little or none of the equity of the firm they manage. This can lead to agency problems 
because even though managers are appointed by shareholders to act on their behalf and to 
represent their interests, goal incongruence between the two parties and the self-interested nature 
of human beings may induce managers to do otherwise (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Large shareholdings afford substantial control over cash flow rights (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) and can thus provide a solution to the manager/shareholder conflict by reducing the 
possibility of managers expropriating their returns. Under the “active monitoring hypothesis” 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Zeckhauser and Pound, 1990), concentrated ownership thwarts the 
value destroying actions of managers (Morck, 2000) and persuade them to disclose more in order 
to increase share prices and enhance firm value. Arguably, public disclosure reduces information 
asymmetry, reduces the cost of capital, and improves market liquidity (Amihud and Mendelson, 
1986; Welker, 1995). The active monitoring viewpoint thus predicts a positive relationship 
between ownership concentration and liquidity. 
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Yet, although concentrated ownership reduces the standard agency problem between 
managers and shareholders, it may generate more serious agency problems between controlling 
and minority shareholders (Lefort, 2005) – “the expropriation hypothesis.” In particular, at high 
levels of ownership, large shareholders may become entrenched and can divert resources from 
the firm and minority shareholders to themselves. Further, by insulating the controlling owner 
from the market for corporate control, ownership concentration increases the propensity for 
expropriation of minority shareholders by large shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). For 
example, Barclay and Holderness (1989) find evidence of private benefits for blockholders in 
trades that are on average priced at a substantial premium over subsequent trades of other 
shareholders. An explanation is the private information held by blockholders allows them to 
estimate the true value of the security and then increase or decrease their holdings in the security 
accordingly. Such activities could lead to wider spreads (Sarin et al., 2000), suggesting that higher 
levels of information asymmetry are likely to be present in firms with large shareholders.  
Concentrated ownership is prevalent in countries with weak investor protection (Dyck and 
Zingales, 2004; Djankov et al., 2008). Firms operating in an environment with weak investor 
protection laws have severe information asymmetry, poor liquidity, and less incentive to 
encourage disclosure (Brockman and Chung, 2003). Although concentrated ownership serves as 
a substitute for weak investor protection (Shleifer and Vishny (1997), weak legal systems and 
poorly functional institutions are inadequate to meet the challenges of entrenched controlling 
shareholders. Therefore, large owners are at liberty to misallocate resources and exacerbate 
information asymmetry by reducing information disclosure (Stulz, 1988; Kyle, 1985). All things 
considered, control by large shareholders reduces liquidity in the firm’s publicly traded shares 
(Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Holstrom and Tirole, 1993; Bhide, 1993) by: i) increasing the 
probability of informed trading; and ii) altering trading activity. Both of these phenomena cause 
spreads to widen. 
49 
 
The adverse selection hypothesis posits that large shareholders with private information 
know beforehand that the going market price of the share is incorrect. So they execute trades 
until the price reflects the valuation of the security, i.e., when the private information becomes 
public. As this information may take some time before the public becomes aware, a monotonic 
price movement occurs. The trading hypothesis postulates that when investors turn over their 
portfolios more often, transaction costs are lower (Demsetz, 1968). Lower transaction costs will 
be more valuable to investors as they signify ease of market entry and exit. This translates into 
more liquid securities with higher turnover frequency. But this condition reverses when firms 
with large investors enter the trading process. Larger traders have superior information (Easley 
and O’Hara, 1987), thus transaction costs are higher and liquidity decreases (Edmans and 
Manson, 2007). Moreover, concentrated ownership reduces free float in the market because 
shares held by large investors are not likely to be a part of the free float (Bolton and Von 
Thadden, 1998; Brockman et al., 2009). Consequently, there will be fewer active traders and 
liquidity decreases (Rubin, 2007; Ginglinger and Hamon, 2010), suggesting that concentrated 
ownership is inversely related with liquidity.  
Expropriation could result as firms with controlling shareholders withhold relevant 
information thereby increasing opacity. Poor disclosure and transparency practices are linked 
with lower liquidity (Chen et al., 2007). Disclosed information is important to market liquidity 
(Heflin et al., 2005) as liquidity reduces in firms with concentrated ownership (Heflin and Shaw, 
2000; Brockman et al., 2009). Accordingly, the expropriation hypothesis predicts there is a 
negative relationship between ownership concentration and liquidity.  
In sum, as ownership stakes increase, owners’ responsibility moves from alignment of 
shareholders interest to one of entrenchment. That is, lower levels of ownership are associated 
with higher liquidity (alignment effect is prevalent) and as the ownership stake increases, liquidity 
decreases (entrenchment effect dominates). The mixture of the convergence of interest and 
entrenchment suggests a non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and liquidity. 
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H-1a: There is a non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and liquidity. 
H-1b: There is a linear relationship between large shareholders and liquidity. 
The presence of more than one controlling shareholder can substantially decrease the 
private benefit of extraction by the controlling (largest) shareholder (Gutierrez and Tribo, 2004). 
Specifically, a second largest shareholder, if present, is likely to contest control and thus limit the 
controlling shareholder from taking one-sided actions that might hurt other shareholders 
(Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000). Edmans and Manso (2011) also argue that competition 
between non-controlling large shareholders can result in more information being impounded in 
prices. All else equal, we predict greater liquidity in firms that have a higher second largest 
shareholder:  
H-2: Firms with a higher second largest shareholding have on average higher liquidity. 
Rather than treating large shareholders as a homogeneous group, the heterogeneous 
behaviour of large shareholders is taken into consideration in this study, consistent with Vitols 
(2004) and Aguilera and Jackson (2003, 2010). A priori, the identity of the largest shareholder is 
expected to influence corporate decision as different owners will have different utility functions.  
Hence, this study classifies the largest and second largest shareholders as: institutions – domestic 
and foreign; holding companies – domestic and foreign; family; and government.  
 The literature on the trading behaviour of institutional investors takes a dyadic approach. 
In the first instance, institutional investors have strong fiduciary responsibilities; are prudent 
investors (Del Guerico, 1996); and prefer stocks with better disclosure (Bushee and Noe, 2000) 
and higher market liquidity (Falkenstein, 1996; Chung and Zang, 2011). These tendencies are 
linked to decreases in bid–ask spreads as well as the information component of spread (Jennings 
et al., 2002; Fehle, 2004). Plus, institutional investors are active traders, (Shapiro and Schwartz, 
1992) who are more sensitive to high transactions costs associated with illiquid stocks (Gompers 
and Metrick, 2001). This suggests that firms with institutional investors as their largest 
shareholder are associated with greater liquidity. 
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Conversely, institutional shareholdings lead to wider spreads through the information 
asymmetry created (Rubin, 2007). This information acquisition and processing (Grullon and 
Wang, 2001), impact price permanently (Sias et al., 2006) and reduce liquidity (Brockman et al., 
2009). As the relationship between institutional shareholders and liquidity is an empirical one, we 
do not predict a sign: 
H-3: There is a relationship between firms with institutional investors as their largest shareholder and 
liquidity. 
Holding companies as professionally managed financial institutions are active investors 
that manage a portfolio of stocks (Daems, 1978). As outside blockholders, holding companies 
may have strong incentives to create value for their shareholders and actively monitor 
management (La Porta at al., 2000). But monitoring may come at a cost such as the extraction of 
private benefits.  As the largest owner, holding companies may manipulate the extent of 
disclosure to maximize private benefits such as changes in the market value of shares (Makhija & 
Patton, 2004). As blockholdings have been linked to higher information asymmetries, which 
reduces liquidity (Sarin et al., 2000; Ginglinger and Hamon, 2012), in the same vein, the activities 
of holding companies may reduce liquidity. 
H-4: There is a relationship between firms with holding companies as their largest shareholder and 
liquidity. 
Family firms have as their objective maximization of firm value (Morck et al., 1988; 
Anderson and Reeb, 2003) since their personal wealth is often tied to the firm (Almeida and 
Wolfenzon, 2006). Family firms tend to be associated with long term horizons, pursue value 
creating projects, and have fewer incentives to expropriate corporate opportunities, thereby 
reducing agency conflicts between managers and shareholders (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). 
Resultantly, opportunistic behaviour and asymmetric information are less since there is no 
separation between ownership and control and a more transparent environment ensues (Wang, 
2006). Revealing information reduces the cost of capital and leads to greater liquidity (Amihud 
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and Mendelson, 1986). Plus when family firms disclose more the price impact of a trade reduces 
(Diamond and Verrachia, 1991) as private information is now impounded in prices. 
However, family firms do not always create value for the firm or its minority shareholders 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003)   as stock markets react negatively when family heirs are appointed as 
managers (Perez-González, 2006). In keeping with agency theory, controlling shareholders will 
take actions with benefits that are not shared with minority shareholders. For instance, family 
firms may choose their board of directors, consisting mostly of the less independent family 
members (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Less monitoring may occur, thereby increasing opacity, 
such as hiding indirect financial benefits like related party transactions or facilitating managerial 
entrenchment of family members (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Schleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Therefore:  
H-5: There is a relationship between family shareholdings and liquidity. 
Government/state ownership tends to be higher in emerging economies characterised as 
having poor protection of property rights (La Porta et al., 2002). State owned enterprises are 
associated with agency problems arising from the self-interested nature of appointed managers 
and government representatives (Wong, 2004) who usually lack the necessary incentive to engage 
in effective monitoring. Choi et al. (2011) argue that government involvement in the economy 
and financial system has a significant impact on agency problems because government can use 
ownership or influence to favour certain parties and expropriate rents from minority 
shareholders.  
Agency costs are likely to be high in government firms as there are no active shareholders 
acting as monitors. Plus the owners (citizens) have little or no corporate governance mechanisms 
to influence how managers run the firm (Cuervo-Cazzura and Dau, 2009). This suggests that the 
information environment of government-owned firms is more opaque and liquidity is thus 
expected to be lower (Brockman and Chung, 2003):  
H-6: Firms with government as the largest shareholder have lower liquidity. 
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Financial liberalization facilitates the opening of domestic markets to international 
investors with the intention of providing diversification benefits, lowering the required risk 
premium (Warther, 1995), and ultimately enhancing market liquidity (Levine, 2001). Foreign 
capital has become an important source of finance (Bekaert et al., 2002).  Foreign investors show 
a preference for large firms with low insider ownership, stocks that are associated with lower 
information asymmetry (Bushee and Noe, 2000; Ferreira and Matos, 2010), liquidity and 
international presence (Dahlquist and Robertson, 2001). Thus, foreign investors contribute to 
market liquidity. But since they are geographically separated from the firm, foreign investors may 
seek more information and interfere with the firm’s operations/business and collect private 
information (Choe et al., 2005; Seasholes, 2004; Huang and Shiu 2005).  
We examine the shareholding of two types of largest foreign shareholders for which we 
have data. The first is foreign institutional investors. Foreign institutions prefer to invest in 
emerging countries with stronger accounting standards, shareholder rights, and legal framework 
(Aggarwal et al., 2005). Thus foreign institutions will exert pressure on firms to increase 
disclosure. Increased disclosure reduces information asymmetries between buyers and sellers of 
shares and increases liquidity (Diamond and Verrachia, 1991, Heflin et al. 2005). Therefore,  
H-7: There is a positive relationship between firms with foreign institutional investors as their largest 
shareholder and liquidity. 
The second group of foreign largest shareholder is foreign holding companies. As 
blockholders are linked to increase in firm investment (Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2009), and 
prevent earnings manipulation (Farber, 2005), in a like vein the actions of foreign holding 
companies will contribute to a liquid market. The participation of large international financial 
institutions should improve market liquidity through better information disclosure and more 
active trading (Stultz, 1999).  
H-8: There is a positive relation with the shareholdings of foreign holding company and liquidity. 
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4.3 Corporate Governance and Liquidity 
Corporate governance is “the set of mechanisms, both institutional and market based, that 
induce the self- interested controllers of a company … to make decisions that maximise the 
value of the company for its owners” (Dennis and McConnell, 2003, page 1). Agency theory 
posits that the separation of ownership and control causes information asymmetries due to the 
misalignment of interests between managers and shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983), as well 
as between large shareholders and minority shareholders (Gomes, 2000). Accordingly, a policy of 
good corporate governance is beneficial for timely disclosure of information, preventing insider 
trading, and communicating efficient market prices. Accordingly, board independence, board 
structure, and board activity are important corporate governance variables that will be used to 
consider the relationship between liquidity and corporate governance. 
Caribbean firms are characterised by concentrated ownership. This type of ownership 
structure often gives rise to opacity, and so board composition is a key control mechanism for 
minority shareholders. Additionally, board structure and information transparency through 
voluntary disclosure are two distinct corporate governance mechanisms in the control and 
monitoring process to reduce agency costs. The intention of Caribbean markets is to alleviate 
investors’ fears about the lack of transparency and protection by positioning the exchanges as 
agencies that verify a firm’s compliance with higher corporate governance standards. 
Transparency and disclosure are instrumental in shaping a firm’s environment. Lack of 
transparency limits price discovery in stock markets (Morck et al., 2000). Moreover, stocks of 
firms with poorer investor protection trade at higher bid-ask spreads (Brockman and Chung, 
2003). Thus, good corporate governance creates an environment in which markets will be more 
liquid. Therefore: 
H-9: Firms with good corporate governance have on average greater liquidity. 
In addition to the overall quality of corporate governance, this thesis also tests the most 
important internal control mechanisms, i.e., the effectiveness of board monitoring (Fama and 
55 
 
Jensen (1983). The draft code of Corporate Governance Principles for the Caribbean (released 
2005) emphasized the importance of the role and composition of the board. In conjunction with 
this, important board functions include defining the company’s purpose; strategizing and 
organising plans to achieve company objectives; appointing the CEO; monitoring and assessing 
the performance of the executive team; and assessing their own performance (Sarkar, 2009). 
Furthermore, the board is responsible for preparing the company’s annual reports in accordance 
with company laws and accounting standards. Given these functions, the board can be viewed as 
the governing body of the firm and forms the mainstay of the corporate governance system 
(Jensen, 1993). An effective board is therefore necessary for a corporate governance framework 
in promoting transparent and efficient markets.  
Emerging economies such as the Caribbean are characterised as having concentrated 
ownership and controlling shareholders may prefer less transparency (Solomon, 2007) to conceal 
their ill-gained benefits. Effective board monitoring is therefore necessary in this situation, 
especially when the legal protection for minority shareholders is weak and external governance 
mechanisms are ineffective (Young et al., 2008). Relatedly, board monitoring aids in reducing the 
information asymmetry between majority and minority shareholders and consequently enhance 
stock market liquidity (Matoussi et al., 2004; Sedrine and Loukil, 2008). The link between 
corporate governance and liquidity lies in information asymmetry,42 in particular the quality and 
timeliness of public disclosure.  Prior studies conclude that a system of good corporate 
governance improves stock market liquidity through the reduction of information asymmetry.43   
In the same vein, board structure and process are desired attributes that have implications 
for firm performance (Zahra and Pearce, 1989) and helps to determine board vigilance. 
Contributing factors to board vigilance include accountability (busy boards, CEO duality); 
progressive practices (retirement age); and director education and compensation. According to 
                                                          
42 Welker(1995); Healy et al. (2001); Heflin et al. (2005); Brown and Hillgeist (2007) 
43
 Welker (1995); Eleswarapu et al. (2004); Chiyachantana et al. (2004); Jain et al. (2008); Chung et al. (2010);   
Matoussi et al. (2004) 
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Mercer (2004), investors feel more confident when the firm has a high quality board of directors. 
Board characteristics such as experience, tenure, knowledge, independence, and stock ownership 
have been used to assess board vigilance (Pettigrew, 1992). Even though board vigilance is a 
prerequisite for effective monitoring, directors who lack experience germane to boards will not 
contribute to corporate strategy. Likewise, directors who lack obligatory time and expertise may 
not be able to make meaningful contribution to shareholder wealth creation (Patton and Baker, 
1987). 
Large shareholders exert control by appointing submissive directors to the board. It is for 
this reason that firms with boards that are effective in monitoring management’s activities are 
associated with regular disclosure that results in reducing information asymmetry (Eng and Mak, 
2003; Cai et al., 2006). When information asymmetry reduces, market liquidity increases (Welker, 
1995). Therefore, the following hypothesis set forth is: 
H-10: Firms with a more effective board monitoring are associated with greater liquidity.  
One of the main responsibilities of the board is to protect shareholders’ interests by 
monitoring management thereby reducing agency costs that may arise. To facilitate this, equity 
based compensation is used to align the interests of directors (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998) 
with those of shareholders (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Hence higher stock ownership places 
directors in a consequential position, meaning if they pursue interests that are not value 
enriching, their stake in the firm will lose value. In addition boards have a prompt response rate 
to poor performance by replacing the CEO when directors are compensated in stock (Perry, 
2000). Thus, directors who own stock oversee management more actively. 
Equity based compensation has been linked to higher market to book value, stronger firm 
performance (Fich and Shivdasani, 2005; Becher et al. 2005), and increased monitoring (Ertugrul 
and Hedge, 2008). However, entrenched boards may be ineffective in reducing agency costs and 
may conspire with managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Such action increases the agency 
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problem. 44  Besides equity based compensation packages may serve to facilitate the CEO’s 
personal utility rather than remedy the principal – agent relationship since director share 
ownership only gives them a nominal interest in the firm (Core et al., 1999). Moreover, the 
CEO’s influence over director appointments (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003) may affect board 
effectiveness, as directors willingly accept pay packages offered by the CEO. When this happen, 
agency costs are not reduced, the degree of information asymmetry increases and decreases 
information flow into the market. As a consequence, liquidity decreases. 
H-11: There is a relationship between director stock ownership and liquidity.  
The board is the mechanism of internal assurance (Mercer, 2004) and so has the 
responsibility for shaping the corporate governance system. Board process involves progressive 
practices such as ongoing evaluation of board performance, evaluation and implementation of a 
CEO succession plan, etc. This advancement in board efficacy should benefit monitoring. If 
board monitoring increases, then managerial/shareholder opportunism should decrease and 
investor confidence will increase. Since effective board monitoring is possibly an acquired skill, 
boards with greater tenure will provide greater monitoring. One can argue that since the board’s 
responsibility is to monitor, supervise, and provide management with strategic guidelines 
(Brennan, 2006), director progressive practices may contribute to increases in disclosure.  
Disclosure policy influences market liquidity (Welker, 1995; .Lang et al., 2012).  
H-12: Director progressive practices are associated with liquidity. 
The effectiveness of a board in monitoring management is dependent on its independence 
(John and Senbet, 1998). Independent directors are perceived as objective and hence their use to 
safeguard against exploitative behaviour of managers and controlling shareholders, to reduce the 
agency problem (Zahra and Pearce II, 1989; Kaymak and Bektas, 2008). The draft Code of 
Corporate Governance Principles for the Caribbean (released 2005) requires that only 
independent directors serve on audit and compensation committees. Independent directors can 
                                                          
44 For example, Blanchard et al. (1994); Yermack (1997); and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001). 
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provide better oversight due to their experience and reputation (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Byrd 
and Hickman, 1992), qualities that assist in lessening the issue of separation and control. 
Furthermore, a higher proportion of independent non-executive directors is associated with 
greater disclosure and higher quality of reported earnings (Chen and Jaggi, 2000) which in turn 
are important for market liquidity (Heflin et al. (2001). Therefore, an independent board as a 
valuable monitor helps to improve liquidity through improved disclosure.  
H-13: Firms with a more independent board are associated with greater liquidity. 
 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework and hypotheses of the thesis. The study 
hypothesizes that firms with a higher ownership concentration have a non-linear relation with 
liquidity. It further hypothesizes that shareholders are heterogeneous and examines how the 
identities of largest shareholders are related to liquidity. Four groups of largest owners are 
identified namely: government, family, institutions, and holding companies. The presence of a 
second largest shareholder is hypothesized to be associated with increases in liquidity. The 
argument extends to include the role of corporate governance in determining liquidity. Since the 
board of directors forms the central internal control mechanism (Fama, 1980), the chapter also 
hypothesizes the relationship between board efficacy and liquidity, taking into consideration 
certain board characteristics and independence.  
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Chapter 5 
Data and Research Method 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the data and research method used in the study. Section 5.2 outlines 
the data selection criteria, including the data sources. Research method is discussed in Section 
5.3, followed by the measurement of test variables in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 discusses the 
sample profile and Section 5.6 provides a chapter summary. 
 
5.2  Data  
The initial sample consists of firms listed on the Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad & 
Tobago stock exchanges from January 2005 to December 2011. The sample period begins in 
2005 as this was the year the Caribbean Technical Working Group was formed and a draft 
Caribbean code of corporate governance was issued. More importantly, the enhanced corporate 
disclosure due to these events makes it possible to collect the required data for this thesis.  
To be included in the sample, the firm must have an available copy of their annual report. 
Since there is no electronic database for Caribbean firms, data on the top ten shareholders45 
(including their percentage shareholding and identity) and the number of shares outstanding are 
collected manually from the annual reports. Corporate governance data including board structure 
and composition are collected from the Corporate Governance section of the annual reports. 
The financial section of the annual report provides financial data including total assets, total 
liabilities, and equities. Official daily trading data such as bid and ask prices; volume traded; last 
close (previous price) and current close prices; and market capitalization are hand collected 
(laboriously) from the official websites of the stock exchanges. Market capitalization is computed 
as the product of share price and number of shares outstanding at year end. This value is 
converted to U.S. dollars at the year-end exchange rates retrieved from the Central Bank’s 
                                                          
45
 Top 10 shareholders as disclosed in the annual reports. 
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webpage for each respective country. After removing outlying observations, the final sample 
consists of 363 firm-year observations for 71 unique firms.  
Table 5.1 shows the number of firms by country and year. Jamaica is the most represented, 
with close to half of the sample belonging to this country. Table 5.2 shows the manufacturing 
industry (28%) has the largest proportion of firms followed by the finance (27%) industry. On an 
added note, although not shown on the table, the contributory percentages of the manufacturing 
industry to GDP at 2008 figures are: Barbados – about 6%; Jamaica – 8.4%; and Trinidad 
&Tobago – 21% (The Commonwealth Network, 2011).  
 
5.3  Research Method 
To test the hypotheses on the importance of ownership structure and corporate 
governance in explaining stock liquidity in the Caribbean, the study uses a panel regression with 
unbalanced panel data. Panel data models allow correction for unobserved (time-invariant) firm 
heterogeneity effects. When the ordinary least squares (OLS) approach is applied to panel data, 
the variance matrix based on independent and identically distributed (iid) errors may be 
inadequate since the error term for a given firm is likely to be correlated over time.  By assuming 
homoskedastic disturbances, the Breusch-Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier for firm specific 
effects and pooled OLS (not reported) specification is rejected due to the presence of 
unobserved heterogeneity.  
The choice of computing the regression coefficients lies between a random effects model 
and a fixed effects model. The random effects model specification relies on the strong 
assumption that the unobserved firm specific effects are uncorrelated with all the regressors, 
while the fixed effects specification allows for unspecified forms of covariance. A Hausman 
(1978) test is done and rejects the random effects specification. 
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Table 5.1 
Distribution of sample firms by country and by year 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.2 
Frequency distribution of sample firms by industry sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Barbados 18 20 20 20 20 20 19
Jamaica 29 30 31 32 32 32 32
Trinidad and Tobago 20 19 20 20 20 18 20
Total 67 69 71 72 72 70 71
Industry Frequency Percent    Cum. Percent
Communication 28 5.68 5.68
Conglomerate 81 16.43 22.11
Finance 134 27.18 49.29
Insurance 44 8.92 58.22
Manufacturing 140 28.40 86.61
Other 17 3.45 90.06
Property 7 1.42 91.48
Retail 14 2.84 94.32
Tourism 7 1.42 95.74
Trading 14 2.84 98.58
Utilities 7 1.42 100
Total 493 100
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To alleviate the concern of endogenous relationships between ownership and corporate 
governance, fixed effects regression is used. The fixed effects regression method controls for 
omitted variables in panel data when omitted variables vary across entities (states) but do not 
change over time (Stock and Watson, 2011). Because one could say ownership and liquidity 
variables may result in clustering of errors, to correct for firm dependency, this study follows 
Petersen (2009) and uses the clustering robust standard errors by company. Clustered errors 
allow for heteroskedasticity and for arbitrary autocorrelation within the company but treat the 
regression errors as uncorrelated across companies (Stock and Watson, 2011). For robustness 
country, industry, and year fixed effects are included to capture any unobserved (time-invariant) 
heterogeneity across countries, industries and time respectively. The following regression is run: 
                                                                                       
       ,              (1) 
where for firm i and year t,   is the intercept;   is the regression coefficient; and         is the 
composite error term.             include the following control variables: price, return volatility, 
volume, leverage, size, and a dummy variable representing cross-listed stocks. The test variables 
and their measurements are detailed below.  
Furthermore, to test the linearity of the relationship between liquidity and ownership 
concentration, the following model which is a modification of Short and Keasey (1999), is 
developed: 
                                             
             
 
   
                          
                                          (2) 
 
5.4 Measurement of Variables  
5.4.1 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable used in this study is liquidity. Liquidity plays a key role in finance 
(asset pricing and market efficiency) and can be defined as the ability to trade shares easily 
irrespective of the amount at a low cost. Existing literature focuses on several measures of 
63 
 
liquidity as this variable is considered a “slippery and elusive concept” (Kyle, (1985), page 1,316) 
for a number of reasons including transactional costs associated with resiliency, depth, and 
tightness. 46  The market microstructure literature identifies order processing costs, inventory 
holding costs, and adverse selection costs as main components of the bid-ask spread (Stoll, 1978; 
Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Copeland and Galai, 1983). Considering this, most studies use 
the bid-ask spread or estimates of the price impact of a trade to measure liquidity.  
Liquidity measures are either order based or trade based. Order driven measures such as 
spreads are seen as real time measures of available liquidity and give the investor a better idea of 
how liquid the market is. Liquidity measures can also be used to examine whether or not 
information asymmetry exists in the market. Computed order driven measures of liquidity are 
quoted Spread and the Zero Return measure. The Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure serves as a 
measure of price impact. The computed trade based measure is turnover. For robustness, this 
study uses all of these measures of liquidity, i.e., the quoted Spread, Zero Return, the Amihud 
illiquidity measure, and turnover, all of which are calculated daily for each firm for each year. 
Quoted spread  
The quoted Spread measures pre-trade transactions costs and is the implicit trading cost for 
market orders when a trade occurs at the quoted price with no price movement. This measure 
assumes that buyers and sellers cannot trade within the quoted spread because if an investor buys 
a stock and then sells it, a loss will be incurred.  Hence, the average of the bid-ask spread is often 
used to estimate the “fair” market value at the time of the quote. The quoted ask includes a 
premium for buying immediately and the bid price includes a discount for immediate sale. Since 
the markets in the study are order driven, most trades will occur at the bid or ask prices. Hence 
traders will avoid trading on a wide bid-ask spread and wait until the spread narrows because of 
the impending transaction costs. The percentage proportional quoted Spread is defined as:           
                                                          
46 Resiliency is related to price impact, i.e., the ability to trade without greatly affecting prices; depth (the size of an 
order flow) is related to the volume of transactions needed to change price; and tightness (the cost of turning 
around a position in a short time) is related to bid-ask spread  See  Kyle (1985.) 
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        =   
         
               
        . 
where     ; is the daily closing ask price at time  ; and      is the closing daily bid price at time 
 . 
Amihud (2002) Illiquidity ratio  
Given the deficiency of transaction level data, the low frequency proxy, the Amihud 
illiquidity (2002) ratio, is used to measure the daily price impact of the order flow. Hasbrouck 
(2009) shows that the Amihud illiquidity ratio is a robust measure of price impact, as previously 
suggested in Kyle (1985). Prior research relating to informed trading finds that information 
asymmetry can also be captured by the price impact of trades because trades convey private 
information (Huang and Stoll, 1996). A large trade has the capability of attracting the attention of 
other traders as the possibility exists that the trade might be information motivated. For instance, 
a large purchase could be an indication of good news and a large sale could imply bad news.  
The Amihud measure is a cost per volume ratio that aims to capture the marginal 
transaction cost per dollar of volume. Therefore, a high illiquidity ratio indicates a low level of 
liquidity. On the other hand, in a liquid market, large volumes will trade with relatively small 
changes in price. A stock is considered illiquid if the order to sell is filled at a price lower than the 
order to buy. So illiquidity can be measured by the costs of immediate execution.  
Studies conducted by Lesmond (2005), Goyenko et al.,  (2009), and Karolyi et al. (2012) 
using daily data find that this measure reliably captures liquidity.  The Amihud ratio is expressed 
as the daily ratio of the absolute value of stock returns to the dollar volume, averaged over the 
number of trading days in the firm’s fiscal year. The average is calculated over all positive volume 
days since the ratio does not allow for days that have zero volumes. The ratio is: 
             ⁄ ∑
|      |
          
   
    . 
where|      |  and            represent the absolute daily returns and daily dollar volume 
(using daily closing price times daily volume) respectively for firm i on day d of year y.     is the 
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number of days with positive trading volume for stock i in year y. The computed value is then 
multiplied by 106 following Amihud (2002) to provide a common representation across the 
measures.  
Zero Return 
Another low frequency liquidity measure employed is the “zero day return” developed by 
Lesmond et al. (1999), which infers that low liquidity and less informed trading lead to a zero 
daily return. This measure is associated with trading costs, so the informed investor will only 
trade if the benefits to be derived from trading on information exceed the transaction costs. 
Hence an investor will not be motivated to obtain private information for stocks with high 
transaction costs. So the days with high transaction costs will see a zero return. Other studies 
that use this measure, as computed below, include Lesmond (2005), Bekaert et al. (2007), and 
Goyenko et al (2009):47 
             
                                       
                                   
. 
Turnover 
Two trade-based measures of liquidity, i.e., turnover (Baekert et al., 2003; Levine and 
Schmukler, 2006) are used in this study, denoted as Turnover1 and Turnover2 respectively. 
Turnover1 captures trading frequency and Turnover2 captures costs per trade. As turnover is 
related to the trading activities of owners and captures trading frequency, stocks with a high 
trading frequency have a smaller price for immediacy because frequent trading reduces the cost 
of inventory controlling (Demsetz, 1968).  Also, high trading volume stocks have lower levels of 
information asymmetry as information is revealed by prices (Glosten and Milgrom (1985). In 
keeping with this argument, Hasbrouck (1991) suggests that information asymmetries are more 
pronounced in small stocks. Thus, turnover is also used to determine the presence of informed 
                                                          
47Lesmond (2005) studies 23 emerging markets; Baekert et al. (2007) use this ratio in a study on the relationship 
between asset pricing and liquidity costs in 19 emerging markets; Goyenko et al. (2009) use daily stock data base 
from CRSP for NYSE data from 1993 to 2005; Levine and Schmuckler (2006) use both Amihud (2002) and Zero 
return to test the relationship between internationalization and liquidity in 45 emerging economies.  
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trading as the higher the turnover, the greater the adverse selection costs. Adverse selection costs 
arise when traders transact with individuals who are more informed about price movements for a 
particular security. Stoll (1978) uses turnover (dollar trading volume divided by market 
capitalization) to capture adverse selection costs.  
The first measure of turnover is tradable turnover, Turnover1, and uses the daily trading 
volume and the number of shares outstanding (determined on an annual basis). Turnover has 
been used to measure volume (Campbell et al., 1993) and the impact of information on trading 
activity (Lakonishok and Smidt, 1986). Turnover1 is defined as: 
∑
      
                  
 
    . 
 
The second measure of turnover, Turnover2, uses dollar trading volume and is measured as 
dollar volume scaled by market capitalization, whereby dollar volume is the daily share volume 
times the daily closing price for each year. 
 
5.4.2 Independent variables 
 
 The independent variables of interest are corporate governance (board composition, 
characteristics, and structure) and ownership. These and control variables are discussed below. 
Corporate governance 
The quality of corporate governance is proxied by a governance index that uses board-
related governance standards considered relevant in improving monitoring, disclosure, and 
transparency. Existing metrics of corporate governance yield varying results as each captures 
different aspects of the governance standards related to either internal or external corporate 
governance. Klapper and Love (2004) construct a governance index for 14 emerging markets 
based on a questionnaire inclusive of board characteristics – independence and accountability 
indices. Black et al. (2006) construct a metric for Korean firms that include the board of 
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directors in the sub-indices. This index was constructed from responses to a survey the Korean 
Stock Exchange sent to all listed firms. In Korea, Choi et al. (2007) construct an index that 
includes the board of directors based on governance data collected by Corporate Governance 
Service.  
Nevertheless, for the intent of this study, a corporate governance index with an emphasis 
on governance standards related to board independence, structure, and effectiveness is 
constructed using data obtained from the firm’s annual reports. Twenty-eight binary coded 
questions in six categories defined by governance standards as specified by International 
Shareholder Services (ISS) are used to construct the corporate governance indices. The 
categories are as follows: 
i. Audit, which is related to the composition of the audit committee and focuses on 
the independence of audit committee members; 
ii. Board, which has 15 governance standards inclusive of characteristics related to 
accountability (busy boards;48 CEO’s duality;49 and having a seat on other boards); 
nomination and composition; and related party transactions; 
iii. Director education, which pertains  to directors’ participation in ISS – accredited 
director education; 
iv. Executive compensation, which emphasises on whether directors receive part of 
their compensation in stock; 
v. Executive ownership, which details whether directors with more than one year of 
service own stock − if they do, it should be at least 1% stock ownership but less 
than 30% of the shares outstanding – and whether directors are subjected to stock 
ownership guidelines; and  
                                                          
48 Board interlocks are viewed as mechanisms of collusion( Mizruchi, 1996) 
49Board monitoring is enhanced when the Chairman and the CEO are separate persons (Jensen, 1993). Structural  
independence of the board refers to board leadership in the form of the Chairperson and management leadership  
in the form of the CEO. 
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vi. Progressive practices, which include mandatory retirement age; regular 
performance reviews; board approval of CEO succession plan in place; the board 
having outside advisors and existence of directors’ term of office.  
For every governance item, each firm is scored per year based on whether it meets the 
minimum standard according to the ISS Corporate Governance: Best Practices User Guide and 
Glossary (2003).50 The governance index adopted a dichotomous procedure in which an item 
scores one if the standard is met and zero if the standard is not met or the information is not 
disclosed. This method is similar to the coding method used by Klapper and Love (2004) and 
Chung et al. (2010). Appendix 3 shows the 28 board-related governance standards in the six 
categories. The governance index constructed uses weighted and unweighted scoring methods to 
form three governance indices: Govindex1, Govindex2, and Govindex3. Unweighted scores are used 
because companies that are better at disclosing important items are also better at disclosing less 
important items (Meek et al., 1995). Hence, Govindex1 is additive and unweighted and gives each 
governance standard an equal importance so that the group with the highest number of 
governance standards does not dominate. Govindex1 is calculated as follows: 
            
       
    
 . 
where Govindex1 is the aggregate governance score, for company j, 0≤Govindex1j ≤1;      is equal 
to 1 if the standard is met and 0 if the standard is not met or not disclosed;     is the maximum 
governance score for each company, which is 28. 
Govindex2 uses the weighted governance score, where the weight is the number of 
standards in each of the six categories. That is, for each category, we add the scores for each 
                                                          
50
 ISS provides 61 individual measures for corporate governance ratings. So from the ISS Corporate Governance: 
Best Practices User Guide and Glossary (2003), 28 governance standards that are closely related to board 
monitoring and operational transparency are selected. These standards are in keeping with those in the corporate 
governance code for the Caribbean issued in 2005. ISS does not code data as representing minimally acceptable 
governance but they provide sufficient information to enable one to make such a determination. We determine if a 
firm’s governance is minimally acceptable (coded 1) or unacceptable (coded 0) by using information in ISS 
Corporate Governance: Best Practices User Guide and Glossary (2003). 
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standard and then divide it by the total number of standards in that category. We then average 
the ratios across the six governance categories. This method therefore places an equal 
importance to each governance category:  
            ∑         (
      
 
 
      
  
 
      
 
 
     
 
 
      
 
 
      
 
)
 
 
  
Govindex3 assigns weights based on the degree of importance of each of the six categories. 
This weighted index is based on the rank a user of the annual report attaches to the information 
disclosure item.51 As such a score reflects both the extent and importance of each disclosure item 
that forms the index (Robbins & Austin, 1986). Likewise, weights can be assigned to different 
items of information either by the researcher who takes into consideration the type of 
information (quantitative or qualitative) in assigning weights to different items of information 
(e.g., Botosan, 1997; Richardson and Welker, 2001).  
Board monitoring is a crucial element of corporate governance (Brickley and James, 1987; 
Weisbach, 1988; Byrd and Hickman,1992; and Lee et al., 1992), so a weight of 30% is assigned to 
the board category. Progressive practices are an ongoing feature that aims to improve board 
behaviour, so a weight of 20% is assigned. Audit committee (15%), director ownership (15%), 
director education (10%) and compensation (10%) are standards aimed at best practices to 
improve transparency and disclosure and liquidity through board efficacy (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989; Jensen, 1993; Klein, 1998; Levasque et al., 2010). In constructing Govindex3, the sum of the 
proportional binary coded values is multiplied by the weights: 
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51
 In keeping with the 2002 McKinsey and Company Global Investor Opinion Survey, whereby investors identified 
the following as areas of concern that needed reform: more timely board disclosure (52%); more independent board 
(44%); and more effective board practices (38%).  
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where Govindex3 is the weighted firm index scored by firm j, 0≤ Govindex3 ≤1; w is the weighting 
point (percentage), i.e., 30 weighting points are given to one category viewed as very important; 
20 points to one category viewed as important; 15 points to two categories for some importance; 
and 10 points to two categories with lesser importance. 
In addition to the above composite measures of governance, we also examine some of the 
governance standards separately. To determine which governance standard drives corporate 
governance, the board, ownership and progressive practices categories are measured: 
 
      
      
  
 ;           
      
 
 ;                      
      
 
  . 
 
where     , is as previously defined and is divided by the number of standards in each respective 
category. 
Board independence is at the core of corporate governance reform in developed and 
developing countries. It is an important measure of board monitoring intensity (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Weisbach, 1988; Brickley et al.1994). So we include it as a separate item in our 
tests. Board_Independence is measured by the ratio of independent board members to board size 
(Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al., 2006). 
Ownership  
 This study defines a firm as having a concentrated ownership structure if its largest 
percentage shareholding is at least 20% (Thomsen and Pedersen 1996; Faccio and Lang 2002); 
otherwise, the firm is said to be widely held. Data on ownership are extracted from the 
shareholding section of the annual reports. In the Caribbean firms examined, such data are often 
disclosed for the largest 10 shareholders. Both the name (identity) and percentage shareholdings 
are collected. Following prior studies by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001), and Lins (2003), this study examines the percentage ownership of the largest (controlling) 
shareholder, the second largest shareholder, and blockholders. Largest_Shareholding is the direct 
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shareholding of the largest shareholder; Second_Shareholding is the direct shareholding of the 
second largest shareholder; and Blockholdings is the sum of shareholdings 5% or more.  
The study also uses an alternate measure of ownership concentration, the Herfindahl 
Index. The reason is that the holding proportion substantially reduces with each incremental 
shareholder. The Herfindahl index, the sum of the squared proportions, converges very quickly 
as the choice of n increases. This measure is defined as the sum of the squared holding 
proportion of n largest shareholders and specifies the characteristics of the size distribution of 
shareholdings (Cubbin and Leech, 1983). 
                  ∑  
 
   
 
In addition, the largest and second largest shareholdings are categorized as institutional – 
domestic or foreign; family; holding company – domestic or foreign; or government. 
Institutional owners consist of banks, insurance firms, pension funds and mutual funds. Holding 
companies represent firms which are not classified as institutional owners. A family owner is a 
personal (non-corporate) investor with residency in the respective countries. Government 
(central or local) ownership represents the state.  Finally, a foreign owner is any organization not 
registered in the countries in the study. 
 
5.4.3 Control variables 
 
The control variables in the study are price, return volatility, firm size, daily volume, dollar 
volume, leverage, board size and dummy variables. Control dummies are used for cross listed 
firms, where 1 denotes cross-listing and 0, otherwise. The location of the exchange, industry, and 
year dummies control for time specific factors that may potentially affect market liquidity. This is 
done to reduce concerns about omitted variables bias regarding variation in parameters over 
time, such as differences in accounting and regulatory standards.  
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Stock price controls for the effects of price distinction and is also an indication of risk, as 
low price stocks are likely to be riskier (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965). As trades are executed at 
bid and ask prices, changes in price will have implications for market liquidity. A price increase 
may cause dealers to suffer a loss if they sell at a low ask. This loss reduces the bid-ask spread 
(Hanley et al., 1993).  
Periods of rapid market decline or advancement are usually associated with volatility. Ho 
and Stoll (1981) report that the more volatile the stock price, the more uncertain the cost of 
holding stock and the wider will be the bid ask-spread. Return volatility positively affects bid-ask 
spreads due to higher adverse selection and inventory risk (Stoll, 1978). If volatility is low, risk 
and uncertainty are at a minimum and spreads will be narrower. Thin speculative markets are 
more volatile (Cohen et al., 1976) than deep ones. Return volatility is the standard deviation of 
daily returns for each firm, for each year over the sample period. 
Large firms have a richer information environment and would face less information 
asymmetry problem (Diamond and Verracchia 1991). Since dealers/traders are likely to set 
narrower bid-ask spreads for shares of larger firms with lower information asymmetry, we expect 
liquidity to be related to firm size. Gompers and Metrick (2001) note large investors, such as 
financial institutions, have a preference for large capitalization firms due to their greater 
disclosure regime. In this sense, firm size proxies for adverse selection risk, which in turn affects 
the liquidity of the stock. Two measures of firm size, total assets and market capitalization, are 
used; the latter is calculated as the closing share price times the number of shares outstanding at 
the end of each year.  
In the trading process of a liquid market (higher trading volume), the broker or trader is 
able to reverse his position more easily, i.e., from a disequilibrium position to an equilibrium one. 
Therefore, dollar trading volume is negatively related to the holding cost and positively related to 
liquidity. Since dollar trading volume is used to control for differences in share price, significant 
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increases in trading volume should lead to decreases in turnover. Dollar volume is the average of 
daily volume times daily closing price for each firm, for each year over the sample period. 
In the trading process, both private and public information can drive trading volume. If 
public information is readily available to all market participants, trades will increase (Harris and 
Raviv, 1993) and liquidity will increase (Lee et al. 1993). Although private information may result 
in an increase in trading volume, it may also reduce liquidity. This is because the average level of 
private information is revealed in security price (Blume et al., 1994) and the market maker will 
post wider spreads. Trading volume is the annual total daily volume traded for each firm. 
An effective board reduces risk through monitoring of management as well as increased 
transparency through greater disclosure. Ultimately, liquidity increases (Lang et al., 2012). Board 
size has implications for board functioning (Coles et al., 2008). Large boards are better monitors 
of management (Kula, 2005); provide advice and expertise to the CEO (Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1988); and lead to higher firm performance (Dalton et al., 2005). Smaller board have lower 
monitoring costs and faster decision making (Mak and Kusnadi, 2005). When monitoring 
increases private benefits decrease and liquidity increases (Holstrom and Tirole, 1993). Board 
size is the natural logarithm of the total number of board members (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 
2008; Lam and Lee, 2008). 
 
5.5 Descriptive Analysis 
Before we explore the descriptive characteristics of the variables in the study, a note on 
country-level characteristics is useful. Table 5.3 shows the country data for liquidity, ownership, 
governance and size. The mean level of order-based and price-based liquidity measures is not 
consistent across the selected sample: Jamaican firms show the highest mean Spread (7.46%) 
compared to Barbados (0.84%); Trinidad & Tobago firms have the highest mean Zero Return 
(25%); and Barbados has the highest mean Amihud measure (5.09).  However, both measures of 
mean turnover, Turnover1 and Turnover2, are more or less the same across the sample: Jamaica – 
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3% and 3%; Trinidad & Tobago – 1% and 2%; and Barbados – 2% and 2% respectively. Trading 
is more active on the Jamaica exchange as the mean daily volume shows (150,000 million shares). 
The Trinidad & Tobago market is the largest as measured by market capitalization with a mean 
value of $US 591 million.  
The governance indices have about the same mean across the countries: Govindex1 – 
Jamaica is 0.38; Trinidad & Tobago is 0.39 and Barbados is 0.32. For Govindex2 and Govindex3, 
Barbados differ somewhat having mean values of less than 0.20 relative to the other countries. 
The average board size is consistent across the countries even though the largest board is in 
Jamaica with a maximum size of 16 members.  
Corporate ownership structure across the countries is dissimilar which may be due to firm 
characteristics such as investment needs, industry, and size (Short, 1994). The Largest_Shareholding 
in Trinidad & Tobago and Jamaica firms belong to institutional investors, owning on average 
48% and 29% of the firms, respectively. In Barbados, the Largest_Shareholding tends to be in the 
hands of domestic holding companies with an average ownership stake of 46%. Trinidad & 
Tobago have the largest presence of government ownership with an average of 12%. The second 
largest shareholding tends to be in the hands of institutional shareholders.  
Table 5.4 shows the summary statistics for the pooled sample. The average liquidity as 
measured by Spread is 4.81%; Zero Return is 20%; and 3% for both measures of turnover. It 
appears that liquidity is low with poor levels of trading activity as shown by the trade based and 
order based liquidity measures. Also, the low turnover percentage suggests that there may be 
some information based trading. According to Karpoff (1987), price and trading volume have a 
positive correlation. So a low turnover is prevalent when prices fluctuate a lot and if traders 
receive a lot of information about the firm, this translates into a less liquid market.  
The average daily price impact is 1.71 and ranges from 0 to 10.98. Pertaining to the aspect 
of information based trading; the Amihud price impact measure suggests some level of 
information may be contained in prices. If a trade contains no new information, its price impact 
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should be zero. The mean daily trading volume indicates that markets are active but as reported 
earlier much of this trading activity takes place in the Jamaica market. The mean volatility is high 
(53%) and the average price is $13.14. This high volatility implies that stock prices vary over a 
large range of values within a short period of time. Emerging economies are characterised by 
high volatility and similar evidence is documented by Bekaert and Harvey (1995) with volatility 
ranging from 18% in Jordan to 104% in Argentina. 
The mean (median) board size for the sample of Caribbean firms is 10 directors, of which 
on average 50% are independent. The board sizes in the sample are on average larger than 
Singapore and Malaysian firms (median of 7.3 and 7.5 respectively), studied by Mak and Kusdani 
(2005).  
Table 5.4 provides the summary statistics for ownership and corporate governance. 
Caribbean firms have concentrated ownership structures as the mean Largest_Shareholding is 47% 
of the outstanding shares. The table also shows that 66% of the firms have at least one large 
shareholder. As the largest shareholder, (domestic) financial institutions (Large_Institution) own 
33% of the outstanding shares, followed by holding companies (Large_HoldingCompany) with 28% 
and foreign institutional investors (Large_InstitutionForeign) with 20%. The average 
Second_Shareholding is 14%, and ranges from of 5% to 36%. The mean Blockholdings is 63%, and 
ranges from 5% to 97%. Other ownership statistics show the median Largest_Shareholding is 
approximately 50%, Blockholdings is 71%, and Second_Shareholding is 11%. These ownership 
statistics are large by Anglo-American standards but are in line with continental Europe.52  
The maximum value for Govindex1, Govindex2 and Govindex3 is 0.71, 0.81, and 0.78 
respectively, as shown in Panel C.  The mean value Govindex1 is 0.37, indicating that firms meet 
less than half the governance standards.  The board category contributes most to the governance 
score with a mean of 7 out of 15 standards, followed by the ownership category (1 out of 3 
                                                          
52 Becht and Roell (1999) report in the Netherlands the median largest voting block is 43.5% and in Austria – 45%-
55%; Demirag and Serter (2003) report an average of 45.10% in Turkey for largest shareholder ; Earle et al. (2005) 
mean blockholder is 60.90% and median 67.20%- Budapest. 
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standards). Very few firms meet the governance standards associated with director education and 
compensation categories. This is not surprising as not many firms in the Caribbean are 
associated with ISS director programs. However, from information gleaned in some annual 
reports, few firms have started in-house director training programs. The summary statistics on 
Govindex2 and Govindex3 are quantitatively similar though a bit lower in magnitude.  
5.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter discusses the data sources, sample selection, research method, and 
measurement of variables. The final sample size is 71 firms with 363 firm-year observations. The 
chapter specifies and outlines the models for statistical analyses. The study uses unbalanced panel 
data with fixed effects for industry, exchange location, and year. The dependent variable in the 
model is liquidity, whilst the independent variables are ownership, corporate governance and 
control variables. Finally, country level descriptive statistics are presented followed by the pooled 
sample. 
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Table 5.3 
Summary statistics – country level for 2005-2011 
Zero Return is the number of trading days with zero returns/number of trading days for the year; Spread is[ ask-
bid/(ask +bid)/2] *100; Turnover1 is volume/shares outstanding; Turnover2  is dollar volume/market capitalization; 
Amihud is average over the year of the daily ratio of the stock’s absolute return to its dollar trading volume; 
Largest_Shareholding is the percentage of shares directly owned by the largest shareholder; Second_Shareholding is the 
percentage of shares directly owned by the second largest shareholder; Blockholdings is the sum of all shareholding 
greater than 5%; Govindex1, Govindex2, and Govindex3 are  scores obtained using minimum standards provided by ISS 
Corporate Governance; Size is the closing share price times number of shares outstanding at year end; Volatility is 
the standard deviation of daily returns for each firm, each year ; Board_Independence is the number of independent 
directors/total number of directors; Board_Size is the total number of directors on the board;  Size_(Assets) is the 
firm’s assets in U.S. dollars; Cross-Listing =1 if the company is cross-listed, otherwise 0; Average_Price is the average 
daily closing prices for each year; DailyVolume is the total of daily  volume  traded each year; DollarVolume  is the total  
daily dollar volume year, where daily dollar volume = volume*closing price.   
 
 
 
 
Barbados
Mean P25 P50 P75 Max Min  SD
Panel A: Liquidty Measures
Spread 0.840 0.220 0.600 1.290 2.620 0.000 0.750
Zero Return 0.210 0.130 0.160 0.210 0.870 0.050 0.180
Turnover1 0.020 0.000 0.010 0.020 0.090 0.000 0.020
Turnover2 0.020 0.000 0.010 0.020 0.090 0.000 0.020
Amihud 5.090 2.730 5.300 6.790 10.590 0.270 2.520
Panel B: Ownership
Largest_Shareholding 0.420 0.200 0.360 0.650 0.970 0.100 0.290
Second_Shareholding 0.130 0.080 0.120 0.180 0.230 0.050 0.060
Blockholdings 0.640 0.420 0.720 0.890 0.970 0.100 0.290
Largest_Family 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Largest_Institution 0.290 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.460
Largest_InstitutionForeign 0.180 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.390
Largest_HoldingCompany 0.460 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.510
Largest_HoldingCompanyForeign 0.070 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.260
Largest_Government 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Second_Family 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Second_Institution 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.510
Second_Institution Foreign 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.220
Second_HoldingCompany 0.150 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.370
Second_Government 0.300 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.470
Panel C: Corporate Governance
Govindex1 0.320 0.250 0.290 0.320 0.710 0.210 0.110
Govindex2 0.210 0.140 0.170 0.190 0.810 0.080 0.150
Govindex3 0.260 0.180 0.220 0.260 0.780 0.130 0.140
Board_Independence 0.520 0.330 0.360 0.750 0.920 0.130 28.000
Panel D: Control Variables
DailyVolume (mil) 4.450 0.237 0.675 1.970 132.000 0.003 18.800
Dollar Volume ($mil) 17.100 1.260 3.410 9.420 431.000 0.026 61.700
Volatility 0.410 0.170 0.290 0.460 3.210 0.030 0.490
Board Size 10.000 9.000 11.000 12.000 13.000 7.000 1.630
Size (US$mil) 440.000 73.800 184.000 467.000 3280.000 1.080 641.000
Cross-Listing 0.440 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.500
Average_Price 2.470 1.040 1.890 3.000 10.770 0.060 2.120
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Table 5.3 (continued) 
Summary statistics – country level for 2005-2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jamaica
Mean P25 P50 P75 Max Min  SD
Panel A: Liquidty Measures
Spread 7.460 3.840 6.450 10.520 19.670 1.310 4.490
Zero Return 0.170 0.120 0.170 0.220 0.400 0.050 0.070
Turnover1 0.030 0.010 0.030 0.050 0.100 0.000 0.030
Turnover2 0.030 0.010 0.030 0.050 0.100 0.000 0.030
Amihud 1.020 0.120 0.440 0.400 6.580 0.000 1.510
Panel B: Ownership
Largest_Shareholding 0.490 0.280 0.530 0.700 0.950 0.080 0.250
Second_Shareholding 0.140 0.070 0.110 0.180 0.360 0.010 0.100
Blockholdings 0.650 0.480 0.720 0.810 0.950 0.090 0.220
Largest_Family 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.160
Largest_Institution 0.290 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.460
Largest_InstitutionForeign 0.270 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.440
Largest_HoldingCompany 0.220 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.420
Largest_HoldingCompanyForeign 0.170 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.370
Largest_Government 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.160
Second_Family 0.070 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.260
Second_Institution 0.430 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.500
Second_Institution Foreign 0.110 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.320
Second_HoldingCompany 0.260 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.440
Second_HoldingCompanyForeign 0.120 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.330
Second_Government 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel C: Corporate Governance
Govindex1 0.380 0.320 0.360 0.430 0.710 0.180 0.110
Govindex2 0.290 0.170 0.270 0.380 0.810 0.070 0.140
Govindex3 0.340 0.240 0.320 0.420 0.780 0.110 0.140
Board_Independence 0.520 0.380 0.500 0.670 1.000 0.080 0.190
Panel D: Control Variables
Daily Volume (bil) 150.000 0.004 0.014 0.050 23000.000 0.000 1860.000
Dollar Volume ($mil) 506.000 67.900 271.000 507.000 4350.000 1.010 740.000
Volatility 0.560 0.360 0.460 0.580 4.570 0.050 0.510
Board_Size 10.000 8.000 10.000 12.000 16.000 3.000 2.350
Size (US$mil) 329.000 53.900 127.000 382.000 3280.000 1.080 538.000
Cross-Listing 0.270 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.440
Average_Price 18.190 2.530 8.400 21.080 252.730 0.000 30.340
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Table 5.3 (continued) 
Summary statistics – country level for 2005-2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trinidad & Tobago
Mean P25 P50 P75 Max Min  SD
Panel A: Liquidty Measures
Spread 1.230 0.590 0.950 1.800 3.110 0.120 0.800
Zero Return 0.250 0.150 0.240 0.320 0.530 0.060 0.120
Turnover1 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.020 0.070 0.000 0.010
Turnover2 0.020 0.010 0.010 0.020 0.100 0.000 0.020
Amihud 0.760 0.050 0.210 0.840 9.180 0.000 1.470
Panel B: Ownership
Largest_Shareholding 0.440 0.200 0.490 0.510 0.910 0.050 0.240
Second_Shareholding 0.100 0.050 0.090 0.130 0.330 0.010 0.060
Blockholdings 0.580 0.490 0.600 0.780 0.910 0.050 0.240
Large_Family 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Large_Institution 0.480 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.500
Large_InstitutionForeign 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.210
Large_HoldingCompany 0.280 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.450
Large_HoldingCompanyForeign 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.270
Large_Government 0.120 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.330
Second_Family 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Second_Institution 0.720 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.450
Second_Institution Foreign 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.140
Second_HoldingCompany 0.130 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.340
Second_HoldingCompanyForeign 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Second_Government 0.130 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.340
Panel C: Corporate Governance
Govindex1 0.390 0.290 0.320 0.540 0.710 0.210 0.150
Govindex2 0.310 0.150 0.210 0.440 0.810 0.080 0.200
Govindex3 0.350 0.200 0.280 0.530 0.780 0.130 0.190
Board_Independence 0.540 0.400 0.550 0.690 0.880 0.220 0.170
Panel D: Control Variables
DailyVolume (mil) 3.640 0.693 2.350 4.530 23.900 0.048 4.250
Dollar Volume ($mil) 54.200 9.180 21.900 56.700 513.000 0.355 82.400
Volatility 0.580 0.240 0.400 0.590 4.240 0.030 0.660
Board Size 10.000 9.000 11.000 12.000 14.000 7.000 2.050
Size (US$mil) 591.000 103.000 351.000 804.000 2410.000 13.100 670.000
Cross-Listing 0.510 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.500
Average_Price 9.730 1.210 3.820 17.800 65.390 0.120 13.740
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Table 5.4 
Summary statistics for 363 firm-year observations, 2005-2011 
Zero Return is the number of trading days with zero returns/number of trading days for the year; Spread is[ ask-
bid/(ask +bid)/2] *100; Turnover1 is volume/shares outstanding; Turnover2  is dollar volume/market capitalization; 
Amihud  is average over the year of the daily ratio of the stock’s absolute return to its dollar trading volume; 
Largest_Shareholding is the percentage of shares directly owned by the largest shareholder; Second_Shareholding is the 
percentage of shares directly owned by the second largest shareholder; Blockholdings is the sum of all shareholding 
greater than 5%; Govindex1, Govindex2, and Govindex3 are  scores obtained using minimum standards provided by ISS 
Corporate Governance; Size is the closing share price times number of shares outstanding at year end; Volatility is 
the standard deviation of the daily returns for each firm, each year; Board_Independence is the number of independent 
directors/total number of directors; Board_Size is the total number of directors on the board;  Size_(Assets) is the 
firm’s assets in U.S. dollars; Cross-Listing =1 if the company is cross-listed, otherwise 0; Average_Price is the average 
daily closing prices each year; DailyVolume is the total of daily  volume  traded each year; DollarVolume  is the total  
daily dollar volume each year ,where daily dollar volume = volume*closing price.   
 
 
 
 
 
  
Mean P25 P50 P75 Max Min  SD
Panel A: Liquidity Measures
Spread 4.810 0.950 3.000 7.350 19.670 0.020 4.850
Zero Return 0.200 0.130 0.180 0.250 0.870 0.050 0.110
Turnover1 0.030 0.010 0.020 0.040 0.150 0.000 0.030
Turnover2 0.030 0.010 0.020 0.040 0.100 0.000 0.020
Amihud 1.710 0.120 0.590 2.310 10.980 0.000 2.430
Panel B: Ownership
Largest_Shareholding 0.470 0.200 0.500 0.660 0.970 0.050 0.260
Second_Shareholding 0.140 0.060 0.110 0.180 0.360 0.050 0.100
Blockholdings 0.630 0.470 0.710 0.820 0.970 0.050 0.240
Largest_Family 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.130
Largest_Institution 0.330 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.470
Largest_InstitutionForeign 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.400
Largest_HoldingCompany 0.280 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.450
Largest_HoldingCompanyForeign 0.130 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.330
Largest_Government 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.220
Second_Family 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.200
Second_Institution 0.510 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.500
Second_InstitutionForeign 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.200
Second_HoldingCompany 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.400
Second_HoldingCompanyForeign 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.270
Second_Government 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.270
Panel C: Corporate Governance
Govindex1 0.370 0.290 0.320 0.430 0.710 0.180 0.120
Govindex2 0.280 0.160 0.220 0.370 0.810 0.070 0.160
Govindex3 0.330 0.220 0.270 0.420 0.780 0.110 0.160
Board_Independence 0.530 0.380 0.500 0.670 1.000 0.080 0.190
Panel D: Control Variables
DailyVolume (bil) 86.100 0.001 0.005 0.020 23000.000 0.000 1040.000
Dollar Volume ($bil) 0.305 0.010 0.062 0.349 4.350 0.000 0.761
Volatility 0.530 0.290 0.420 0.570 4.570 0.030 0.550
Leverage 0.580 0.330 0.620 0.850 0.980 0.000 0.280
Board Size 10.000 9.000 10.000 12.000 16.000 3.000 2.160
Size (US$mil) 0.439 0.074 0.184 0.467 3.280 0.001 0.641
Cross-Listing 0.360 0.360 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.480
Average_Price 13.140 13.140 4.840 16.570 252.730 0.000 24.590
81 
 
Chapter 6 
Empirical Results 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the empirical results of the relationship between liquidity, different 
types of corporate ownership, and corporate governance. Spread, Zero Return, and turnover are 
used as proxies for market liquidity and the Amihud (2002) measure serves as the proxy for price 
impact. Univariate analysis of the relationships are discussed in Section 6.2 and Section 6.3 gives 
the multivariate analyses where the liquidity measures are first regressed on ownership levels and 
then on ownership type, corporate governance variables as well as other control variables. The 
linearity of the relationship between liquidity and stock ownership is also examined. Section 6.4 
provides a summary. 
 
6.2 Univariate Analysis 
The univariate analysis shows differences in liquidity across ownership types. Table 6.1 
shows the results of parametric (t-test) and non-parametric (Mann Whitney) tests of significance. 
For the liquidity variables, a high value of Turnover (1 and 2) and a small value of Spread translate 
into high liquidity, whereas a higher value of Zero Return and Amihud represents lower liquidity 
and higher price impact respectively.  
Results show a general support for the prediction that the identity of the largest 
shareholder matters to liquidity. Specifically, firms with holding companies (both domestic and 
foreign) as the largest shareholder have significantly lower liquidity, proxied by Turnover1 and 
Turnover2. So too are firms with government and institutions as the second largest shareholder. 
The reverse is found for firms with foreign institutions as the largest owner, when liquidity is 
proxied by Zero Return. Second largest shareholdings of domestic holding companies increase 
with liquidity as there is lower price impact, as proxied by Amihud. 
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Table 6.2 reports the pair-wise correlation between the test variables. To adjust for 
skewness, the natural logarithm of market capitalization, board independence, number of 
directors, total assets, and total daily dollar volume is used throughout the analysis.  
Spread is significantly negatively correlated with Zero Return, positively correlated with 
Turnover1 and Turnover2, similar to Lesmond, (2005) and negatively correlated with Amihud 
measure.  Amihud and Mendelson (1986) suggest that since investors demand a premium for less 
liquid stocks, expected returns should be negatively related to the level of liquidity. As Zero Return 
is associated with no-trading, the significant negative correlation with spreads may indicate that 
liquidity has ‘dried up,’ as all limit orders are filled at the best quotes and so traders are more 
likely to trade with each other. Zero Return is positively correlated with Turnover1 (significant) and 
Turnover2, as expected. It may also imply lack of news, or informed trading (Lesmond et al., 
1999). The significant and positive correlation of Turnover1 and Turnover2 with Spread indicates 
that trading frequency increases (decreases) with spread.  
Even though the correlation between the variables is low (Baekert et al. 2003), the positive 
correlation between the liquidity measures is in accordance with Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) 
that there are common factors in different proxies of liquidity.  Turnover1 and Turnover2 are highly 
correlated with each other (0.85) because they have a common set of variables (daily volume).  
Amihud is significantly negatively correlated with Size and Daily_Volume implying that stocks that 
are generally traded less have lower market capitalizations and lower price impact.
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Table 6.1 
Univariate tests for differences in mean and median liquidity 
Table 6.1 examines the relation between liquidity, and ownership by using a univariate ownership identity approach. Large_Family, 
Large_Institution;Large_HoldingCompany;Large_InstitutionForeign;Large_Goverment and Large_HoldingCompanyForeign,Second_Family,Second_Institution,Second_HoldingCompany,  
Second_HoldingCompanyForeign;Second_InstitutionForeign;Second_Government are dummy variables indicating whether the largest and second largest shareholdings belong to family, 
institution, holding company, foreign institution, government or foreign holding company respectively. Zero Return is the number of trading days with zero returns/number of 
trading days for the year; Spread is[ ask-bid/(ask +bid)/2] *100; Turnover1 is volume/shares outstanding; Turnover2  is dollar volume/market capitalization; Amihud is average over 
the year of the daily ratio of the stock’s absolute return to its dollar trading volume. P-values from parametric t-tests and non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests are reported. 
 
Groups Mean
 T-test      
p-value
Mann 
Whitney 
p-value Mean
 T-test      
p-value
Mann 
Whitney 
p-value Mean
 T-test         
p-value
Mann 
Whitney 
p-value Mean
 T-test      
p-value
Mann 
Whitney 
p-value Mean
 T-test      
p-value
Mann 
Whitney 
p-value
Large_Family 0 0.021 0.011 0.100 0.021 0.275 0.249 0.199 0.339 0.339 4.153 0.153 0.188 1.772 0.451 0.517
1 0.047 0.033 0.161 6.681 1.011
Second_Family 0 0.022 0.028 0.102 0.023 0.739 0.594 0.199 0.427 0.677 4.395 0.003 0.001 1.797 0.737 0.436
1 0.035 0.021 0.176 7.935 1.587
Large_Government 0 0.021 0.685 0.635 0.021 0.832 0.449 0.195 0.037 0.010 4.101 0.097 0.249 1.736 0.407 0.358
1 0.019 0.020 0.240 5.790 2.226
Second_Government 0 0.023 0.044 0.037 0.024 0.009 0.003 0.196 0.219 0.276 4.872 0.000 0.000 1.714 0.050 0.953
1 0.014 0.012 0.223 0.907 2.739
Large_HoldingCompany 0 0.020 0.114 0.007 0.019 0.026 0.015 0.204 0.162 0.036 4.610 0.009 0.000 1.635 0.152 0.279
1 0.024 0.025 0.187 3.260 2.027
Second_HoldingCompany 0 0.022 0.683 0.894 0.022 0.481 0.590 0.206 0.006 0.015 4.191 0.009 0.022 1.971 0.009 0.029
1 0.024 0.025 0.168 5.771 1.129
Large_HoldingCompanyForeign 0 0.022 0.023 0.020 0.022 0.020 0.028 0.198 0.850 0.600 4.012 0.039 0.087 1.720 0.383 0.210
1 0.014 0.014 0.202 5.488 2.074
Second_HoldingCompanyForeign 0 0.023 0.837 0.089 0.022 0.388 0.050 0.195 0.051 0.004 4.386 0.008 0.000 1.787 0.601 0.298
1 0.024 0.027 0.242 7.219 2.083
Large_Institutional 0 0.021 0.809 0.445 0.022 0.704 0.436 0.189 0.022 0.010 4.306 0.518 0.996 1.877 0.200 0.867
1 0.021 0.021 0.216 3.976 1.530
Second_Institution 0 0.020 0.056 0.010 0.019 0.003 0.000 0.189 0.160 0.397 5.440 0.000 0.001 1.635 0.273 0.523
1 0.025 0.026 0.205 3.661 1.931
Large_InstitutionForeign 0 0.021 0.815 0.218 0.022 0.575 0.308 0.204 0.019 0.017 4.132 0.532 0.085 1.824 0.260 0.012
1 0.021 0.020 0.169 4.530 1.437
Second_InstitutionForeign 0 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.199 0.370 0.155 4.437 0.105 0.223 1.793 0.872 0.616
1 0.007 0.006 0.174 5.957 1.716
Turnover1 Turnover2 Zero Returns Spread Amihud
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Table 6.2 
Correlation matrix 
This table provides correlation coefficients for liquidity, ownership, corporate governance and other explanatory variables. The sample period covers from January 2005 to 
December 2011. Zero Return is the number of trading days with zero returns/number of trading days for the year; Spread is[ ask-bid/(ask +bid)/2] *100; Turnover1 is volume/shares 
outstanding; Turnover2  is dollar volume/market capitalization; Amihud  is average over the year of the daily ratio of the stock’s absolute return to its dollar trading volume; 
Largest_Shareholding is the percentage of shares directly owned by the largest shareholder; Second_Shareholding is the percentage of shares directly owned by the second largest 
shareholder; Blockholdings is the sum of all shareholding greater than 5%; Govindex1, Govindex2, and Govindex3 are  scores obtained using minimum standards provided by ISS 
Corporate Governance: Best Practices; Size is the closing share price times number of shares outstanding at year end; Volatility is the standard deviation of the stock daily return 
during the year; Board_Independence is the number of independent directors/total number of directors; Board_Size is the total number of directors on the board;  Size_(Assets) is the 
firm’s assets in U.S. dollars; Cross-Listing =1 if the company is cross-listed, otherwise 0; Average_Price is the average daily closing prices during the year for each year, 2005-2011; 
DailyVolume is the total of daily  volume  traded during the year for each year, 2005-2011;DollarVolume  is the total  daily dollar volume during the year for each year, 2005-
2011,where daily dollar volume = volume*closing price.   
 
 
 
 
Spread
Zero 
Return Turnover1 Turnover2 Amihud
Largest_      
Share       
holding
Second_       
Share      
holding
Block                   
holdings
Govindex    
1
Govindex
2
Govindex
3
Ln 
(Daily     
Volume)
Ln(Dollar
Volume) Volatility
Board_      
Independence
Ln(Board
_Size) Ln(Size) Ln(Assets)
Cross-
Listing
Average
_Price
Spread 1.0000
Zero Return -0.2354* 1.0000
Turnover1 0.1421* 0.1237* 1.0000
Turnover2 0.1624* 0.0973 0.8735* 1.0000
Amihud -0.0553 -0.0926 -0.0977 -0.1575* 1.0000
Largest_Shareholding 0.1016 -0.1859* -0.2491* -0.2295* -0.0740 1.0000
Second_Shareholding 0.1316* -0.0891 -0.1224 -0.1274 0.0807 -0.0301 1.0000
Blockholdings 0.1470* -0.2176* -0.2640* -0.2565* -0.0151 0.8332* 0.3691* 1.0000
Govindex1 0.0324 0.1277* 0.0492 0.0343 -0.1763* -0.1356* -0.2448* -0.1729* 1.0000
Govindex2 0.0069 0.1442* 0.0569 0.0472 -0.1937* -0.0512 -0.2806* -0.1289* 0.9062* 1.0000
Govindex3 0.0337 0.1335* 0.0501 0.0391 -0.1996* -0.0442 -0.2648* -0.1074 0.9406* 0.9918* 1.0000
Ln (DailyVolume) 0.1951* 0.2343* 0.5834* 0.5736* -0.3097* -0.0218 -0.1004 -0.0823 0.2741* 0.2920* 0.2974* 1.0000
Ln(DollarVolume) 0.2263* 0.1417* 0.5532* 0.5493* -0.5177* -0.0253 -0.1035 -0.0900 0.2747* 0.2859* 0.2924* 0.7698* 1.0000
Volatility 0.0706 -0.0140 0.0527 0.0851 -0.0315 -0.0870 -0.0357 -0.0378 0.0033 -0.0269 -0.0266 0.0821 0.0004 1.0000
Board_Independence 0.0613 0.0476 -0.1014 -0.1137 -0.0010 -0.1584* -0.0725 -0.0696 0.4060* 0.3035* 0.3387* -0.0532 -0.0473 -0.0288 1.0000
Ln(Board_Size) -0.1642* 0.2310* 0.0211 -0.0148 -0.1168 -0.1658* -0.0244 -0.2141* 0.3182* 0.3128* 0.3199* 0.2105* 0.3062* -0.2004* 0.1645* 1.0000
Ln(Size) -0.4486* 0.2211* -0.1546* -0.2281* -0.1948* 0.1346* -0.1331* 0.0253 0.1443* 0.1542* 0.1419* 0.0279 0.2873* -0.2039* -0.0302 0.5148* 1.0000
Ln(Assets) -0.5508* 0.0970 -0.3500* -0.3865* 0.2073* -0.0322 -0.0140 -0.0509 -0.0583 -0.0417 -0.0732 -0.4216* -0.3314* -0.0910 0.0101 0.2494* 0.5674* 1.0000
Cross-Listing -0.2272* 0.2023* -0.1190* -0.0973 -0.0073 -0.1652* -0.2131* -0.2894* 0.2735* 0.2231* 0.2108* -0.0640 -0.0198 0.0235 0.1734* 0.2681* 0.3997* 0.3939* 1.0000
Average_Price 0.0857 0.0145 0.1479* 0.1573* -0.2882* 0.0049 -0.0620 -0.0272 0.0622 0.0860 0.0872 0.0703 0.4250* -0.0593 -0.0061 0.1302* 0.3063* -0.0141 0.0005 1.0000
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The cross sectional correlation between liquidity and ownership shows Largest_Shareholding, 
Second_Shareholding, and Blockholdings are all positively correlated with Spread, and significantly 
negatively correlated with both measures of Turnover. Blockholdings and Largest_Shareholding are 
highly correlated, at 0.83. One reason for the high correlation is that over time both variables 
tend to move in the same direction. Including both variables in a multivariate specification would 
lead to multicollinearity so only one variable will be included at a time.  
Govindex1, Govindex2 and Govindex3 are positively correlated with Zero Return and negatively 
correlated with Amihud measures, implying that increases (decreases) in corporate governance are 
associated with increases (decreases) in market liquidity. As expected, the three governance 
indices are highly correlated with each other.  
Since the correlation coefficients of the explanatory variables are relatively small, 
multicollinearity may not be a serious problem in the data. The liquidity measures of Spread, Zero 
Return and Turnover (1 and 2) are positively correlated with trading volume, indicating that 
investors trade at the same time to benefit from liquidity (Admati and Pfeleider, 1998, Gregoriou 
et al., 2002). Dollar trading volume is related to how quickly a dealer expects to turn around her 
position and is positively related to liquidity (Stoll, 1978; Chordia et al., 2001). Size as measured 
by the logarithm of market capitalization is positively and significantly correlated with dollar 
volume. Average price is positively correlated with liquidity measures (Sarin, et al., 2000; Dennis 
and Weston, 2001; Attig et al., 2006), but is negative with Amihud measure. A possible reason is 
stock price reflects transaction costs and inventories and high priced stocks might have high 
transactions costs and higher frequency of non-trading days (Stoll and Whaley, 1983). In keeping 
with Baekert et al. (2007), there is no consistent pattern with volatility and liquidity measures as 
on average the correlations move towards zero. This may be because market thinness and 
volatility are positively related (Pagano, 1989).  
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6.3 Multivariate Analyses 
6.3.1 Liquidity, ownership and corporate governance 
To examine the relationship between liquidity, corporate ownership, and corporate 
governance while controlling for other factors, fixed effects regressions are used where standard 
errors are clustered by company (Petersen, 2009). Each of the liquidity measures is regressed on 
ownership and corporate governance variables taking into consideration fixed effects industry, 
exchange, and year dummy variables. In tests with the Amihud measure as the dependent 
variable, Ln(DailyVolume) is the control variable since dollar volume is included in the 
denominator of the Amihud measure.  
Results for the various liquidity measures are reported in Table 6.3 (Govindex2 and 
Govindex3 yield similar results, see Appendix 4, Table A1). The dependent variables are the two 
turnover measures (Turnover1 and Turnover2) in Panel A; Zero Return and Spread in Panel B; and 
Amihud in Panel C.  
Panel A shows that Turnover1 and Turnover2 are negatively related to Largest_Shareholding. 
The relationship is significant in all specifications except for specification (11). Therefore, firms 
with a higher largest shareholding have lower turnover, in line with the argument that large 
shareholders reduce liquidity in a firm’s traded shares (Bhide, 1993). Some further supporting 
evidence is also found when ownership concentration is proxied by Blockholdings for the Turnover1 
measure. This finding is consistent with high ownership concentration reducing the intensity of 
trading activity and the continuity of the order flow (Kothare, 1997).  
In Panel B, the results are generally similar but less significant when liquidity is proxied by 
Zero Return; they are insignificant for Spread. Both Largest_Shareholding and Blockholdings are 
significantly positive in Panel C when the Amihud measure is the dependent variable. In keeping 
with the literature on the Amihud (2002) price impact measure, larger positive values mean 
greater price impact and lower liquidity. The reported results thus suggest that firms with higher 
ownership concentration have a higher Amihud measure and thus lower liquidity.  
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Of the control variables, only Size and DollarVolume have some explanatory power. While 
larger firms have lower liquidity, as proxied by Turnover1 and Turnover2, firms with higher average 
daily dollar volume have higher liquidity as stocks will be less volatile and are more competitive. 
Contrary to expectations, the size of the second largest shareholding (Second_Shareholding) and the 
quality of corporate governance (Govindex1and Board_Independence) are insignificant. 
Other tests are done using an alternate measure of ownership concentration, the 
Herfindahl Index. The results reported in Table A2 show that liquidity is lower in firms with 
concentrated shareholdings. 
Interaction terms of ownership with Govindex1 are included in Table 6.4 to test whether 
the power of Govindex1 has anything to do with the power of controlling shareholders. Good 
corporate governance may be valuable in firms with large controlling shareholders to limit 
diversion of resources; or it may be less valuable since firms with large shareholders may 
disregard or circumvent governance rules. From Table 6.4, the interaction is not significant, 
hinting that the large shareholdings may substitute for corporate governance rather than 
complement it.  
Arguably, a single set of criteria to judge corporate governance is highly questionable as 
firms differ and a one size does not fit all. Bebchuck and Hamdani (2009) argue that the quest 
for single global governance metric is misguided as it does not appropriately consider how 
governance problems differ in firms with or without a controlling shareholder. Plus, when 
institutional systems are poorly developed, concentrated ownership may substitute for weak 
investor protection (Schleifer and Vishny, 1997). These conditions prevail in developing/ 
emerging markets where control,53 is not contestable and can have implications for stock market 
liquidity. Good corporate governance is less beneficial in firms with more powerful insiders. 
                                                          
53 Schleifer and Vishny (1997), page 761) argue that “as ownership gets beyond a certain point, large owners gain 
nearly full control of the company and are wealthy enough to prefer to use firms to generate private benefits that are 
not shared by the minority shareholders.” 
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Corporate governance rules, no matter how good they are, may be side-stepped or disregarded 
by controlling shareholders. 
Table 6.5 tests for non-linearity of the relationship between ownership and liquidity. As 
before, results for Turnover1 and Turnover2 are reported in Panel A; Zero Return and Spread in Panel 
B; and Amihud in Panel C. Contrary to predictions, there is no evidence of non-linearity in the 
relationship. Both the squared and cubed ownership variables are not significant in all the 
specifications examined. Of the ownership variables tested, only Blockholdings is significant when 
liquidity is proxied by Turnover1 and Amihud, in line with Table 6.3. Therefore, firms with higher 
ownership concentration, as measured by total blockholdings, are associated with lower liquidity. 
This finding supports the entrenchment hypothesis.  
Tests on the linear relationship of large shareholdings and liquidity find that liquidity is 
lower in their presence (see Table A3, Appendix A). 
The identity of the largest shareholder is expected to influence corporate decision and the 
corporate information environment, both of which may impact on market liquidity. Four identity 
groups of the largest shareholder is examined: financial institutions (domestic and foreign); 
family; holding companies (foreign and domestic); and government. In the regressions shown in 
Table 6.6, the liquidity measure is first regressed on each of these identity groups separately 
(specifications 1-8) and then regressed on all of them together (specifications 9-10). In the latter, 
the largest government-shareholder (Largest_Government) is the base case. When the identity 
groups are tested separately, Panel A shows, only Largest_Government has a negative and 
significant relationship with Turnover1 (specifications (7) and (8)). Therefore, firms with 
government as the largest shareholder have lower liquidity. Similar results are found for Turnover2 
(Panel B) and Spread (Panel D). The latter finding is consistent with Wei et al. (2005). 
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Table 6.3 
 Panel regressions for liquidity 
Fixed effects regression analysis of liquidity, ownership and corporate governance. Largest_Shareholding is the direct shareholding of the largest shareholder; Second _Shareholding is the 
direct shareholdings of the second largest shareholder and Blockholdings is the total shareholdings of 5% or more. The liquidity measures are: Zero Return is the number of trading 
days with zero returns/number of trading days for the year; Spread is[ ask-bid/(ask +bid)/2] *100; Turnover1 is volume/shares outstanding; Turnover2  is dollar volume/market 
capitalization; Amihud  is average over the year of the daily ratio of the stock’s absolute return to its dollar trading volume; Govindex1, Govindex2, and Govindex3 are  scores obtained 
using minimum standards provided by ISS Corporate Governance: Best Practices; Size is the closing share price times number of shares outstanding at year end; Volatility is the 
standard deviation of the stock daily return during the year; Board_Independence is the number of independent directors/total number of directors;  Size_(Assets) is the firm’s assets in 
U.S. dollars; Cross-Listing =1 if the company is cross-listed, otherwise 0; Average_Price is the average daily closing prices during the year for each year 2005-2011; DailyVolume is the 
total of daily  volume  traded during the year for each year 2005-2011; DollarVolume  is the total  daily dollar volume during the year for each year 2005-2011,where daily dollar 
volume = volume*closing price.  T-values reported in parentheses. 
 
Panel:A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Largest_Shareholding -0.024*** -0.023** -0.023* -0.019** -0.017* -0.014
(-3.54) (-3.20) (-2.54) (-2.74) (-2.40) (-1.54)
Second_Shareholding -0.005 0.010 -0.007 0.007 -0.006 0.010 -0.008 0.004 -0.008 0.002 -0.010 -0.002
(-0.49) (0.92) (-0.61) (0.65) (-0.68) (1.05) (-0.86) (0.33) (-0.78) (0.19) (-1.16) (-0.21)
Blockholdings -0.023* -0.020* -0.023* -0.016 -0.013 -0.010
(-2.51) (-2.20) (-2.27) (-1.76) (-1.42) (-0.83)
Govindex1 -0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.003
(-0.20) (-0.16) (0.14) (0.24)
Ln(Board_Independence) -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001
(-1.10) (-0.88) (-0.27) (-0.12)
Ln(Size) -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(-4.95) (-4.99) (-4.83) (-4.87) (-4.99) (-4.88) (-7.93) (-8.17) (-7.98) (-8.24) (-7.55) (-7.88)
Average_Price 0.054 0.068 0.056 0.066 0.046 0.092 0.077* 0.087* 0.077* 0.083* 0.118 0.152
(1.23) (1.55) (1.27) (1.49) (0.43) (0.90) (2.26) (2.40) (2.10) (2.19) (1.12) (1.50)
Ln(DollarVolume) 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(6.93) (6.99) (6.82) (6.90) (6.31) (6.35) (7.90) (7.97) (7.87) (7.95) (6.59) (6.72)
Volatility 0.079 0.050 0.065 0.038 0.035 -0.048 0.088 0.077 0.081 0.071 0.052 0.010
(0.54) (0.32) (0.44) (0.25) (0.02) (-0.02) (0.56) (0.48) (0.51) (0.45) (0.03) (0.00)
Cross_Listing -0.279 -0.085 -0.156 -0.666 0.033 -0.014 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.307 0.357
(-0.01) (-0.22) (-0.04) (-0.18) (0.08) (-0.04) (0.85) (0.74) (0.84) (0.83) (0.72) (0.83)
Intercept 0.026 0.032 0.025 0.029 0.059 0.061 0.062*** 0.065*** 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.088** 0.088**
(1.37) (1.60) (1.24) (1.44) (1.82) (1.87) (3.85) (3.99) (3.64) (3.81) (3.29) (3.35)
Number of Observations 326 327 321 322 231 231 324 325 319 320 227 227
Adjusted R
2 0.525 0.514 0.516 0.505 0.551 0.544 0.556 0.549 0.546 0.539 0.555 0.549
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Exchange Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Turnover1 Turnover2
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Table 6.3 (continued)
 
Panel: B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Largest_Shareholding -0.095* -0.098* -0.091 2.542 2.677 1.707
(-2.40) (-2.36) (-1.58) (1.79) (1.79) (0.88)
Second_Shareholding -0.034 0.036 -0.036 0.036 -0.002 0.057 6.620 4.599 5.931 3.882 5.881 4.292
(-0.41) (0.43) (-0.44) (0.44) (-0.02) (0.67) (1.98) (1.26) (1.75) (1.05) (1.65) (1.13)
Blockholdings -0.079 -0.080 -0.054 2.522 2.592 2.444
(-1.80) (-1.71) (-0.90) (1.69) (1.62) (1.03)
Govindex1 0.004 0.002 -3.599 -3.386
(0.04) (0.02) (-1.40) (-1.35)
Ln(Board_Independence) -0.018 -0.016 0.044 0.020
(-1.19) (-0.98) (0.07) (0.03)
Ln(Size) 0.011 0.009 0.012 0.010 0.010 0.005 -0.600* -0.588 -0.566 -0.551 -0.906* -0.908**
(1.32) (1.11) (1.34) (1.13) (0.86) (0.48) (-2.06) (-1.97) (-1.94) (-1.84) (-2.63) (-2.78)
Average_Price 0.177 0.039 -0.021 0.014 -0.395 -0.186 2.060 1.460 0.00193 0.00101 0.0121 0.0100
(0.11) (0.24) (-0.11) (0.07) (-0.66) (-0.34) (0.28) (0.19) (0.23) (0.11) (0.44) (0.36)
Ln(DollarVolume) 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.012 0.016* -0.452* -0.472** -0.463** -0.484** -0.602** -0.613**
(1.23) (1.65) (1.19) (1.62) (1.53) (2.13) (-2.53) (-2.64) (-2.68) (-2.78) (-2.83) (-2.76)
Volatility -0.001 -0.003 0.018 0.020 0.025 0.029 -0.105 -0.086 -0.111 -0.092 -0.537 -0.512
(-0.13) (-0.23) (0.80) (0.82) (0.97) (0.98) (-0.34) (-0.28) (-0.37) (-0.31) (-1.27) (-1.25)
Cross_Listing 0.020 0.020 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.915 0.922 1.093 1.079 1.017 1.189
(0.89) (0.87) (-0.12) (-0.22) (0.00) (-0.10) (1.37) (1.44) (1.65) (1.68) (1.16) (1.29)
Intercept -0.077 -0.070 -0.082 -0.075 -0.064 -0.037 14.56* 14.45* 15.02** 14.84* 22.72** 22.37**
(-0.68) (-0.65) (-0.70) (-0.66) (-0.38) (-0.22) (2.53) (2.51) (2.64) (2.59) (3.24) (3.19)
Number of Observations 307 308 300 301 226 226 315 316 310 311 223 223
Adjusted R
2 0.339 0.328 0.332 0.320 0.402 0.390 0.611 0.609 0.614 0.611 0.568 0.570
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Exchange Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Zero Return Spread
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Table 6.3 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel: C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Largest_Shareholding 1.009* 1.055* 0.899
(2.06) (2.02) (1.53)
Second_Shareholding 0.454 -0.471 0.510 -0.473 0.807 -0.174
(0.45) (-0.48) (0.49) (-0.47) (0.83) (-0.18)
Blockholdings 1.422* 1.517* 1.619*
(2.44) (2.42) (2.51)
Govindex1 0.091 0.094
(0.10) (0.11)
Ln(Board_Independence) 0.229 0.215
(1.14) (1.13)
Ln(Size) -0.627*** -0.638*** -0.623*** -0.632*** -0.432*** -0.451***
(-6.87) (-6.86) (-6.79) (-6.79) (-3.73) (-3.84)
Average_Price -2.330 -3.200 -0.331 -0.432 -0.986 -1.050
(-1.01) (-1.29) (-1.17) (-1.43) (-1.66) (-1.75)
Ln(DailyVolume) -0.049 -0.047 -0.049 -0.046 -0.070 -0.063
(-0.99) (-0.96) (-0.96) (-0.91) (-1.44) (-1.30)
Volatility -0.210 -0.214 0.524 0.631* 0.449 0.594
(-1.22) (-1.25) (1.84) (2.01) (1.66) (1.92)
Cross_Listing 0.495 0.597* -0.210 -0.215 -0.082 -0.077
(1.88) (2.05) (-1.21) (-1.25) (-0.51) (-0.48)
Intercept 17.360*** 17.180*** 17.200*** 16.950*** 12.240*** 12.110***
(10.01) (9.91) (9.56) (9.43) (5.29) (5.44)
Number of Observations 309 309 302 302 239 239
Adjusted R
2 0.537 0.540 0.534 0.538 0.348 0.359
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
Exchange Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
Amihud
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Table 6.4 
 Interaction analysis of independent variables 
Largest_Shareholding is the direct shareholding of the largest shareholder; Second _Shareholding is the direct 
shareholdings of the second largest shareholder and Blockholdings is the total shareholdings of 5% or more. The 
liquidity measures are: Zero Return is the number of trading days with zero returns/number of trading days for the 
year; Spread is[ ask-bid/(ask +bid)/2] *100; Turnover1 is volume/shares outstanding; Turnover2  is dollar 
volume/market capitalization; Govindex1 is  score obtained using minimum standards provided by ISS Corporate 
Governance: Best Practices; Size is the closing share price times number of shares outstanding at year end; Volatility 
is the standard deviation of the stock daily return during the year; Cross-Listing =1 if the company is cross-listed, 
otherwise 0; Average_Price is the average daily closing prices during the year for each year 2005-2011; DailyVolume is 
the total of daily  volume  traded during the year for each year 2005-2011; DollarVolume  is the total  daily dollar 
volume during the year for each year 2005-2011,where daily dollar volume = volume*closing price.  T-values 
reported in parentheses. 
 
 
Spread Turnover1 Turnover2 Zero Returns Amihud
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Largest_Shareholding 2.757 -0.026*** -0.019* -0.082* 1.208*
(1.71) (-3.41) (-2.62) (-2.04) (2.06)
Second_Shareholding 0.910 -0.005 -0.005 -0.029 1.420
(0.25) (-0.43) (-0.45) (-0.32) (1.26)
Govindex1 -3.758 -0.018 -0.011 0.103 1.165
(-1.27) (-1.26) (-0.85) (0.98) (0.86)
Largest_Shareholding*Govindex1 -0.759 0.016 0.0138 -0.095 -0.662
(-0.38) (1.47) (1.67) (-1.89) (-0.88)
Ln(Size) -0.563 -0.058*** -0.772*** 0.925 -0.610***
(-1.91) (-4.70) (-7.88) (1.06) (-5.83)
Average_Price 0.625 0.0582 0.079* 0.0042 -4.87
(0.07) (1.30) (2.13) (0.02) (-1.34)
Ln(DollarVolume) -5.390** 7.860*** 7.690*** 9.080
(-2.93) (7.17) (8.36) (1.68)
Ln(DailyVolume) -0.046
(-0.86)
Volatility -15.800 0.067 0.084 -0.169 -19.700
(-0.54) (0.45) (0.53) (-0.16) (-1.01)
Cross_Listing 0.852 -0.000829 0.00234 0.0223 0.398
(1.22) (-0.23) (0.67) (1.02) (1.39)
Intercept 16.940** 0.028 0.066*** -0.102 17.050***
(2.95) (1.59) (3.99) (-0.90) (9.09)
Number of Observations 310 321 319 300 307
Adjusted R
2 0.601 0.521 0.549 0.341 0.529
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Dummy yes yes yes yes yes
Exchange Dummy yes yes yes yes yes
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Thus, consistent with Hypothesis H6, firms with government as the largest shareholder 
have lower liquidity. Additionally, Panel E reports that Largest_InstitutionForeign has a positive 
price impact, suggesting lower liquidity. 
The second set of regression results where Largest_Government is the base category shows 
that Largest_Family is positively related with Turnover1. Therefore, family firms are associated with 
higher liquidity (Wang, 2006) than government-owned firms. Largest_HoldingCompany is 
significantly positively related to Turnover1 (specifications (9) and (10) in Panel A) and Turnover2 
(specification (10) in Panel B) and negatively related with Spread (specifications (9) and (10) in 
Panel D). These results confirm Hypothesis H4 that holding companies as the largest 
shareholder can contribute to a liquid market. There is also evidence showing that firms with 
foreign holding companies as the largest shareholder (Largest_HoldingCompanyForeign) have higher 
liquidity (Panel D, specification (9)), supporting Hypothesis H8.  
Specifications (9) and (10) of Panels A and B show Largest_Institution is positively related to 
Turnover1 and Turnover2. Panel D shows that it is significantly negatively related with Spread. 
These results suggest that firms with financial institutions as the largest shareholder are more 
liquid, in accordance with H3. Results in Panel C, specification (9) shows that 
Largest_InstitutionForeign is significantly negatively related to Zero Return, consistent with greater 
transparency of such firms (Aggarwal et al., 2005). Zero returns occur when traders do not 
consider the information available to them sufficiently valuable to cover the transaction costs.  
The tests conducted so far show that liquidity is indifferent to the second largest 
shareholding and corporate governance.54 We probe further into these relationships. First, we 
extend the tests of the role of the second largest shareholder by examining whether the identity 
of the second largest shareholder matters to liquidity. As with the largest shareholder, we identify 
four groups of largest second shareholder: financial institutions (domestic and foreign); family; 
                                                          
54 Although not reported in Table 6.6, including the second largest shareholding in the regressions makes no 
material difference to the reported results. In all cases, the second largest shareholding is insignificant. 
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holding companies (foreign and domestic); and government. In the regressions, the second 
largest government-shareholder (Second_Government) is the base case. 
Table 6.8 shows only weak evidence that the identity of the second largest shareholder is 
important in explaining liquidity. In Panel A, while Second_Family has a significant positive 
coefficient (specification (3)), Second_InstitutionForeign has a significant negative coefficient 
(specifications (5) and (9)). Therefore, while firms with family as the second largest shareholder 
have higher liquidity, the reverse holds true for firms with foreign financial institutions as the 
second largest shareholder.  Panel C shows firms with foreign holding companies as the second 
largest shareholder have lower liquidity, as measured by a higher incidence of zero return days. 
Overall, results for the relationship between liquidity and the identity of the second largest 
shareholder generally lack significance, both statistically and economically. 
Next, the relationship between governance and liquidity is further explored by dividing the 
governance index into three sub-indices: board, director stock ownership and progressive 
practices. The hypothesize relationship centres on board efficacy since it serves to protect 
shareholders’ interests and reduce agency costs. Table 6.8 reports the results. Contrary to 
expectations, none of the governance standards are significant. 55 These results may be driven by 
poor disclosure as well as differences in regulatory practices and enforcement across the 
countries. For example, as noted in Chapter 2, there are differences in defining ‘board 
independence’ across the exchanges. Additional tests are done on the 28 individual governance 
standards and Table 6.9 reports the results. Eight standards are found to be significant and have 
the expected signs (positive). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
55 Other regressions using ownership identity yield similar results. 
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6.4  Summary 
 
This chapter presents the results of the relationship between ownership, corporate 
governance, and liquidity. To eliminate the concern of omitted variables bias, several regressions 
are run by incorporating fixed effects year, exchange and time dummies.  
Results show that, consistent with past studies, firms with concentrated ownership have 
lower liquidity. Additionally, the identity of large owners matters for liquidity, albeit less so for 
the second largest shareholder. Even though the results of the governance index yield results 
contrary to expectations, further investigation shows that eight governance standards matter for 
good corporate governance. 
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Table 6.5 
Tests of linearity of the relationship between ownership and liquidity 
Largest_Shareholding is the direct shareholding of the largest shareholder; Largest_Shareholding^2 is the squared value of Largest_Shareholding; Largest_Shareholding^3 is the cubed value of 
Largest_Shareholding; Blockholdings is the sum of all shareholding greater than 5%; Zero Return is the number of trading days with zero returns/number of trading days for the year; 
Spread is[ ask-bid/(ask +bid)/2] *100; Turnover1 is volume/shares outstanding; Turnover2  is dollar volume/market capitalization; Amihud  is average over the year of the daily ratio of 
the stock’s absolute return to its dollar trading volume; Govindex1, Govindex2, and Govindex3 are  scores obtained using minimum standards provided by ISS Corporate Governance: 
Best Practices; Size is the closing share price times number of shares outstanding at year end; Volatility is the standard deviation of the stock daily return during the year; 
Board_Independence is the number of independent directors/total number of directors;  Size_(Assets) is the firm’s assets in U.S. dollars; Cross-Listing =1 if the company is cross-listed, 
otherwise 0; Average_Price is the average daily closing prices during the year for each year, 2005-2011; DailyVolume is the total of daily  volume  traded during the year for each year, 
2005-2011; DollarVolume  is the total  daily dollar volume during the year for each year, 2005-2011,where daily dollar volume = volume*closing price. T-values reported in 
parentheses. 
 
Panel: A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Largest_Shareholding -0.120 -0.125 -0.178 -0.111 -0.105 -0.151
(-1.51) (-1.37) (-1.77) (-1.58) (-1.38) (-1.58)
Largest_Shareholding^2 0.213 0.227 0.319 0.212 0.204 0.286
(1.23) (1.17) (1.53) (1.40) (1.25) (1.49)
Largest_Shareholding^3 -0.135 -0.144 -0.191 -0.140 -0.134 -0.174
(-1.23) (-1.20) (-1.49) (-1.44) (-1.30) (-1.47)
Second_Shareholding 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.095 0.092 0.045 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.123 0.126 0.051
(0.36) (0.23) (0.54) (0.96) (0.97) (0.44) (0.21) (0.13) (0.17) (1.38) (1.44) (0.60)
Second_Shareholding^2 -0.274 -0.272 -0.109 -0.489 -0.503 -0.255
(-0.63) (-0.64) (-0.25) (-1.26) (-1.32) (-0.70)
Second_Shareholding^3 0.197 0.192 0.070 0.521 0.536 0.320
(0.37) (0.37) (0.14) (1.11) (1.16) (0.73)
Blockholdings -0.012* -0.019* -0.022* -0.015 -0.012 -0.009
(-2.60) (-2.26) (-2.26) (-1.80) (-1.44) (-0.78)
Govindex1 -0.009 -0.001 -0.004 0.005
(-0.54) (-0.03) (-0.29) (0.49)
Ln(Board_Independence) -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001
(-1.03) (-0.92) (-0.19) (-0.15)
Ln(Size) -0.006*** -0.06*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.010***
(-4.84) (-4.69) (-4.61) (-4.89) (-4.81) (-4.73) (-8.05) (-7.97) (-7.23) (-7.94) (-8.04) (-7.45)
Average_Price 0.058 0.059 0.062 0.055 0.055 0.078 0.008* 0.008* 0.014 0.007* 0.007 0.014
(1.32) (1.33) (0.59) (1.20) (1.19) (0.70) (2.44) (2.17) (1.35) (2.01) (1.86) (1.29)
Ln(DollarVolume) 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009***
(6.86) (6.76) (6.11) (6.96) (6.89) (6.29) (7.89) (7.82) (6.33) (7.96) (7.96) (6.71)
Turnover1 Turnover2
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Table 6.5 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Volatility 0.099 0.085 0.056 0.030 0.018 -0.014 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.66) (0.57) (0.28) (0.20) (0.12) (-0.07) (0.67) (0.61) (0.26) (0.31) (0.27) (-0.06)
Cross_Listing 0.031 0.047 -0.017 -0.013 -0.003 0.029 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004
(0.08) (0.13) (-0.04) (-0.03) (-0.01) (0.07) (0.99) (1.04) (0.61) (0.91) (0.97) (0.92)
Intercept 0.034 0.034 0.066 0.023 0.020 0.056 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.094*** 0.055** 0.045** 0.083**
(1.56) (1.40) (1.96) (1.08) (0.93) (1.62) (4.05) (3.70) (3.46) (3.13) (2.86) (2.80)
Number of Observations 326 321 231 327 322 231 324 319 227 325 320 227
Adjusted R
2
0.526 0.517 0.555 0.515 0.507 0.540 0.557 0.546 0.557 0.551 0.541 0.546
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Exchange Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Turnover1 Turnover2
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Table 6.5 (continued) 
 
 
Panel: B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Largest_Shareholding -0.280 -0.270 -0.146 12.37 6.583 18.65
(-0.49) (-0.51) (-0.19) (0.92) (0.47) (1.19)
Largest_Shareholding^2 0.418 0.385 0.023 -36.23 -22.53 -53.56
(0.33) (0.32) (0.01) (-1.07) (-0.64) (-1.55)
Largest_Shareholding^3 -0.269 -0.245 0.044 31.78 22.80 43.61
(-0.33) (-0.32) (0.04) (1.36) (0.94) (1.96)
Second_Shareholding -0.014 -0.019 0.001 -0.063 -0.069 0.101 5.165 5.254 3.402 11.66 6.317 12.86
(-0.13) (-0.17) (0.01) (-0.10) (-0.11) (0.12) (1.39) (1.43) (1.01) (0.67) (0.36) (0.66)
Second_Shareholding^2 0.415 0.451 -0.346 -43.48 -22.03 -44.26
(0.15) (0.16) (-0.10) (-0.54) (-0.27) (-0.53)
Second_Shareholding^3 -0.449 -0.507 0.582 65.42 39.38 59.05
(-0.14) (-0.16) (0.15) (0.64) (0.38) (0.57)
Blockholdings -0.079 -0.081 -0.054 2.608 2.656 2.552
(-1.82) (-1.73) (-0.88) (1.73) (1.63) (1.06)
Govindex1 -0.005 -0.001 -3.207 -3.321
(-0.06) (-0.01) (-1.21) (-1.31)
Ln(Board_Independence) -0.019 -0.016 -0.0421 0.026
(-1.23) (-0.99) (-0.06) (0.04)
Ln(Size) 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.005 -0.584 -0.547 -0.836* -0.607* -0.569 -0.910**
(1.32) (1.35) (0.96) (1.07) (1.09) (0.42) (-1.94) (-1.81) (-2.30) (-2.07) (-1.94) (-2.71)
Average_Price 0.002 -0.002 -0.041 0.005 0.002 -0.018 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.009
(0.14) (-0.09) (-0.66) (0.27) (0.11) (-0.29) (0.30) (0.22) (0.27) (0.15) (0.12) (0.31)
Ln(DollarVolume) 0.007 0.007 0.012 0.009 0.009 0.016* -0.394* -0.404* -0.495* -0.467* -0.479** -0.606**
(1.23) (1.18) (1.55) (1.56) (1.54) (2.01) (-2.41) (-2.53) (-2.56) (-2.62) (-2.76) (-2.74)
Zero Return Spread
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Table 6.5 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Volatility -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.071 -0.071 -0.484 -0.097 -0.095 -0.525
(-0.10) (-0.09) (0.05) (-0.21) (-0.20) (-0.10) (-0.24) (-0.25) (-1.18) (-0.32) (-0.32) (-1.28)
Cross_Listing 0.0205 0.019 0.023 0.020 0.019 0.029 0.678 0.881 0.707 0.919 1.058 1.231
(0.94) (0.88) (0.88) (0.80) (0.76) (0.87) (0.95) (1.19) (0.80) (1.44) (1.63) (1.33)
Intercept -0.061 -0.068 -0.075 -0.063 -0.068 -0.037 13.221* 14.050* 19.950** 14.380* 15.000* 21.730**
(-0.53) (-0.57) (-0.43) (-0.57) (-0.59) (-0.17) (2.19) (2.33) (2.77) (2.41) (2.51) (2.70)
Number of Observations 307 300 226 308 301 226 315 310 223 316 311 223
Adjusted R
2
0.335 0.328 0.397 0.324 0.316 0.384 0.624 0.625 0.567 0.607 0.609 0.587
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Exchange Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Zero Return Spread
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Table 6.5 (continued) 
 
 
 
Panel: C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Largest_Shareholding 7.969 8.428 9.455
(1.12) (1.18) (1.15)
Largest_Shareholding^2 -8.696 -9.679 -12.370
(-0.55) (-0.61) (-0.68)
Largest_Shareholding^3 1.385 2.053 4.069
(0.14) (0.20) (0.36)
Second_Shareholding -0.138 -0.108 0.226 6.575 6.899 12.080
(-0.12) (-0.09) (0.18) (0.68) (0.70) (1.14)
Second_Shareholding^2 -34.370 -35.530 -57.300
(-0.83) (-0.84) (-1.27)
Second_Shareholding^3 44.100 45.290 70.560
(0.90) (0.91) (1.34)
Blockholdings 1.507* 1.603* 1.824**
(2.51) (2.50) (2.98)
Govindex1 0.298 0.280
(0.35) (0.35)
Ln(Board_Independence) 0.264 0.213
(1.34) (1.06)
Ln(Size) -0.665*** -0.664*** -0.506*** -0.643*** -0.639*** -0.441***
(-6.94) (-6.92) (-4.12) (-7.06) (-6.96) (-4.05)
Average_Price -0.003 -0.004 -0.011 -0.004 -0.005 -0.013
(-1.28) (-1.36) (-1.73) (-1.37) (-1.46) (-1.77)
Ln(DailyVolume) -0.067 -0.068 -0.078 -0.047 -0.047 -0.064
(-1.37) (-1.34) (-1.50) (-0.97) (-0.94) (-1.37)
Volatility -0.259 -0.260 -0.135 -0.231 -0.232 -0.110
(-1.53) (-1.53) (-0.95) (-1.35) (-1.35) (-0.70)
Cross_Listing 0.591* 0.603* 0.566* 0.629 0.655 0.673*
(2.26) (2.15) (2.04) (1.99) (1.97) (2.03)
Intercept 17.300*** 17.100*** 12.560*** 16.840*** 16.590*** 11.130***
(9.98) (9.44) (5.71) (9.46) (9.02) (5.18)
Number of Observations 309 302 239 309 302 239
Adjusted R
2
0.552 0.549 0.371 0.539 0.536 0.363
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
Exchange Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
Amihud
101 
 
Table 6.6 
Liquidity and the identity of the largest shareholders 
Direct shareholdings of the largest shareholders are: Largest_Family; Largest_Institution; Largest_HoldingCompany; 
Largest_InstitutionForeign; Largest_HoldingCompanyForeign; Largest_Government. Zero Return is the number of trading days 
with zero returns/number of trading days for the year; Spread is[ ask-bid/(ask +bid)/2] *100; Turnover1 is 
volume/shares outstanding; Turnover2  is dollar volume/market capitalization; Amihud  is average over the year of 
the daily ratio of the stock’s absolute return to its dollar trading volume; Govindex1, Govindex2, and Govindex3 are  
scores obtained using minimum standards provided by ISS Corporate Governance; Size is the closing share price 
times number of shares outstanding at year end; Volatility is the standard deviation of the stock daily return during 
the year; Board_Independence is the number of independent directors/total number of directors;  Size_(Assets) is the 
firm’s assets in U.S. dollars; Cross-Listing =1 if the company is cross-listed, otherwise 0; Average_Price is the average 
daily closing prices each year for 2005-2011; DailyVolume is the total of daily  volume  traded each year for 2005-
2011; DollarVolume  is the total  daily dollar volume each year for 2005-2011,where daily dollar volume = 
volume*closing price. T-values reported in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Large_Shareholding -0.017* -0.024*** -0.015* -0.020** -0.015* -0.019** -0.015* -0.019** -0.014* -0.021**
(-2.35) (-3.43) (-2.26) (-2.81) (-2.15) (-2.71) (-2.23) (-2.85) (-2.00) (-3.07)
Largest_Family 0.016 0.021 0.027* 0.034*
(1.39) (1.82) (2.08) (2.54)
Largest_Government -0.011* -0.012*
(-2.00) (-2.40)
Largest_HoldingCompany 0.005 0.003 0.014* 0.014*
(1.33) (0.90) (2.38) (2.53)
Largest_HoldingCompanyForeign -0.003 -0.001 0.006 0.011
(-0.66) (-0.18) (0.98) (1.71)
Largest_Institution -0.002 -0.003 0.010 0.011*
(-0.72) (-1.06) (1.81) (2.02)
Largest_InstitutionForeign 0.000 0.003 0.010 0.016*
(-0.03) (0.48) (1.49) (2.15)
Govindex1 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001
(-0.38) (-0.33) (-0.31) (-0.29) (-0.01)
Ln(Board_Independence) -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003
(-1.41) (-1.54) (-1.41) (-1.44) (-1.15)
Ln(Size) -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.009***
(-5.35) (-5.29) (-4.45) (-5.05) (-5.62) (-5.81) (-6.58) (-6.77) (-4.51) (-4.66)
Average_Price 0.060 0.073 0.046 0.045 0.060 0.053 0.061 0.067 0.051 0.100
(1.36) (0.71) (1.08) (0.45) (1.45) (0.52) (1.48) (0.68) (1.19) (1.04)
Ln(DollarVolume) 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.010***
(8.16) (7.46) (7.38) (6.49) (7.83) (7.31) (7.93) (7.50) (7.64) (6.49)
Volatility 0.023 -0.013 0.004 -0.012 0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.060 0.009 -0.106
(0.16) (-0.07) (0.25) (-0.06) (0.05) (-0.37) (-0.03) (-0.34) (0.06) (-0.60)
Cross_Listing 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.51) (0.36) (0.57) (0.55) (0.67) (0.73) (0.67) (0.89) (0.62) (0.74)
Intercept 0.028 0.072* 0.013 0.052 0.022 0.049 0.031 0.065* 0.004 0.056
(1.58) (2.29) (0.62) (1.72) (1.17) (1.66) (1.85) (2.27) (0.18) (1.81)
Number of Observations 364 262 364 262 364 262 364 262 364 262
Adjusted R
2 0.520 0.581 0.526 0.578 0.526 0.588 0.527 0.584 0.534 0.594
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Exchange Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Turnover1
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Table 6.6 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Panel B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Large_Shareholding -0.013 -0.015* -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.013
(-1.86) (-2.13) (-1.57) (-1.45) (-1.58) (-1.48) (-1.60) (-1.49) (-1.56) (-1.75)
Largest_Family 0.001 0.005 0.007 0.017
(0.20) (0.64) (0.82) (1.81)
Largest_Government -0.005 -0.009*
(-1.29) (-2.12)
Largest_HoldingCompany 0.004 0.002 0.008 0.011*
(1.28) (0.41) (1.80) (2.36)
Largest_HoldingCompanyForeign -0.006 -0.007 -0.002 0.003
(-1.42) (-1.62) (-0.30) (0.65)
Largest_Institution -0.002 0.001 0.004 0.010*
(-0.56) (0.17) (0.97) (2.35)
Largest_InstitutionForeign 0.003 0.008 0.006 0.015*
(0.58) (1.57) (1.07) (2.31)
Govindex1 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002
(-0.35) (-0.32) (-0.46) (-0.38) (-0.15)
Ln(Board_Independence) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(-0.93) (-1.19) (-0.97) (-0.93) (-0.89)
Ln(Size) -0.008*** -0.011*** -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.010***
(-7.93) (-7.35) (-6.82) (-6.24) (-8.59) (-7.13) (-8.68) (-7.16) (-6.04) (-5.40)
Average_Price 0.008 0.016 0.006 0.012 0.007 0.011 0.007 0.012 0.007 0.017
(1.97) (1.54) (1.47) (1.19) (1.91) (1.07) (1.93) (1.18) (1.55) (1.62)
Ln(DollarVolume) 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.009***
(9.59) (8.50) (8.78) (6.90) (9.33) (8.37) (9.35) (8.40) (8.81) (6.91)
Volatility 0.056 0.010 0.071 0.019 0.045 -0.006 0.037 -0.028 0.065 -0.034
(0.36) (0.05) (0.47) (0.10) (0.30) (-0.03) (0.24) (-0.14) (0.42) (-0.17)
Cross_Listing 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
(1.66) (1.71) (1.90) (1.82) (1.90) (1.75) (1.90) (1.88) (1.78) (1.98)
Intercept 0.059*** 0.106*** 0.037* 0.077** 0.053*** 0.079** 0.055*** 0.087** 0.037* 0.088**
(3.68) (3.66) (2.19) (3.15) (3.59) (2.97) (3.80) (3.21) (2.00) (2.90)
Number of Observations 361 258 361 258 361 258 361 258 361 258
Adjusted R
2 0.534 0.558 0.543 0.560 0.533 0.554 0.534 0.557 0.540 0.563
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Exchange Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Turnover2
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Table 6.6 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Large_Shareholding -0.084** -0.101* -0.107** -0.125* -0.108** -0.125* -0.108** -0.127** -0.079* -0.088
(-2.63) (-2.33) (-2.94) (-2.61) (-3.03) (-2.61) (-3.13) (-2.74) (-2.25) (-1.89)
Largest_Family 0.003 0.033 -0.030 0.032
(0.13) (0.94) (-0.78) (0.63)
Largest_Government 0.036 0.020
(1.53) (0.59)
Largest_HoldingCompany -0.008 -0.014 -0.034 -0.016
(-0.43) (-0.65) (-1.26) (-0.43)
Largest_HoldingCompanyForeign -0.008 -0.015 -0.048 -0.037
(-0.21) (-0.37) (-1.27) (-0.75)
Largest_Institution 0.011 0.017 -0.022 0.004
(0.64) (0.81) (-0.87) (0.09)
Largest_InstitutionForeign -0.034 -0.038 -0.069* -0.057
(-1.30) (-1.23) (-2.50) (-1.36)
Govindex1 0.048 0.058 0.063 0.057 0.041
(0.72) (0.83) (0.87) (0.80) (0.60)
Ln(Board_Independence) -0.013 -0.012 -0.010 -0.011 -0.014
(-1.09) (-0.98) (-0.73) (-0.84) (-1.21)
Ln(Size) 0.014 0.017 0.008 0.006 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.015 0.019
(1.60) (1.42) (1.15) (0.60) (1.15) (0.80) (1.26) (0.77) (1.93) (1.64)
Average_Price -0.008 -0.072 0.004 -0.033 0.003 -0.040 0.001 -0.043 -0.011 -0.073
(-0.41) (-1.16) (0.24) (-0.57) (0.15) (-0.68) (0.03) (-0.72) (-0.53) (-1.18)
Ln(DollarVolume) 0.008 0.012* 0.008 0.0123* 0.008 0.013 0.008 0.012 0.007 0.011*
(1.68) (2.00) (1.91) (2.08) (1.74) (1.97) (1.67) (1.89) (1.69) (2.04)
Volatility 0.084 0.418 0.175 0.504 0.157 0.343 0.251 0.527 0.198 0.396
(0.07) (0.41) (0.16) (0.50) (0.14) (0.33) (0.23) (0.51) (0.17) (0.37)
Cross_Listing 0.021 0.030 0.016 0.026 0.016 0.024 0.015 0.022 0.021 0.031
(1.19) (1.43) (0.88) (1.20) (0.86) (1.14) (0.79) (1.03) (1.13) (1.45)
Intercept -0.148 -0.195 -0.043 0.009 -0.055 -0.043 -0.065 -0.031 -0.142 -0.223
(-1.30) (-1.09) (-0.41) (0.06) (-0.51) (-0.28) (-0.63) (-0.20) (-1.20) (-1.19)
Number of Observations 338 256 338 256 338 256 338 256 338 256
Adjusted R
2 0.337 0.417 0.326 0.403 0.327 0.404 0.331 0.404 0.336 0.416
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Exchange Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Zero Return
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Table 6.6 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
Panel D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Large_Shareholding 1.280 1.549 0.691 1.734 0.872 1.993 0.818 1.764 0.868 1.136
(1.04) (1.02) (0.53) (1.01) (0.68) (1.18) (0.67) (1.07) (0.70) (0.69)
Largest_Family 0.136 0.944 -3.918 -1.567
(0.07) (0.47) (-1.91) (-0.68)
Largest_Government 3.875*** 2.401**
(4.88) (2.93)
Largest_HoldingCompany -1.075 -0.845 -4.351*** -2.695**
(-1.87) (-1.63) (-4.83) (-3.17)
Largest_HoldingCompanyForeign 0.406 0.014 -3.012** -1.579
(0.48) (0.01) (-3.14) (-1.34)
Largest_Institution -0.028 -0.168 -3.674*** -2.349*
(-0.05) (-0.25) (-4.49) (-2.38)
Largest_InstitutionForeign -0.753 0.427 -4.105*** -1.589
(-0.70) (0.36) (-3.63) (-1.13)
Govindex1 -1.610 -1.954 -1.480 -2.269 -2.615
(-0.72) (-0.88) (-0.66) (-1.04) (-1.27)
Ln(Board_Independence) 0.080 0.007 0.072 -0.052 0.014
(0.14) (0.01) (0.13) (-0.09) (0.02)
Ln(Size) -0.583* -1.248** -0.773** -1.225*** -0.636* -1.142** -0.544* -1.026** -0.636* -1.216*
(-1.99) (-2.83) (-2.90) (-3.47) (-2.25) (-3.14) (-2.17) (-2.70) (-2.48) (-2.64)
Average_Price 0.002 0.024 0.006 0.021 0.003 0.020 0.002 0.013 0.002 0.018
(0.18) (0.86) (0.68) (0.83) (0.38) (0.75) (0.18) (0.47) (0.26) (0.66)
Ln(DollarVolume) -0.376* -0.503* -0.337 -0.470* -0.385* -0.501* -0.425* -0.560* -0.371* -0.506*
(-2.05) (-2.24) (-1.92) (-2.08) (-2.16) (-2.24) (-2.38) (-2.44) (-2.14) (-2.28)
Volatility -0.105 -0.549 -0.116 -0.538 -0.0962 -0.572 -0.009 -0.462 -0.037 -0.482
(-0.37) (-1.39) (-0.41) (-1.33) (-0.35) (-1.53) (-0.03) (-1.13) (-0.13) (-1.23)
Cross_Listing 0.502 0.648 0.444 0.758 0.442 0.720 0.336 0.544 0.367 0.500
(0.84) (0.84) (0.78) (1.00) (0.75) (0.92) (0.60) (0.70) (0.65) (0.65)
Intercept 15.460* 29.950*** 19.000*** 29.480*** 16.590** 27.750*** 15.480** 26.700***20.440***31.790***
(2.52) (3.62) (3.46) (4.34) (2.90) (4.04) (3.15) (3.88) (3.66) (3.72)
Number of Observations 346 247 346 247 346 247 346 247 346 247
Adjusted R
2 0.575 0.553 0.581 0.556 0.574 0.555 0.598 0.562 0.599 0.559
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Exchange Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Spread
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Panel E
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Large_Shareholding 0.096 0.557 0.174 0.891 0.475 0.891 0.491 0.891 -0.113 0.407
(0.17) (0.96) (0.16) (1.60) (0.80) (1.58) (0.85) (1.62) (-0.20) (0.64)
Largest_Family -0.774 -0.127 -1.174 -0.0912
(-1.41) (-0.32) (-1.20) (-0.10)
Largest_Government 0.607 0.234
(0.78) (0.28)
Largest_HoldingCompany -0.673 -0.434 -0.666 -0.300
(-1.14) (-1.37) (-0.83) (-0.37)
Largest_HoldingCompanyForeign 0.222 -0.197 -0.014 0.197
(0.26) (-0.55) (-0.02) (0.21)
Largest_Institution -0.007 0.212 -0.545 0.043
(-0.02) (0.88) (-0.65) (0.05)
Largest_InstitutionForeign 0.761 0.830* 0.346 0.796
(1.96) (2.11) (0.37) (0.82)
Govindex1 0.111 1.930 -0.093 0.167 -0.046
(0.11) (0.88) (-0.09) (0.16) (-0.04)
Ln(Board_Independence) 0.252 0.243 0.268 0.267 0.263
(1.16) (1.09) (1.20) (1.19) (1.20)
Ln(Size) -0.639*** -0.578*** -0.917*** -0.487*** -0.572*** -0.455*** -0.539*** -0.446*** -0.688*** -0.625***
(-5.85) (-4.64) (-3.99) (-4.03) (-5.36) (-3.95) (-5.05) (-3.86) (-5.45) (-4.20)
Average_Price -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.009 -0.006 -0.011 -0.006 -0.011 -0.003 -0.004
(-0.98) (-0.98) (-0.66) (-1.47) (-1.42) (-1.74) (-1.42) (-1.72) (-0.73) (-0.69)
Ln(DailyVolume) -0.032 -0.071 -0.191 -0.060 -0.017 -0.068 -0.027 -0.069 -0.020 -0.054
(-0.58) (-1.47) (-1.38) (-1.27) (-0.32) (-1.59) (-0.49) (-1.61) (-0.35) (-1.06)
Volatility -0.095 -0.120 -0.443 -0.130 -0.0942 -0.126 -0.097 -0.121 -0.083 -0.124
(-0.44) (-0.65) (-1.35) (-0.70) (-0.43) (-0.67) (-0.44) (-0.67) (-0.37) (-0.66)
Cross_Listing 0.216 0.426 0.473 0.466 0.259 0.407 0.243 0.398 0.184 0.401
(0.79) (1.70) (1.08) (1.83) (0.92) (1.66) (0.86) (1.60) (0.68) (1.62)
Intercept 17.890*** 15.920*** 27.560*** 14.370*** 16.450*** 13.620*** 15.830*** 13.460*** 19.330*** 16.750***
(9.05) (6.06) (6.52) (6.02) (8.20) (5.90) (7.95) (5.96) (8.67) (5.62)
Number of Observations 348 268 371 268 348 268 348 268 348 268
Adjusted R
2 0.478 0.382 0.389 0.375 0.473 0.371 0.473 0.372 0.479 0.378
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Exchange Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Amihud
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Table 6.7 
Liquidity and the identity of the second largest shareholders 
Direct shareholdings of second largest shareholders are: Second_Family; Second_Institution; Second_HoldingCompany; 
Second_InstitutionForeign; Second_HoldingCompanyForeign; Second_Government. Zero Return is the number of trading days 
with zero returns/number of trading days for the year; Spread is[ ask-bid/(ask +bid)/2] *100; Turnover1 is 
volume/shares outstanding; Turnover2  is dollar volume/market capitalization; Amihud  is average over the year of 
the daily ratio of the stock’s absolute return to its dollar trading volume; Govindex1, Govindex2, and Govindex3 are  
scores obtained using minimum standards provided by ISS Corporate Governance; Size is the closing share price 
times number of shares outstanding at year end; Volatility is the standard deviation of the stock daily return during 
the year; Board_Independence is the number of independent directors/total number of directors;  Size_(Assets) is the 
firm’s assets in U.S. dollars; Cross-Listing =1 if the company is cross-listed, otherwise 0; Average_Price is the average 
daily closing prices each year for 2005-2011; DailyVolume is the total of daily  volume  traded each year for 2005-
2011; DollarVolume  is the total  daily dollar volume each year for 2005-2011,where daily dollar volume = 
volume*closing price. T-values reported in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Large_Shareholding -0.019* -0.018 -0.021** -0.021* -0.027*** -0.028* -0.022** -0.022* -0.023** -0.021
(-2.62) (-1.79) (-3.10) (-2.30) (-3.40) (-2.44) (-3.23) (-2.52) (-2.85) (-1.68)
Second-Family 0.011* 0.007 0.007 0.006
(2.55) (1.25) (1.00) (0.61)
Second_Government 0.001 0.003
(0.02) (0.04)
Second_HoldingCompany -0.004 -0.002 -0.006 -0.006
(-0.83) (-0.50) (-1.01) (-0.72)
Second_HoldingCompanyForeign -0.007 -0.008 -0.010 -0.011
(-1.40) (-1.18) (-1.30) (-1.15)
Second_Institution 0.002 0.003 -0.001 -0.001
(0.82) (0.82) (-0.27) (-0.11)
Second_InstitutionForeign -0.012* -0.012 -0.016* -0.016
(-2.31) (-1.76) (-2.27) (-1.83)
Govindex1 -0.001 0.003 -0.004 -0.002 0.001
(-0.05) (0.19) (-0.27) (-0.12) (0.05)
Ln(Board_Independence) -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005
(-1.20) (-0.86) (-1.38) (-1.01) (-1.33)
Ln(Size) -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.006** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.004** -0.006**
(-5.03) (-5.26) (-4.85) (-5.07) (-3.42) (-2.84) (-4.92) (-5.02) (-3.31) (-2.75)
Average_Price 0.056 0.052 0.063 0.060 0.0763* 0.083 0.058 0.049 0.072 0.081
(1.28) (0.50) (1.49) (0.56) (2.12) (0.89) (1.37) (0.47) (1.87) (0.84)
Ln(DollarVolume) 0.082*** 0.010*** 0.082*** 0.094*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.008***
(7.13) (6.46) (7.19) (6.29) (5.95) (4.65) (7.00) (6.40) (5.85) (4.58)
Volatility 0.075 0.008 0.063 0.000 0.028 -0.056 0.072 0.012 0.035 -0.059
(0.51) (0.04) (0.44) (-0.00) (0.19) (-0.29) (0.49) (0.06) (0.25) (-0.32)
Cross_Listing 0.032 0.109 0.036 0.114 0.118 0.150 0.026 0.094 0.204 0.318
(0.09) (0.27) (0.10) (0.29) (0.33) (0.37) (0.07) (0.21) (0.58) (0.72)
Intercept 0.017 0.054 0.015 0.049 0.011 0.046 0.022 0.056 0.002 0.039
(0.82) (1.60) (0.71) (1.49) (0.51) (1.29) (1.07) (1.64) (0.12) (1.01)
Number of Observations 321 231 321 231 321 231 321 231 321 231
Adjusted R
2 0.520 0.553 0.523 0.553 0.534 0.568 0.516 0.550 0.541 0.571
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Exchange Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Turnover1
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Table 6.7 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Panel B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Large_Shareholding -0.014 -0.009 -0.017* -0.014 -0.019* -0.017 -0.016* -0.013 -0.017* -0.014
(-1.94) (-0.89) (-2.37) (-1.50) (-2.59) (-1.56) (-2.36) (-1.40) (-2.27) (-1.18)
Second-Family 0.000 -0.005 -0.007 -0.006
(-0.13) (-0.89) (-1.01) (-0.70)
Second_Government 0.003 0.001
(0.49) (0.12)
Second_HoldingCompany -0.003 -0.002 -0.008 -0.006
(-0.76) (-0.49) (-1.23) (-0.70)
Second_HoldingCompanyForeign -0.006 -0.007 -0.011 -0.010
(-1.18) (-1.25) (-1.41) (-1.04)
Second_Institution 0.003 0.005 -0.003 -0.001
(1.21) (1.53) (-0.62) (-0.12)
Second_InstitutionForeign -0.009 -0.008 -0.016* -0.014
(-1.76) (-1.36) (-2.17) (-1.64)
Govindex1 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001
(0.35) (0.25) (0.08) (0.24) (0.05)
Ln(Board_Independence) -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003
(-0.36) (-0.33) (-0.65) (-0.23) (-1.00)
Ln(Size) -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.008***
(-8.24) (-7.95) (-8.15) (-7.68) (-6.05) (-4.31) (-8.09) (-7.54) (-5.98) (-4.35)
Average_Price 0.078 0.126 0.0792* 0.119 0.0962** 0.164 0.0735* 0.121 0.0801* 0.135
(1.94) (1.18) (2.18) (1.14) (2.89) (1.69) (2.10) (1.19) (2.21) (1.35)
Ln(DollarVolume) 0.079*** 0.097*** 0.079*** 0.094*** 0.072*** 0.082*** 0.079*** 0.093*** 0.071*** 0.008***
(8.37) (7.03) (8.26) (6.98) (6.96) (4.84) (8.35) (7.02) (6.63) (4.83)
Volatility 0.091 0.011 0.088 0.026 0.051 -0.057 0.098 0.021 0.074 -0.030
(0.58) (0.06) (0.57) (0.13) (0.33) (-0.29) (0.62) (0.10) (0.48) (-0.15)
Cross_Listing 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.006
(0.99) (0.99) (0.98) (0.91) (1.23) (1.05) (1.16) (0.91) (1.63) (1.32)
Intercept 0.051** 0.082** 0.055*** 0.088** 0.044** 0.073** 0.055*** 0.084** 0.044** 0.079**
(3.24) (3.12) (3.48) (3.33) (2.97) (2.71) (3.51) (3.11) (2.92) (2.73)
Number of Observations 319 227 319 227 319 227 319 227 319 227
Adjusted R
2 0.547 0.5547 0.5449 0.5542 0.5574 0.5691 0.5455 0.553 0.5574 0.5654
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Exchange Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Turnover2
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Table 6.7 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Panel C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Large_Shareholding -0.129** -0.134* -0.087* -0.073 -0.110** -0.107 -0.099* -0.088 -0.131** -0.132*
(-3.11) (-2.30) (-2.05) (-1.23) (-2.73) (-1.95) (-2.27) (-1.62) (-3.02) (-2.08)
Second_Family 0.063 0.064 0.051 0.043
(1.92) (1.97) (0.98) (0.67)
Second_Government 0.013 0.024
(0.32) (0.41)
Second_HoldingCompany -0.001 -0.019 -0.009 -0.034
(-0.05) (-0.88) (-0.18) (-0.52)
Second_HoldingCompanyForeign 0.087** 0.079* 0.077 0.062
(2.70) (2.10) (1.31) (0.77)
Second_Institution -0.019 -0.010 -0.005 -0.007
(-1.15) (-0.51) (-0.12) (-0.12)
Second_InstitutionForeign -0.072 -0.062 -0.059 -0.066
(-1.85) (-1.60) (-1.00) (-0.85)
Govindex1 0.018 0.041 0.011 0.009 0.037
(0.20) (0.45) (0.13) (0.10) (0.41)
Ln(Board_Independence) -0.014 -0.013 -0.021 -0.021 -0.017
(-0.92) (-0.85) (-1.42) (-1.38) (-1.11)
Ln(Size) 0.008 0.008 0.013 0.013 0.015* 0.016 0.011 0.010 0.015 0.017
(0.95) (0.72) (1.51) (1.15) (2.11) (1.51) (1.26) (0.87) (1.87) (1.63)
Average_Price 0.131 -0.244 -0.003 -0.348 -0.078 -0.455 -0.033 -0.515 0.123 -0.221
(0.71) (-0.40) (-0.02) (-0.57) (-0.39) (-0.78) (-0.16) (-0.76) (0.64) (-0.36)
Ln(DailyVolume) 0.007 0.012 0.008 0.012 0.005 0.009 0.008 0.012 0.005 0.008
(1.31) (1.58) (1.53) (1.71) (1.04) (1.27) (1.33) (1.61) (1.02) (1.13)
Volatility -0.016 -0.008 -0.029 -0.031 -0.011 -0.004 -0.007 0.006 -0.038 -0.046
(-0.15) (-0.07) (-0.26) (-0.28) (-0.10) (-0.04) (-0.07) (0.06) (-0.34) (-0.41)
Cross_Listing 0.020 0.024 0.022 0.031 0.027 0.032 0.022 0.032 0.027 0.036
(0.91) (0.97) (1.01) (1.25) (1.28) (1.33) (1.03) (1.16) (1.21) (1.27)
Intercept -0.019 -0.022 -0.145 -0.146 -0.117 -0.098 -0.096 -0.062 -0.109 -0.117
(-0.16) (-0.13) (-1.28) (-0.89) (-1.11) (-0.58) (-0.81) (-0.36) (-0.94) (-0.74)
Number of Observations 300 226 300 226 300 226 300 226 300 226
Adjusted R
2 0.357 0.430 0.343 0.415 0.348 0.415 0.332 0.404 0.372 0.446
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Exchange Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Zero Return
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Table 6.7 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Panel D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Large_Shareholding 2.766 1.411 2.564 1.524 3.018* 1.959 2.574 1.473 3.406* 2.756
(1.68) (0.65) (1.63) (0.76) (2.05) (1.02) (1.64) (0.76) (2.20) (1.23)
Second_Family 0.0102 0.928 -0.259 -0.589
(0.01) (0.56) (-0.14) (-0.28)
Second_Government 0.59 1.322
(0.54) (0.80)
Second_HoldingCompany 0.654 0.855 0.328 -0.376
(0.70) (0.79) (0.21) (-0.19)
Second_HoldingCompanyForeign -0.643 -0.318 -1.095 -1.893
(-0.68) (-0.30) (-0.71) (-0.86)
Second_Institution -0.673 -1.308 -0.686 -1.892
(-1.08) (-1.52) (-0.62) (-1.16)
Second_InstitutionForeign 1.672 1.337 1.714 0.798
(1.56) (1.04) (1.13) (0.39)
Govindex1 -4.627 -4.577 -4.17 -4.586 -4.345
(-1.86) (-1.74) (-1.74) (-1.84) (-1.73)
Ln(Board_Independence) 0.021 0.074 0.29 -0.149 0.164
(0.03) (0.12) (0.45) (-0.22) (0.24)
Ln(Size) -0.535 -0.851* -0.549 -0.839* -0.748* -1.172** -0.55 -0.907* -0.735* -1.172**
(-1.87) (-2.36) (-1.86) (-2.31) (-2.58) (-3.10) (-1.90) (-2.62) (-2.53) (-3.02)
Average_Price -0.242 0.450 0.039 1.020 -0.216 -0.177 -0.032 0.450 -0.479 -0.553
(-0.25) (0.16) (0.05) (0.38) (-0.25) (-0.07) (-0.04) (0.16) (-0.50) (-0.20)
Ln(DollarVolume) -0.546** -0.713*** -0.554** -0.717** -0.421* -0.499* -0.556** -0.705** -0.409* -0.482*
(-3.21) (-3.44) (-3.16) (-3.35) (-2.53) (-2.43) (-3.17) (-3.18) (-2.61) (-2.44)
Volatility -0.13 -0.543 -0.165 -0.61 -0.097 -0.45 -0.146 -0.538 -0.0568 -0.395
(-0.44) (-1.29) (-0.56) (-1.45) (-0.35) (-1.15) (-0.50) (-1.29) (-0.20) (-1.02)
Cross_Listing 0.73 0.563 0.775 0.639 0.626 0.611 0.852 0.917 0.586 0.758
(1.04) (0.64) (1.11) (0.71) (0.93) (0.67) (1.18) (0.91) (0.83) (0.75)
Intercept 16.890** 24.480*** 17.360** 24.270*** 19.260*** 26.910*** 17.270** 25.770*** 18.710** 27.220***
(3.07) (3.54) (2.94) (3.44) (3.45) (4.02) (3.05) (4.06) (3.32) (3.88)
Number of Observations 310 223 310 223 310 223 310 223 310 223
Adjusted R
2 0.604 0.556 0.602 0.555 0.613 0.574 0.602 0.556 0.612 0.572
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Exchange Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Spread
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Panel E
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Large_Shareholding 0.682 0.323 0.927 0.705 1.139* 0.995 0.908 0.688 0.729 0.423
(1.07) (0.42) (1.61) (1.07) (2.07) (1.64) (1.51) (1.03) (0.96) (0.44)
Second_Family -0.198 -0.112 0.0866 0.203
(-0.50) (-0.28) (0.11) (0.33)
Second_Government -0.213 -0.242
(-0.29) (-0.35)
Second_HoldingCompany -0.246 -0.167 0.097 0.254
(-0.81) (-0.61) (0.12) (0.32)
Second_HoldingCompanyForeign 0.727 0.810 1.073 1.231
(1.37) (1.30) (0.97) (1.02)
Second_Institution 0.076 -0.009 0.298 0.346
(0.30) (-0.04) (0.38) (0.46)
Second_InstitutionForeign 0.671 0.682 0.830 0.968
(1.65) (1.64) (1.02) (1.12)
Govindex1 0.311 0.194 0.324 0.343 0.310
(0.33) (0.20) (0.33) (0.37) (0.32)
Ln(Board_Independence) 0.408 0.366 0.411 0.402 0.473*
(1.85) (1.65) (1.83) (1.81) (2.19)
Ln(Size) -0.625*** -0.465*** -0.609*** -0.454*** -0.648*** -0.519*** -0.601*** -0.445*** -0.670*** -0.529***
(-5.80) (-3.96) (-5.46) (-3.55) (-5.94) (-4.26) (-5.64) (-3.76) (-5.79) (-4.36)
Average_Price -0.37 -0.99 -0.54 -1.09 -0.45 -0.90 -0.50 -0.99 -0.29 -0.72
(-1.00) (-1.55) (-1.44) (-1.77) (-1.23) (-1.33) (-1.37) (-1.51) (-0.79) (-1.08)
Ln(DailyVolume) -0.066 -0.095* -0.056 -0.083 -0.022 -0.040 -0.056 -0.086 -0.041 -0.057
(-1.34) (-2.04) (-1.07) (-1.73) (-0.40) (-0.76) (-1.09) (-1.76) (-0.75) (-1.13)
Volatility -0.235 -0.109 -0.205 -0.088 -0.212 -0.085 -0.212 -0.097 -0.241 -0.105
(-1.21) (-0.73) (-1.03) (-0.52) (-1.10) (-0.58) (-1.07) (-0.61) (-1.24) (-0.71)
Cross_Listing 0.32 0.31 0.3 0.302 0.213 0.216 0.255 0.246 0.184 0.13
(1.14) (1.13) (1.05) (1.09) (0.74) (0.80) (0.80) (0.83) (0.57) (0.39)
Intercept 18.320*** 13.600*** 17.820*** 13.270***17.910*** 13.480*** 17.690*** 13.080*** 18.580***13.650***
(9.29) (5.68) (8.75) (5.08) (9.63) (5.78) (9.52) (5.50) (8.56) (5.49)
Number of Observations 307 241 307 241 307 241 307 241 307 241
Adjusted R
2 0.531 0.364 0.525 0.357 0.527 0.360 0.525 0.356 0.529 0.363
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Exchange Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Amihud
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Table 6.8 
 Liquidity and corporate governance 
Board is 15 ISS standards; Ownership is 3 ISS standards; Progressive Practice is 6 ISS standards; Volatility is the standard 
deviation of the stock daily return during the year;  Size is the closing share price times number of shares outstanding 
at year end;; Cross-Listing =1 if the company is cross-listed, otherwise 0; Average_Price is the average daily closing 
prices during the year each year for 2005-2011; DailyVolume is the total of daily  volume  traded during the year each 
year for 2005-2011; DollarVolume  is the total  daily dollar volume during the year each year for 2005-2011,where 
daily dollar volume = volume*closing price. T-values reported in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Large_Shareholding -0.024** -0.027** -0.019* -0.018* -0.020* -0.014
(-3.27) (-3.04) (-2.44) (-2.43) (-2.25) (-1.80)
Second_Shareholding -0.006 0.002 -0.003 0.003 0.014 0.004 -0.008 -0.003 -0.007 0.011 0.028* 0.010
(-0.59) (0.11) (-0.32) (0.23) (1.06) (0.04) (-0.84) (-0.25) (-0.74) (1.06) (2.36) (0.88)
Blockholdings -0.015 -0.016 -0.010 -0.024** -0.026** -0.019*
(-1.53) (-1.58) (-1.03) (-2.72) (-2.76) (-2.00)
Board -0.007 -0.001 -0.002 -0.007
(-0.50) (-0.05) (-0.15) (-0.56)
Ownership 0.016 0.013 0.012 0.016
(1.57) (1.21) (1.19) (1.51)
ProgressivePractices -0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.001
(-0.12) (0.20) (-0.04) (0.06)
Ln(Size) -0.007*** -0.007***-0.006*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.007***
(-5.21) (-3.76) (-5.05) (-7.73) (-5.91) (-7.47) (-7.28) (-5.57) (-7.05) (-5.36) (-3.76) (-5.18)
Average_Price 0.078* 0.097* 0.071 0.097* 0.109** 0.087* 0.088* 0.105** 0.081* 0.093* 0.105* 0.083*
(2.01) (2.34) (1.85) (2.53) (2.80) (2.26) (2.47) (2.78) (2.25) (2.29) (2.54) (2.09)
Ln(DollarVolume) 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008***
(6.87) (5.91) (6.84) (7.55) (6.25) (7.39) (7.45) (6.04) (7.37) (7.00) (6.15) (6.89)
Volatility 0.013 0.040 0.024 0.034 -0.082 0.030 0.039 -0.070 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.009
(0.09) (0.21) (0.16) (0.20) (-0.46) (0.18) (0.24) (-0.41) (0.19) (0.02) (0.08) (0.12)
Cross_Listing 0.007 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.20) (0.50) (0.11) (0.80) (1.15) (0.81) (0.79) (1.23) (0.74) (0.05) (0.26) (0.03)
Intercept 0.031 0.005 0.022 0.066*** 0.060** 0.0564*** 0.063*** 0.057** 0.055** 0.036 0.008 0.025
(1.48) (0.17) (1.04) (3.90) (3.09) (3.54) (3.64) (2.92) (3.32) (1.69) (0.26) (1.20)
Number of Observations 304 239 292 302 238 290 302 238 290 304 239 292
Adjusted R
2 0.541 0.564 0.526 0.531 0.530 0.529 0.539 0.540 0.536 0.533 0.556 0.520
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Exchange Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Turnover2Turnover1
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Panel B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Large_Shareholding -0.059 -0.076 -0.078 3.289* 1.396 3.816*
(-1.38) (-1.55) (-1.65) (2.02) (0.73) (2.10)
Second_Shareholding 0.044 0.070 0.051 0.042 0.097 0.056 6.644 3.059 5.093 4.541 1.231 2.650
(0.57) (0.70) (0.62) (0.51) (1.00) (0.65) (1.94) (0.77) (1.68) -1.230 -0.360 -0.780
Blockholdings -0.088 -0.090 -0.108 3.003 2.121 3.452
(-1.71) (-1.61) (-1.91) (1.63) (1.08) (1.64)
Board 0.006 0.020 -0.204 0.028
(0.09) (0.28) (-0.10) -0.010
Ownership 0.030 0.056 -3.270 -2.972
(0.44) (0.87) (-1.85) (-1.66)
Progressive Practice 0.009 0.025 -3.649 -3.846
(0.17) (0.48) (-1.70) (-1.76)
Ln(Size) -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.007 0.007 0.006 -0.583 -0.712 -0.650* -0.534 -0.731 -0.594*
(-0.10) (-0.22) (-0.14) (0.85) (0.69) (0.73) (-1.91) (-1.72) (-2.35) (-1.72) (-1.79) (-2.09)
Average_Price 0.111 0.047 0.101 0.168 0.189 0.189 -0.014 0.587 -2.320 -0.733 5.040 -3.390
(0.02) (0.63) (0.28) (0.54) (0.86) (1.03) (-0.00) (0.83) (-0.32) (-0.08) (0.68) (-0.42)
Ln(DollarVolume) 0.020*** 0.017** 0.020*** 0.010 0.006 0.009 -0.458* -0.294 -0.480** -0.491* -0.297 -0.513**
(3.51) (2.92) (3.65) (1.52) (0.86) (1.48) (-2.42) (-1.48) (-2.76) (-2.62) (-1.50) (-2.97)
Volatility -0.001 -0.008 -0.001 -0.004 -0.011 -0.005 -0.021 -0.147 -0.037 0.006 -0.112 -0.005
(-0.06) (-0.76) (-0.14) (-0.31) (-0.79) (-0.37) (-0.07) (-0.44) (-0.12) (0.02) (-0.33) (-0.02)
Cross_Listing 0.016 0.019 0.012 0.021 0.015 0.017 1.169 0.849 1.445 1.122 0.996 1.402
(0.68) (0.82) (0.52) (0.82) (0.55) (0.62) (1.60) (1.19) (1.98) (1.56) (1.40) (1.89)
Intercept -0.093 -0.028 -0.074 -0.033 0.009 0.010 13.700* 17.070* 15.920** 12.930* 16.870* 15.150**
(-0.78) (-0.21) (-0.58) (-0.27) (0.06) (0.08) (2.32) (2.32) (2.92) -2.12 -2.33 -2.66
Number of Observations 326 264 311 287 237 272 292 237 277 292 237 277
Adjusted R
2 0.355 0.298 0.354 0.322 0.249 0.330 0.604 0.619 0.621 0.599 0.621 0.615
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Exchange Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
SpreadZero Return
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Panel C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Large_Shareholding 1.035 0.910 1.409*
(1.64) (1.27) (2.04)
Second_Shareholding 0.314 1.065 -0.243 -0.975 -0.170 -1.905*
(0.29) (0.90) (-0.24) (-0.96) (-0.15) (-2.10)
Blockholdings 2.039** 1.508 2.493**
(2.75) (1.96) (3.07)
Board 0.491 0.613
(0.47) (0.64)
Ownership -0.732 -0.537
(-1.03) (-0.76)
Progressive Practice 0.025 -0.148
(0.04) (-0.22)
Ln(Size) -0.565*** -0.506*** -0.582*** -0.596*** -0.543*** -0.607***
(-4.40) (-3.97) (-4.55) (-4.77) (-4.44) (-4.91)
Average_Price -0.303 -0.317 -0.303 -0.448 -0.387 -0.477
(-1.02) (-1.07) (-1.07) (-1.46) (-1.28) (-1.60)
Ln(DollarVolume) -0.108 -0.120 -0.117 -0.0998 -0.113 -0.114
(-1.32) (-1.58) (-1.45) (-1.31) (-1.53) (-1.54)
Volatility -0.233 -0.375 -0.251 -0.249 -0.373 -0.272
(-1.13) (-1.48) (-1.21) (-1.22) (-1.45) (-1.33)
Cross_Listing 0.303 0.439 0.412 0.499 0.584* 0.644*
(1.11) (1.69) (1.47) (1.64) (2.02) (2.03)
Intercept 17.970*** 17.610*** 18.660*** 17.730*** 17.740***18.370***
(8.23) (7.17) (8.08) (8.27) (7.36) (8.14)
Number of Observations 292 234 278 292 234 278
Adjusted R
2 0.548 0.579 0.581 0.558 0.583 0.593
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
Exchange Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
Amihud
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Table 6.9 
 Regression results for governance standards 
Largest_Shareholding is the direct shareholding of the largest shareholder; Second _Shareholding is the direct 
shareholdings of the second largest shareholder and Blockholdings is the total shareholdings of 5% or more. The 
liquidity measures are: Zero Return is the number of trading days with zero returns/number of trading days for the 
year; Spread is[ask-bid/(ask+bid)/2]*100; Turnover1 is volume/shares outstanding; Turnover2 is dollar volume/market 
capitalization; Size is the closing share price times number of shares outstanding at year end; Volatility is the 
standard deviation of the stock daily return during the year; Model includes 28 governance standards as outlined in 
appendix 3; Size_(Assets) is the firm’s assets in U.S. dollars; Cross-Listing =1 if the company is cross-listed, otherwise 
0; Average_Price is the average daily closing prices during the year for each year 2005-2011; DailyVolume is the total of 
daily  volume  traded during the year for each year 2005-2011; DollarVolume  is the total  daily dollar volume during 
the year for each year 2005-2011,where daily dollar volume = volume*closing price.  T-values reported in 
parentheses. 
 
Panel A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Largest_Shareholding 2.742 2.127 2.270 2.248
(1.61) (1.28) (1.30) (1.28)
Second_Shareholding 1.235 0.745 1.127 1.923 -1.979 -1.828 -1.721 -1.669
(0.34) (0.20) (0.30) (0.51) (-0.54) (-0.49) (-0.46) (-0.45)
Blockholding 3.527 2.894 3.516* 3.151
(1.98) (1.76) (2.03) (1.80)
All directors attend at least 75% board meetings -1.585** -1.428**
(-2.93) (-2.68)
Size of board  is at least 6 but not more than 15 5.302** 5.034**
(2.71) (2.64)
The CEO and Chairman duties are separated 2.419*** 2.278**
(3.65) (3.06)
Shareholders vote on directors selected to fill 1.644*
vacancies (2.13)
Compensation Committee is comprised solely of -1.922*
 independent outside directors (-2.13)
Ln(Size) -0.592* -0.637* -0.571* -0.639* -0.596* -0.640* -0.599* -0.580*
(-2.07) (-2.16) (-2.02) (-2.16) (-2.05) (-2.16) (-2.06) (-2.02)
Average_Price -0.123 0.603 -0.059 0.068 -0.252 0.447 -0.230 -0.196
(-0.16) (0.73) (-0.08) (0.09) (-0.32) (0.53) (-0.30) (-0.26)
Ln(DollarVolume) -0.522** -0.585** -0.595** -0.541** -0.512** -0.572** -0.558** -0.578**
(-2.70) (-3.13) (-3.09) (-2.71) (-2.70) (-3.13) (-2.87) (-3.05)
Volatility -0.114 -0.059 -0.108 -0.083 -0.064 -0.021 -0.055 -0.063
(-0.37) (-0.20) (-0.35) (-0.26) (-0.21) (-0.07) (-0.18) (-0.21)
Cross_Listing 0.889 0.401 0.854 0.552 1.058 0.590 1.102 1.043
(1.23) (0.63) (1.16) (0.73) (1.46) (0.97) (1.46) (1.40)
Intercept 16.200** 13.240* 14.860* 16.050** 15.450* 12.730* 16.180** 14.210*
(2.71) (2.16) (2.46) (2.64) (2.57) (2.09) (2.69) (2.35)
Number of Observations 298 298 298 298 298 298 298 298
Adjusted R
2
0.601 0.616 0.605 0.595 0.605 0.619 0.605 0.610
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Exchange Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Spread
115 
 
Table 6.9 (continued) 
Panel B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Largest_Shareholding -0.108* -0.108*
(-2.45) (-2.45)
Second_Shareholding -0.021 -0.021 0.0777
(-0.22) (-0.22) (0.90)
Blockholding -0.095*
(-2.01)
Size of board  is at least 6 but not more than 15 0.049** 0.0489** 0.051**
(2.97) (2.97) (2.81)
Ln(Size) 0.011 0.011 0.009
(1.29) (1.29) (1.04)
Average_Price 0.086 0.086 0.113
(0.49) (0.49) (0.63)
Ln(DollarVolume) 0.009 0.010 0.010
(1.62) (1.62) (1.95)
Volatility 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.17) (0.17) (0.07)
Cross_Listing 0.013 0.013 0.011
(0.54) (0.54) (0.43)
Intercept -0.153 -0.153 -0.128
(-1.27) (-1.27) (-1.08)
Number of Observations 289 289 289
Adjusted R
2
0.354 0.354 0.342
Year Dummy yes yes yes
Industry Dummy yes yes yes
Exchange Dummy yes yes yes
Zero Returns
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Table 6.9 (continued) 
Panel C
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Largest_Shareholding -0.024** -0.024** -0.023** -0.023** -0.018*
(-3.11) (-3.18) (-2.99) (-2.90) (-2.54)
Second_Shareholding -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.006 -0.004 0.018 0.012 0.021* 0.018 0.015 0.011
(-0.31) (-0.17) (-0.28) (-0.42) (-0.36) (1.83) (1.19) (2.14) (1.73) (1.39) (1.10)
Blockholding -0.022* -0.019 -0.023* -0.021* -0.020* -0.013
(-2.47) (-1.95) (-2.55) (-2.37) (-2.29) (-1.56)
Size of board  is at least 6 but 0.015*** 0.016***
not more than 15 (3.85) (4.04)
Board members are elected annually. -0.016** -0.016**
(-2.98) (-3.08)
Shareholders have cumulative voting -0.013** -0.015***
 rights to elect directors (-3.15) (-3.81)
No interlocks exist among directors on the 0.025* 0.025**
compensation committee (2.53) (2.80)
All directors with more than one year 0.015*** 0.015***
service own stock (3.76) (3.65)
Shareholders vote on directors selected to -0.015*
 fill vacancies (-2.35)
Ln(Size) -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005***
(-4.73) (-4.27) (-4.62) (-4.69) (-4.56) (-4.65) (-4.49) (-4.17) (-4.57) (-4.63) (-4.48)
Average_Price 0.057 0.057 0.055 0.060 0.0817* 0.065 0.063 0.065 0.061 0.067 0.084*
(1.27) (1.25) (1.22) (1.34) (2.15) (1.41) (1.38) (1.42) (1.35) (1.46) (2.00)
Ln(DollarVolume) 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(7.10) (6.74) (7.17) (6.88) (7.91) (7.16) (6.99) (6.78) (7.25) (6.94) (7.96)
Volatility 0.442 0.397 0.485 -0.151 0.493 0.331 0.267 0.281 0.380 -0.275 0.426
(0.30) (0.26) (0.32) (-0.10) (0.32) (0.21) (0.17) (0.17) (0.24) (-0.18) (0.27)
Cross_Listing -0.314 -0.735 -0.189 -0.206 0.987 -0.582 -0.167 -1.070 -0.434 -0.367 1.450
(-0.08) (-0.19) (-0.05) (-0.05) (0.28) (-0.15) (-0.04) (-0.27) (-0.11) (-0.09) (0.40)
Intercept 3.380 26.000 15.400 18.700 5.640 6.030 31.900 29.700 18.100 21.700 6.590
(0.17) (1.30) (0.79) (0.97) (0.30) (0.30) (1.60) (1.43) (0.89) (1.06) (0.32)
Number of Observations 307 307 307 307 307 307 307 307 307 307 307
Adjusted R
2 0.519 0.527 0.517 0.521 0.561 0.509 0.514 0.518 0.508 0.512 0.552
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Exchange Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Turnover1
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Table 6.9 (continued) 
Panel D
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Largest_Shareholding -0.019* -0.019* -0.018* -0.010** -0.016*
(-2.46) (-2.47) (-2.38) (-2.64) (-2.17)
Second_Shareholding -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 0.012 0.017 0.011 0.012 0.009
(-0.47) (-0.38) (-0.49) (-0.62) (-0.48) (1.24) (1.56) (1.17) (1.36) (0.71)
Blockholding -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 -0.017 -0.011
(-1.79) (-1.86) (-1.76) (-1.93) (-1.34)
Size of board  is at least 6 but not 0.007* 0.008*
 more than 15 (2.17) (1.99)
Board members are elected annually -0.016*** -0.016***
(-3.45) (-3.52)
Shareholders have cumulative voting -0.013*** -0.015***
 rights to elect directors (-3.62) (-4.06)
Board guidelines are disclosed publicly 0.007* 0.007*
(2.24) (2.18)
All directors with more than one year 0.009* 0.009*
service own stock (2.42) (2.41)
Ln(Size) -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008***
(-7.72) (-7.08) (-7.63) (-7.96) (-7.41) (-7.99) (-7.34) (-7.96) (-8.28) (-7.55)
Average_Price 0.082* 0.079* 0.078* 0.085* 0.092** 0.087* 0.085* 0.083* 0.090* 0.095*
(2.17) (2.10) (2.07) (2.37) (2.64) (2.23) (2.20) (2.16) (2.46) (2.48)
Ln(DollarVolume) 0.078*** 0.076*** 0.079*** 0.077*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.077*** 0.079*** 0.078*** 0.079***
(8.30) (7.91) (8.38) (8.66) (8.85) (8.39) (7.97) (8.49) (8.75) (8.89)
Volatility 0.529 0.292 0.544 0.513 0.62 0.463 0.218 0.481 0.446 0.574
(0.32) (0.18) (0.33) (0.32) (0.38) (0.27) (0.13) (0.28) (0.27) (0.34)
Cross_Listing 2.81 2.66 2.8 2.18 3.38 2.83 2.58 2.78 2.23 3.84
(0.76) (0.72) (0.76) (0.63) (1.00) (0.74) (0.67) (0.74) (0.62) (1.11)
Intercept 4.790** 6.140*** 5.240** 6.030*** 4.570** 4.980** 6.410*** 5.430*** 6.250*** 4.650**
(3.01) (3.96) (3.28) (3.90) (2.76) (3.18) (4.17) (3.44) (4.08) (2.72)
Number of Observations 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305
Adjusted R
2 0.5456 0.5579 0.5476 0.5543 0.5599 0.5378 0.5508 0.5405 0.5457 0.5522
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Exchange Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Turnover2
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Chapter 7 
Summary and Conclusion 
The separation of ownership and control gives rise to agency problem between managers 
and shareholders, and between majority and minority shareholders. However agency theory 
suggests that the ensuing conflict can be resolved through a system of good corporate 
governance. Existing evidence on ownership structure suggests that weak shareholder protection 
and ineffective monitoring allow controlling shareholders to make decisions that favour their 
personal interests.  
This thesis argues that corporate ownership and corporate governance matter for market 
liquidity. Consistent with the extant literature, it posits a non-linear relationship between 
concentrated ownership and liquidity, and that corporate governance matters for liquidity. Board 
is the corporate governance proxy, seeing that the board is accountable to stakeholders for the 
overall performance of the firm. For this reason, firms with a more effective board are expected 
to be associated with greater liquidity. 
The sample consists of 71 firms in Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago. Results 
show that consistent with some of the reviewed studies, concentrated ownership reduces 
liquidity and that ownership type matters. Family firms are more liquid than government firms. 
As the largest shareholder, firms with holding companies (domestic and foreign) are more liquid. 
However, when foreign holding companies are the second largest shareholder, liquidity is less.  
 Regrettably, the study fails to establish a relationship between an index of governance 
quality and liquidity for Caribbean firms. The same is observed for board independence. A 
consequence of such finding is that minority shareholders cannot depend on the board’s 
monitoring capability. As such, these results can have implications for regulators and policy 
makers. These results may be driven by several factors. The first is that institutional settings and 
corporate governance practices vary across firms and countries (Doidge et al. 2007). For 
instance, in Barbados and Trinidad & Tobago, at least 20% of the board should be independent 
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of affiliates whereas Jamaica requires that two-thirds of an entity’s board comprise independent 
non-executive directors. Second, in the Caribbean, practices of corporate governance use the 
‘comply or explain’ principle that makes disclosure voluntary.  
In emerging economies, board monitoring and control may be less effective because 
formal and informal institutional support to operate as intended may be lacking (Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2003; Peng, 2004). Consequently, majority shareholders are allowed the privilege to 
decide on the quality of corporate governance practices implemented. As suggested by Aggarwal 
et al. (2010), governance standards may be chosen by the controlling shareholder to maximise 
her private value of the firm. Hence the controlling shareholder’s decision on whether or not to 
adopt corporate governance standards may involve weighing the benefits of greater liquidity 
against the costs of say, lessening her ability to expropriate firm value. 
In addition, concentrated ownership impedes disclosure given the disparity in monitoring 
power held by different types of dominant shareholders (Badrinath et al, 1989; Falkenstein, 
1996). So it’s probable that in markets like the Caribbean where ownership is concentrated, 
installing good corporate governance principles might result in majority shareholders’ reluctance 
to institute same. Plus, in closely held firms, the emphasis shifts away from shareholder 
governance mechanisms such as board of directors (Berglof and von Thadden, 1999) as 
controlling shareholders can thwart board action.  
The caveat in corporate finance literature is establishing the causality of the relationship, 
which in this case is large/concentrated ownership leads to lower liquidity and firms with poor 
corporate governance are less liquid. First, a potential problem has to do with the inadequacy of 
reporting standards across the exchanges and the lack of standardization of trading data 
disclosed. Second, ownership data as disclosed in firm’s annual reports does not allow the 
researcher to trace ultimate ownership through control enhancing mechanisms. Third, the 
corporate governance standards used are as stated by ISS which may be better suited for 
developed markets as emerging/ developing markets are still transitioning. Fourth, governance 
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rating methodologies that use a single metric for assessing investor protection worldwide are 
likely to give results that may be inaccurate leading to an unclear interpretation. 
Data limitation was another limitation in conducting this study. Despite having an 
electronic network, the markets studied do not provide easy and full access to high frequency 
data. Intraday transactional databases would enhance the quality of this thesis with the ability to 
identify buyer/ seller trades, given that the modelling of the impact of trades on prices is based 
on the trade initiator (O’Hara, 1995). Thin trading poses another limitation as there are many 
days of non-trading in the data which can potentially result in mismeasurement of the liquidity 
variables. 
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Appendices 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Appendix 1 
Draft- Corporate Governance Principles for Caribbean Countries 
The Core principles are aimed at improving the legal, institutional and regulatory framework for 
corporate governance in the Caribbean and facilitating the development of national and/or 
sector specific codes. The principles represent a common basis that countries in the Caribbean 
consider essential for the development of good governance practices.  
Corporate Governance Principles 
Principle I – Overall Objective  
The corporate governance framework within the Caribbean should encourage the development 
of transparent and efficient markets, have its basis in the rule of law and ethical business 
practices and foster the division of responsibilities among supervisory, regulatory, and 
enforcement bodies. 
Principle II – Shareholder Rights  
The Corporate Governance framework should protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholders 
rights. 
Principle III – Equal Treatment of Shareholders  
The corporate governance framework should ensure the equitable treatment of all shareholders, 
including minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders should have the opportunity to 
obtain effective redress for violation of their rights. 
Principle IV – Rights of other Stakeholders  
The corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of stakeholders established by 
law or through mutual agreements and encourage active co-operation between entities, including 
family owned businesses and state-owned/controlled enterprises, and stakeholders in creating 
wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises. 
Principle V – Disclosure and Transparency  
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The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made 
on all material matters relating to the entity, including its financial situation, performance, 
ownership, and governance. 
Principle VI – Board Responsibilities  
The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the entity, the 
effective monitoring of management by the Board, and the Board’s accountability to the entity 
and to stakeholders. 
A. Every company should be headed by an effective Board whose principal focus should be on 
optimising shareholder value. The Board should be the focal point of the corporate governance 
system and is ultimately accountable and responsible for the performance and affairs of the 
company;  
B. The Board of Directors of every entity should meet regularly;  
C. Board members should act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence and 
care, and in the best interest of the entity and the stakeholders. 
D. Where Board decisions may affect different shareholder groups differently, the Board should 
treat all shareholders fairly.  
E. The Board should seek to codify ethical conduct. At a minimum, the ethical code should seek 
to set clear limits on the pursuit of private interests, including dealings in the shares of the entity 
and define conflicts of interest and independence. An overall framework for ethical behaviour 
goes beyond compliance with the law, which should always be a fundamental requirement, and 
includes consideration of the interests of stakeholders.  
F. Board training and certification should be encouraged;  
G. The Board should fulfil certain key functions, including: 
1. Reviewing and guiding corporate strategy, major plans of action, risk policy, annual budgets 
and business plans; setting performance objectives; monitoring implementation and corporate 
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performance; developing management policies and overseeing major capital expenditures, 
acquisitions and divestitures;  
2. Monitoring the effectiveness of the company’s governance practices and making changes as 
needed;  
3. Selecting, developing, compensating, monitoring and, when necessary, replacing key 
executives and overseeing succession planning; 
4. Aligning key executive and Board remuneration with the longer-term interests of the company 
and its shareholders;  
5. Ensuring a formal and transparent Board nomination and election process; 
6. Monitoring and managing potential conflicts of interest of management, Board members and 
shareholders, including misuse of corporate assets and abuse in related party transactions;  
7. Ensuring the integrity of the company’s accounting and financial reporting systems, including 
the independent audit, and that appropriate systems of control are in place, in particular, systems 
for risk management, financial and operational control, and compliance with the law and relevant 
standards;  
8. Overseeing the process of disclosure and communications;  
H. The Board should be able to exercise objective independent judgment on corporate affairs. 
1. Boards should consider assigning a sufficient number of non-executive Board members 
capable of exercising independent judgment to tasks where there is a potential for conflict of 
interest. Examples of such key responsibilities are ensuring the integrity of financial and non-
financial reporting, the review of related party transactions, nomination of Board members and 
key executives, and Board remuneration;  
2. The establishment of Board committees should be encouraged; in particular, the use of audit 
committees should be mandated. The committees’ mandate, composition and working 
procedures should be well defined and disclosed by the Board; 
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3. Board members should be able to commit themselves effectively to their responsibilities by 
being familiar with the industry or industries in which the company operates.  
I. In order to fulfil their responsibilities, Board members should have access to accurate, relevant 
and timely information.  
J. The Board should institute mechanisms for direct interface with regulators on a regular basis.  
K. Board appointments should be made through a well-managed and efficient process that 
provides for a mix of proficient directors, each of whom is able to add value and to bring 
independent judgment to bear on the decision making process. 
L. Performance evaluation and peer reviews of Board members should be instituted.  
M. The Board should maintain a system of internal controls to safeguard shareholders’ 
investment and the corporation’s assets. The Board should also seek to publicly disclose 
assessments of the effectiveness of internal controls within the company.  
N. Members of the Board and key executives should be required to disclose to the Board 
whether they, directly, indirectly or on behalf of third parties, have a material interest in any 
transaction or matter directly affecting the company. 
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Appendix 2 
 World Governance Indicators Index 
The World Governance Indicators Index developed by Kaufman, Kray and Mastruzzi (2010) is 
based on the following criteria: 
i. voice and accountability – the extent to which citizens are able to participate in the selection 
of government;  
ii. political stability and absence of violence – the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means including terrorism or 
domestic violence; government effectiveness;  
iii. the quality of public services, the quality of and the degree of independence of the civil 
service from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and 
the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies;  
iv. regulatory quality – the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies 
and regulations that promote private sector development;  
v. rule of law – the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society 
and in particular the quality of the contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence; and  
vi. Control of corruption – the extent to which there are effective mechanisms to prevent public 
power being used for private gain. 
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Appendix 3 
Board related minimally acceptable corporate governance standards, based on ISS 
Corporate Governance Best Practices User Guide and Glossary, 2003 
Audit 
Audit committee consists solely of Independent outside directors. 
Board 
CEO serves on no more than two additional boards of other public companies. 
All directors attend at least 75% of board meetings or had valid excuses for non-     
attendance. 
Size of board of directors is at least 6 but not more than 15 members. 
No former CEO serves on board. 
CEO is not listed as having a 'related party transaction' in proxy statement. 
Board is controlled by more than 50% independent outside directors. 
Compensation Committee is comprised solely of independent outside directors. 
The CEO and Chairman duties are separated or a lead director is specified. 
Shareholders vote on directors selected to fill vacancies. 
Board members are elected annually. 
Nominating committee is comprised solely of independent outside directors. 
Governance committee meets at least once during the year. 
Shareholders have cumulative voting rights to elect directors. 
Board guidelines are disclosed publicly. 
Policy exists requiring outside directors to serve on no more than four additional boards. 
Director Education 
At least one member of board has participated in ISS-accredited director education. 
Executive  and director compensation 
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No interlocks exist among directors on the compensation committee. 
Directors receive all or a portion of their fees in stock. 
Ownership 
All directors with more than one year service own stock. 
Officers' and directors' stock ownership is at least 1% but not more than 30% of shares 
outstanding. 
Directors are subject to stock ownership guidelines.  
Progressive practices 
Mandatory retirement age for directors. 
Performance of board is reviewed regularly. 
A board-approved CEO succession plan is in place. 
Board has outside advisors. 
Outside directors meet without the CEO and disclose the number of times they met. 
Director term limit exist. 
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Appendix 4        
Table A1 
Panel regressions for liquidity using Govindex2 and Govindex3 
Fixed effects regression analysis of liquidity, ownership and corporate governance. Largest_Shareholding is the direct shareholding of the largest shareholder; Second _Shareholding is the 
direct shareholdings of the second largest shareholder and Blockholdings is the total shareholdings of 5% or more. The liquidity measures are: Zero Return is the number of trading 
days with zero returns/number of trading days for the year; Spread is[ ask-bid/(ask +bid)/2] *100; Turnover1 is volume/shares outstanding; Turnover2  is dollar volume/market 
capitalization; Amihud  is average over the year of the daily ratio of the stock’s absolute return to its dollar trading volume; Govindex1, Govindex2, and Govindex3 are  scores obtained 
using minimum standards provided by ISS Corporate Governance: Best Practices; Size is the closing share price times number of shares outstanding at year end; Volatility is the 
standard deviation of the stock daily return during the year; Board_Independence is the number of independent directors/total number of directors;  Size_(Assets) is the firm’s assets in 
U.S. dollars; Cross-Listing =1 if the company is cross-listed, otherwise 0; Average_Price is the average daily closing prices during the year for each year 2005-2011; DailyVolume is the 
total of daily  volume  traded during the year for each year 2005-2011; DollarVolume  is the total  daily dollar volume during the year for each year 2005-2011,where daily dollar 
volume = volume*closing price.  T-values reported in parentheses. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Largest_Shareholding -0.023** -0.023** -0.0168* -0.0168* -0.010* -0.010* 2.904 2.911
(-3.33) (-3.30) (-2.44) (-2.44) (-2.37) (-2.35) (1.95) (1.96)
Second_Shareholding -0.006 0.007 -0.006 0.007 -0.009 0.001 -0.008 0.001 -0.032 0.038 -0.035 0.035 5.931 3.838 5.955 3.817
(-0.54) (0.66) (-0.60) (0.62) (-0.88) (0.04) (-0.88) (0.06) (-0.39) (0.46) (-0.43) (0.43) (1.73) (1.01) (1.75) (1.01)
Blockholding -0.020* -0.020* -0.013 -0.013 -0.080 -0.080 2.723 2.762
(-2.21) (-2.21) (-1.43) (-1.43) (-1.71) (-1.69) (1.72) (1.75)
Govindex2 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.018 0.007 -2.817 -2.395
(0.01) (-0.11) (-0.27) (-0.37) (0.25) (0.09) (-1.44) (-1.23)
Govindex3 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 0.007 -0.002 -2.967 -2.582
(-0.20) (-0.27) (-0.27) (-0.34) (0.09) (-0.03) (-1.46) (-1.28)
Ln(Size) -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008** -0.008*** 0.012 0.009 0.012 0.010 -0.594* -0.575 -0.591* -0.573
(-4.86) (-4.92) (-4.88) (-4.93) (-7.97) (-8.24) (-7.97) (-8.24) (1.34) (1.12) (1.35) (1.14) (-2.04) (-1.92) (-2.03) (-1.92)
Average_Price 0.057 0.067 0.056 0.066 0.076* 0.081* 0.076* 0.081* -0.017 0.015 -0.020 0.012 0.00239 0.00150 0.00236 0.00143
(1.29) (1.50) (1.28) (1.49) (2.07) (2.13) (2.07) (2.13) (-0.09) (0.08) (-0.11) (0.07) (0.28) (0.17) (0.28) (0.16)
Ln(DollarVolume) 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.009 -0.449** -0.474** -0.452** -0.476**
(6.94) (6.99) (6.91) (6.98) (7.88) (7.96) (7.88) (7.96) (1.19) (1.62) (1.19) (1.62) (-2.65) (-2.73) (-2.66) (-2.75)
Volatility 0.066 0.039 0.066 0.038 0.08 0.070 0.008 0.007 0.017 0.019 0.018 0.020 -0.097 -0.079 -0.105 -0.085
(0.45) (0.25) (0.45) (0.25) (0.51) (0.44) (0.51) (0.43) (0.74) (0.79) (0.78) (0.82) (-0.33) (-0.26) (-0.35) (-0.29)
Cross_Listing -0.266 -0.671 -0.134 -0.577 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 1.141 1.097 1.127 1.094
(-0.07) (-0.19) (-0.04) (-0.16) (0.90) (0.93) (0.89) (0.91) (-0.11) (-0.22) (-0.11) (-0.22) (1.74) (1.74) (1.71) (1.73)
Intercept 0.024 0.029 0.024 0.029 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.060*** -0.080 -0.075 -0.082 -0.076 14.74* 14.55* 14.88* 14.67*
(1.24) (1.45) (1.25) (1.46) (3.70) (3.87) (3.68) (3.86) (-0.68) (-0.65) (-0.69) (-0.66) (2.57) (2.53) (2.61) (2.55)
Number of Observations 321 322 321 322 319 320 319 320 300 301 300 301 310 311 310 311
Adjusted R
2 0.516 0.505 0.516 0.505 0.546 0.539 0.546 0.539 0.333 0.320 0.332 0.320 0.614 0.610 0.614 0.611
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Exchange Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Turnover1 Turnover2 Zero Returns Spread
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Appendix A1 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Largest_Shareholding 1.038 1.034
(1.98) (1.97)
Second_Shareholding -0.425 0.537 -0.422 0.545
(-0.42) (0.51) (-0.42) (0.52)
Blockholding 1.502* 1.497*
(2.37) (2.36)
Govindex2 0.264 0.208
(0.45) (0.34)
Govindex3 0.293 0.277
(0.47) (0.43)
Ln(Size) -0.633*** -0.624*** -0.633*** -0.624***
(-6.73) (-6.73) (-6.73) (-6.73)
Average_Price -0.428 -0.330 -0.427 -0.328
(-1.42) (-1.16) (-1.41) (-1.15)
Ln(DailyVolume) -0.048 -0.050 -0.048 -0.050
(-0.94) (-0.97) (-0.94) (-0.98)
Volatility 0.619 0.515 0.618 0.513
(1.98) (1.81) (1.98) (1.81)
Cross_Listing -0.214 -0.209 -0.213 -0.209
(-1.24) (-1.20) (-1.23) (-1.20)
Intercept 16.99*** 17.23*** 16.98*** 17.23***
(9.55) (9.67) (9.49) (9.63)
Number of Observations 302 302 302 302
Adjusted R
2 0.538 0.534 0.538 0.534
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes
Industry Dummy yes yes yes yes
Exchange Dummy yes yes yes yes
Amihud
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Table A2 
Panel regressions for liquidity 
Herfindahl is the sum of squared top 5 direct shareholding of the largest shareholder; Second _Shareholding is the direct 
shareholdings of the second largest shareholder. The liquidity measures are: Zero Return is the number of trading 
days with zero returns/number of trading days for the year; Spread is[ ask-bid/(ask +bid)/2] *100; Turnover1 is 
volume/shares outstanding; Turnover2  is dollar volume/market capitalization; Size is the closing share price times 
number of shares outstanding at year end; Volatility is the standard deviation of the stock daily return during the 
year; Model includes 28 governance standards as outlined in appendix 3; Size_(Assets) is the firm’s assets in U.S. 
dollars; Cross-Listing =1 if the company is cross-listed, otherwise 0; Average_Price is the average daily closing prices 
during the year for each year 2005-2011; DailyVolume is the total of daily  volume  traded during the year for each 
year 2005-2011; DollarVolume  is the total  daily dollar volume during the year for each year 2005-2011,where daily 
dollar volume = volume*closing price.  T-values reported in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Turnover1 Turnover2 Spread Zero Returns Amihud
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Herfindahl -0.024** -0.019* 3.884 -0.101* 0.765
(-3.01) (-2.50) (1.95) (-2.20) (1.35)
Second_Shareholding -0.002 -0.002 0.985 -0.014 1.145
(-0.18) (-0.22) (0.28) (-0.15) (1.05)
Govindex1 0.157 0.526 -4.692 0.878 0.106
(0.11) (0.47) (-1.74) (0.10) (0.11)
Ln(Size) -0.688*** -0.830*** -0.605 0.012 -0.613***
(-5.66) (-8.06) (-1.92) (1.30) (-6.72)
Average_Price 0.074 0.0851* 0.924 -0.004 -3.210
(1.84) (2.28) (0.10) (-0.02) (-1.05)
Ln(DollarVolume) 0.823*** 0.787*** -0.499** 0.007
(7.33) (8.21) (-2.85) (1.18)
Ln(DailyVolume) -0.051
(-1.03)
Volatility 0.043 0.294 -0.123 -0.003 -0.210
(0.03) (0.18) (-0.41) (-0.28) (-1.18)
Cross_Listing 0.0834 0.298 1.056 0.0210 0.478
(0.24) (0.84) (1.46) (0.87) (1.69)
Intercept 0.029 0.061*** 17.490** -0.096 17.270***
(1.55) (3.82) (2.87) (-0.80) (9.65)
Number of Observations 310 308 299 294 296
Adjusted R
2 0.542 0.550 0.600 0.324 0.525
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Dummy yes yes yes yes yes
Exchange Dummy yes yes yes yes yes
144 
 
Table A3 
Linearity of ownership and liquidity 
Largest_Shareholding is the direct shareholding of the largest shareholder; Largest_Shareholding^2 is the squared value of 
Largest_Shareholding; Largest_Shareholding^3 is the cubed value of Largest_Shareholding; Blockholdings is the sum of all 
shareholding greater than 5%; Zero Return is the number of trading days with zero returns/number of trading days 
for the year; Spread is[ ask-bid/(ask +bid)/2] *100; Turnover1 is volume/shares outstanding; Turnover2  is dollar 
volume/market capitalization; Amihud  is average over the year of the daily ratio of the stock’s absolute return to its 
dollar trading volume; Govindex1, is scores obtained using minimum standards provided by ISS Corporate 
Governance: Best Practices; Size is the closing share price times number of shares outstanding at year end; Volatility 
is the standard deviation of the stock daily return during the year; Board_Independence is the number of independent 
directors/total number of directors;  Size_(Assets) is the firm’s assets in U.S. dollars; Cross-Listing =1 if the company 
is cross-listed, otherwise 0; Average_Price is the average daily closing prices during the year for each year, 2005-2011; 
DailyVolume is the total of daily  volume  traded during the year for each year, 2005-2011; DollarVolume  is the total  
daily dollar volume during the year for each year, 2005-2011,where daily dollar volume = volume*closing price. T-
values reported in parentheses. 
Panel A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Largest_Shareholding 0.861 -2.587 -2.787 -5.262 0.524 5.996** 5.979** 5.175**
(0.67) (-0.44) (-0.46) (-0.73) (0.90) (2.90) (2.87) (2.78)
Largest_Shareholding^2 3.700 3.735 7.100 -5.599* -5.586* -4.267*
(0.59) (0.59) (1.00) (-2.59) (-2.58) (-2.37)
Govindex1 -1.514 -1.449 0.112 -0.142
(-0.67) (-0.65) (0.11) (-0.13)
Ln(Board_Independence) 0.132 0.234
(0.23) (1.07)
Ln(Size) -0.639* -0.646* -0.641* -1.106** -0.560*** -0.558*** -0.571*** -0.490***
(-2.27) (-2.34) (-2.26) (-3.04) (-5.31) (-5.40) (-5.38) (-4.14)
Average_Price 3.35 2.940 3.360 18.700 -5.650 -5.070 -6.030 -9.880
(0.38) (0.41) (0.38) (0.69) (-1.41) (-1.57) (-1.55) (-1.53)
Ln(DollarVolume) -0.385* -0.373* -0.373* -0.489*
(-2.15) (-2.23) (-2.25) (-2.39)
Ln(DailyVolume) -0.020 -0.034 -0.034 -0.077
(-0.38) (-0.72) (-0.68) (-1.97)
Volatility -0.094 -0.0704 -0.0659 -0.474 -0.113 -0.145 -0.163 -0.175
(-0.33) (-0.24) (-0.23) (-1.17) (-0.53) (-0.70) (-0.79) (-1.03)
Cross_Listing 0.441 0.256 0.311 0.376 0.260 0.450 0.504 0.621*
(0.75) (0.39) (0.48) (0.42) (0.93) (1.63) (1.67) (2.15)
Intercept 16.650** 16.810** 17.130** 27.940*** 16.160*** 15.440*** 15.690*** 13.770***
(2.98) (2.95) (2.97) (4.23) (8.19) (8.15) (8.09) (6.17)
Number of Observations 346 352 346 247 348 359 348 268
Adjusted R
2 0.576 0.579 0.576 0.561 0.473 0.488 0.486 0.386
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Exchange Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Amihud
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Table A3 (continued) 
Panel B 
 
Turnover2 Zero Return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Largest_Shareholding -0.016* -0.046 -0.049 -0.056 -0.011 -0.048 -0.036 -0.047 -0.108** -0.068 -0.075 -0.099
(-2.25) (-1.83) (-1.56) (-1.80) (-1.61) (-1.76) (-1.49) (-1.55) (-3.12) (-0.49) (-0.54) (-0.57)
Largest_Shareholding^2 0.033 0.026 0.030 0.030 0.026 0.036 -0.051 -0.039 -0.036
(1.27) (1.07) (1.16) (1.40) (1.19) (1.33) (-0.39) (-0.27) (-0.23)
Govindex1 -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005 0.063 0.062
(-0.47) (-0.46) (-0.49) (-0.48) (0.89) (0.88)
Ln(Board_Independence) -0.004 -0.003 -0.011
(-1.49) (-0.96) (-0.81)
Ln(Size) -6.530*** -6.510*** -6.550*** -8.190*** -7.950*** -7.840*** -7.940*** -9.510*** 8.470 12.200 8.480 6.840
(-5.68) (-5.77) (-5.69) (-5.73) (-8.81) (-8.51) (-8.89) (-6.99) (1.16) (1.63) (1.16) (0.70)
Average_Price 0.059 0.058 0.060 0.039 0.076 0.0761* 0.074 0.100 0.0275 0.001 0.026 -0.386
(1.44) (1.40) (1.43) (0.39) (1.91) (2.11) (1.96) (0.97) (0.15) (0.00) (0.14) (-0.66)
Ln(DollarVolume) 8.250*** 8.290*** 8.340*** 9.950*** 7.960*** 7.960*** 8.020*** 9.560*** 8.180 6.450 8.200 12.500
(7.84) (7.72) (7.76) (7.34) (9.36) (9.18) (9.15) (8.32) (1.74) (1.33) (1.74) (1.97)
Volatility 0.016 0.567 0.405 0.207 0.459 0.848 0.701 0.466 0.165 3.910 1.360 4.090
(0.11) (0.39) (0.28) (0.11) (0.30) (0.54) (0.45) (0.23) (0.15) (0.35) (0.12) (0.40)
Cross_Listing 0.021 0.061 0.104 0.034 0.059 0.411 0.481 0.360 0.0159 1.410 1.730 2.540
(0.64) (0.17) (0.29) (0.09) (1.90) (1.21) (1.39) (0.89) (0.86) (0.72) (0.86) (1.07)
Intercept 2.67 2.920 3.030 5.820 0.056*** 5.630*** 5.710*** 8.170** -0.053 -9.820 -5.920 -2.280
(1.41) (1.61) (1.55) (1.92) (3.76) (3.82) (3.92) (3.12) (-0.51) (-0.95) (-0.55) (-0.15)
Number of Observations 364 372 364 262 361 369 361 258 338 350 338 256
Adjusted R
2 0.521 0.530 0.524 0.581 0.534 0.543 0.537 0.558 0.329 0.306 0.328 0.403
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Exchange Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Turnover1
